Soc. And if unlike, they are other?

  Theaet. Certainly.

  Soc. And would you not say the same of Socrates sleeping and waking,
or in any of the states which we were mentioning?

  Theaet. I should.

  Soc. All agents have a different patient in Socrates, accordingly as
he is well or ill.

  Theaet. Of course.

  Soc. And I who am the patient, and that which is the agent, will
produce something different in each of the two cases?

  Theaet. Certainly.

  Soc. The wine which I drink when I am in health, appears sweet and
pleasant to me?

  Theaet. True.

  Soc. For, as has been already acknowledged, the patient and agent
meet together and produce sweetness and a perception of sweetness,
which are in simultaneous motion, and the perception which comes
from the patient makes the tongue percipient, and the quality of
sweetness which arises out of and is moving about the wine, makes
the wine, both to be and to appear sweet to the healthy tongue.

  Theaet. Certainly; that has been already acknowledged.

  Soc. But when I am sick, the wine really acts upon another and a
different person?

  Theaet. Yes.

  Soc. The combination of the draught of wine, and the Socrates who is
sick, produces quite another result; which is the sensation of
bitterness in the tongue, and the, motion and creation of bitterness
in and about the wine, which becomes not bitterness but something
bitter; as I myself become not but percipient?

  Theaet. True.

  Soc. There is no, other object of which I shall ever have the same
perception, for another object would give another perception, and
would make the perception other and different; nor can that object