delicate occasion. It is curious to observe with what address this
temporary solution of continuity is kept from the eye, whilst all that
could be found in this act of necessity to countenance the idea of
an hereditary succession is brought forward, and fostered, and made
the most of, by this great man and by the legislature who followed
him. Quitting the dry, imperative style of an act of parliament, he
makes the Lords and Commons fall to a pious, legislative ejaculation
and declare that they consider it "as a marvellous providence and
merciful goodness of God to this nation to preserve their said
Majesties' royal persons most happily to reign over us on the throne
of their ancestors, for which, from the bottom of their hearts, they
return their humblest thanks and praises".- The legislature plainly
had in view the act of recognition of the first of Queen Elizabeth,
chap. 3rd, and of that of James the First, chap. 1st, both acts
strongly declaratory of the inheritable nature of the crown; and in
many parts they follow, with a nearly literal precision, the words and
even the form of thanksgiving which is found in these old
declaratory statutes.

    The two Houses, in the act of King William, did not thank God that
they had found a fair opportunity to assert a right to choose their
own governors, much less to make an election the only lawful title
to the crown. Their having been in a condition to avoid the very
appearance of it, as much as possible, was by them considered as a
providential escape. They threw a politic, well-wrought veil over
every circumstance tending to weaken the rights which in the
meliorated order of succession they meant to perpetuate, or which
might furnish a precedent for any future departure from what they
had then settled forever. Accordingly, that they might not relax the
nerves of their monarchy, and that they might preserve a close
conformity to the practice of their ancestors, as it appeared in the
declaratory statutes of Queen Mary* and Queen Elizabeth, in the next
clause they vest, by recognition, in their Majesties all the legal
prerogatives of the crown, declaring "that in them they are most
fully, rightfully, and entirely invested, incorporated, united, and
annexed". In the clause which follows, for preventing questions by
reason of any pretended titles to the crown, they declare (observing
also in this the traditionary language, along with the traditionary
policy of the nation, and repeating as from a rubric the language of
the preceding acts of Elizabeth and James,) that on the preserving
"a certainty in the SUCCESSION thereof, the unity, peace, and
tranquillity of this nation doth, under God, wholly depend".

    * 1st Mary, sess. 3, ch. 1.

    They knew that a doubtful title of succession would but too much
resemble an election, and that an election would be utterly
destructive of the "unity, peace, and tranquillity of this nation",
which they thought to be considerations of some moment. To provide for
these objects and, therefore, to exclude for ever the Old Jewry
doctrine of "a right to choose our own governors", they follow with
a clause containing a most solemn pledge, taken from the preceding act
of Queen Elizabeth, as solemn a pledge as ever was or can be given
in favor of an hereditary succession, and as solemn a renunciation
as could be made of the principles by this Society imputed to them:
The Lords spiritual and temporal, and Commons, do, in the name of
all the people aforesaid, most humbly and faithfully submit
themselves, their heirs and posterities for ever; and do faithfully
promise that they will stand to maintain, and defend their said
Majesties, and also the limitation of the crown, herein specified
and contained, to the utmost of their powers, etc. etc.

    So far is it from being true that we acquired a right by the
Revolution to elect our kings that, if we had possessed it before, the
English nation did at that time most solemnly renounce and abdicate
it, for themselves and for all their posterity forever. These
gentlemen may value themselves as much as they please on their whig
principles, but I never desire to be thought a better whig than Lord
Somers, or to understand the principles of the Revolution better
than those, by whom it was brought about, or to read in the
Declaration of Right any mysteries unknown to those whose
penetrating style has engraved in our ordinances, and in our hearts,
the words and spirit of that immortal law.

    It is true that, aided with the powers derived from force and
opportunity, the nation was at that time, in some sense, free to
take what course it pleased for filling the throne, but only free to
do so upon the same grounds on which they might have wholly
abolished their monarchy and every other part of their constitution.
However, they did not think such bold changes within their commission.
It is indeed difficult, perhaps impossible, to give limits to the mere
abstract competence of the supreme power, such as was exercised by
parliament at that time, but the limits of a moral competence
subjecting, even in powers more indisputably sovereign, occasional
will to permanent reason and to the steady maxims of faith, justice,
and fixed fundamental policy, are perfectly intelligible and perfectly
binding upon those who exercise any authority, under any name or under
any title, in the state. The House of Lords, for instance, is not
morally competent to dissolve the House of Commons, no, nor even to
dissolve itself, nor to abdicate, if it would, its portion in the
legislature of the kingdom. Though a king may abdicate for his own
person, he cannot abdicate for the monarchy. By as strong, or by a
stronger reason, the House of Commons cannot renounce its share of
authority. The engagement and pact of society, which generally goes by
the name of the constitution, forbids such invasion and such
surrender. The constituent parts of a state are obliged to hold
their public faith with each other and with all those who derive any
serious interest under their engagements, as much as the whole state
is bound to keep its faith with separate communities. Otherwise
competence and power would soon be confounded and no law be left but