Probability.- It will not be difficult to put the case a stage
lower, and make it appear ridiculous. To begin at the very
beginning. What is more absurd than to say that lifeless bodies have
passions, fears, hatreds- that insensible bodies, lifeless and
incapable of life, have passions which presuppose at least a sensitive
soul to feel them, nay more, that the object of their dread is the
void? What is there in the void that could make them afraid? Nothing
is more shallow and ridiculous. This is not all; it is said that
they have in themselves a source of movement to shun the void. Have
they arms, legs, muscles, nerves?
* Treatise on the Vacuum.
76. To write against those who made too profound a study of
science: Descartes.
77. I cannot forgive Descartes. In all his philosophy he would
have been quite willing to dispense with God. But he had to make Him
give a fillip to set the world in motion; beyond this, he has no
further need of God.
78. Descartes useless and uncertain.
79. Descartes.- We must say summarily: "This is made by figure and
motion," for it is true. But to say what these are, and to compose the
machine, is ridiculous. For it is useless, uncertain, and painful. And
were it true, we do not think all Philosophy is worth one hour of
pain.
80. How comes it that a cripple does not offend us, but that a
fool does? Because a cripple recognises that we walk straight, whereas
a fool declares that it is we who are silly; if it were not so, we
should feel pity and not anger.
Epictetus asks still more strongly: "Why are we not angry if we
are told that we have a headache, and why are we angry if we are
told that we reason badly, or choose wrongly"? The reason is that we
are quite certain that we have not a headache, or are not lame, but we
are not so sure that we make a true choice. So, having assurance
only because we see with our whole sight, it puts us into suspense and
surprise when another with his whole sight sees the opposite, and
still more so when a thousand others deride our choice. For we must
prefer our own lights to those of so many others, and that is bold and
difficult. There is never this contradiction in the feelings towards a
cripple.
81. It is natural for the mind to believe and for the will to
love; so that, for want of true objects, they must attach themselves
to false.
82. Imagination.- It is that deceitful part in man, that
mistress of error and falsity, the more deceptive that she is not
always so; for she would be an infallible rule of truth, if she were
an infallible rule of falsehood. But being most generally false, she
gives no sign of her nature, impressing the same character on the true
and the false.
I do not speak of fools, I speak of the wisest men; and it is
among them that the imagination has the great gift of persuasion.
Reason protests in vain; it cannot set a true value on things.
This arrogant power, the enemy of reason, who likes to rule and
dominate it, has established in man a second nature to show how
all-powerful she is. She makes men happy and sad, healthy and sick,
rich and poor; she compels reason to believe, doubt, and deny; she
blunts the senses, or quickens them; she has her fools and sages;
and nothing vexes us more than to see that she fills her devotees with
a satisfaction far more full and entire than does reason. Those who
have a lively imagination are a great deal more pleased with
themselves than the wise can reasonably be. They look down upon men
with haughtiness; they argue with boldness and confidence, others with
fear and diffidence; and this gaiety of countenance often gives them
the advantage in the opinion of the hearers, such favour have the
imaginary wise in the eyes of judges of like nature. Imagination
cannot make fools wise; but she can make them happy, to the envy of
reason which can only make its friends miserable; the one covers
them with glory, the other with shame.
What but this faculty of imagination dispenses reputation,
awards respect and veneration to persons, works, laws, and the
great? How insufficient are all the riches of the earth without her
consent!
Would you not say that this magistrate, whose venerable age
commands the respect of a whole people, is governed by pure and
lofty reason, and that he judges causes according to their true nature
without considering those mere trifles which only affect the
imagination of the weak? See him go to sermon, full of devout zeal,
strengthening his reason with the ardour of his love. He is ready to
listen with exemplary respect. Let the preacher appear, and let nature
have given him a hoarse voice or a comical cast of countenance, or let
his barber have given him a bad shave, or let by chance his dress be
more dirtied than usual, then, however great the truths he
announces, I wager our senator loses his gravity.
If the greatest philosopher in the world find himself upon a plank
wider than actually necessary, but hanging over a precipice, his
imagination will prevail, though his reason convince him of his
safety. Many cannot bear the thought without a cold sweat. I will
not state all its effects.
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