Str. And, therefore, the arts which we have described, as they
have no authority over themselves or one another, but are each of them
concerned with some special action of their own, have, as they ought
to have, special names corresponding to their several actions.

  Y. Soc. I agree.

  Str. And the science which is over them all, and has charge of the
laws, and of all matters affecting the State, and truly weaves them
all into one, if we would describe under a name characteristic of
their common nature, most truly we may call politics.

  Y. Soc. Exactly so.

  Str. Then, now that we have discovered the various classes in a
State, shall I analyse politics after the pattern which weaving
supplied?

  Y. Soc. I greatly wish that you would.

  Str. Then I must describe the nature of the royal web, and show
how the various threads are woven into one piece.

  Y. Soc. Clearly.

  Str. A task has to be accomplished, which although difficult,
appears to be necessary.

  Y. Soc. Certainly the attempt must be made.

  Str. To assume that one part of virtue differs in kind from another,
is a position easily assailable by contentious disputants, who
appeal to popular opinion.

  Y. Soc. I do not understand.

  Str. Let me put the matter in another way: I suppose that you
would consider courage to be a part of virtue?

  Y. Soc. Certainly I should.

  Str. And you would think temperance to be different from courage;
and likewise to be a part of virtue?

  Y. Soc. True.

  Str. I shall venture to put forward a strange theory about them.

  Y. Soc. What is it?

  Str. That they are two principles which thoroughly hate one
another and are antagonistic throughout a great part of nature.

  Y. Soc. How singular!

  Str. Yes very-for all the parts of virtue are commonly said to be
friendly to one another.

  Y. Soc. Yes.

  Str. Then let us carefully investigate whether this is universally
true, or whether there are not parts of virtue which are at war with
their kindred in some respect.

  Y. Soc. Tell me how we shall consider that question.

  Str. We must extend our enquiry to all those things which we
consider beautiful and at the same time place in two opposite classes.

  Y. Soc. Explain; what are they?

  Str. Acuteness and quickness, whether in body or soul or in the
movement of sound, and the imitations of them which painting and music
supply, you must have praised yourself before now, or been present
when others praised them.

  Y. Soc. Certainly.

  Str. And do you remember the terms in which they are praised?

  Y. Soc. I do not.

  Str. I wonder whether I can explain to you in words the thought
which is passing in my mind.

  Y. Soc. Why not?

  Str. You fancy that this is all so easy: Well, let us consider these
notions with reference to the opposite classes of action under which
they fall. When we praise quickness and energy and acuteness,
whether of mind or body or sound, we express our praise of the quality
which we admire by one word, and that one word is manliness or
courage.

  Y. Soc. How?

  Str. We speak of an action as energetic and brave, quick and
manly, and vigorous too; and when we apply the name of which I speak
as the common attribute of all these natures, we certainly praise
them.