101 AD

                                 THE DISCOURSES

                                  by Epictetus
DISCOURSES

                                    BOOK ONE

  CHAPTER 1

  Of the things which are in our Power, and not in our Power

  Of all the faculties, you will find not one which is capable of
contemplating itself; and, consequently, not capable either of
approving or disapproving. How far does the grammatic art possess
the contemplating power? As far as forming a judgement about what is
written and spoken. And how far music? As far as judging about melody.
Does either of them then contemplate itself? By no means. But when you
must write something to your friend, grammar will tell you what
words you must write; but whether you should write or not, grammar
will not tell you. And so it is with music as to musical sounds; but
whether you should sing at the present time and play on the lute, or
do neither, music will not tell you. What faculty then will tell
you? That which contemplates both itself and all other things. And
what is this faculty? The rational faculty; for this is the only
faculty that we have received which examines itself, what it is, and
what power it has, and what is the value of this gift, and examines
all other faculties: for what else is there which tells us that golden
things are beautiful, for they do not say so themselves? Evidently
it is the faculty which is capable of judging of appearances. What
else judges of music, grammar, and other faculties, proves their
uses and points out the occasions for using them? Nothing else.

  As then it was fit to be so, that which is best of all and supreme
over all is the only thing which the gods have placed in our power,
the right use of appearances; but all other things they have not
placed in our power. Was it because they did not choose? I indeed
think that, if they had been able, they would have put these other
things also in our power, but they certainly could not. For as we
exist on the earth, and are bound to such a body and to such
companions, how was it possible for us not to be hindered as to
these things by externals?

  But what says Zeus? "Epictetus, if it were possible, I would have
made both your little body and your little property free and not
exposed to hindrance. But now be not ignorant of this: this body is
not yours, but it is clay finely tempered. And since I was not able to
do for you what I have mentioned, I have given you a small portion
of us, this faculty of pursuing an object and avoiding it, and the
faculty of desire and aversion, and, in a word, the faculty of using
the appearances of things; and if you will take care of this faculty
and consider it your only possession, you will never be hindered,
never meet with impediments; you will not lament, you will not
blame, you will not flatter any person."

  "Well, do these seem to you small matters?" I hope not. "Be
content with them then and pray to the gods." But now when it is in
our power to look after one thing, and to attach ourselves to it, we
prefer to look after many things, and to be bound to many things, to
the body and to property, and to brother and to friend, and to child
and to slave. Since, then, we are bound to many things, we are
depressed by them and dragged down. For this reason, when the
weather is not fit for sailing, we sit down and torment ourselves, and
continually look out to see what wind is blowing. "It is north."
What is that to us? "When will the west wind blow?" When it shall
choose, my good man, or when it shall please AEolus; for God has not
made you the manager of the winds, but AEolus. What then? We must make
the best use that we can of the things which are in our power, and use
the rest according to their nature. What is their nature then? As
God may please.

  "Must I, then, alone have my head cut off?" What, would you have all
men lose their heads that you may be consoled? Will you not stretch
out your neck as Lateranus did at Rome when Nero ordered him to be
beheaded? For when he had stretched out his neck, and received a
feeble blow, which made him draw it in for a moment, he stretched it
out again. And a little before, when he was visited by Epaphroditus,
Nero's freedman, who asked him about the cause of offense which he had
given, he said, "If I choose to tell anything, I will tell your
master."

  What then should a man have in readiness in such circumstances? What
else than "What is mine, and what is not mine; and permitted to me,
and what is not permitted to me." I must die. Must I then die
lamenting? I must be put in chains. Must I then also lament? I must go
into exile. Does any man then hinder me from going with smiles and
cheerfulness and contentment? "Tell me the secret which you
possess." I will not, for this is in my power. "But I will put you
in chains." Man, what are you talking about? Me in chains? You may
fetter my leg, but my will not even Zeus himself can overpower. "I
will throw you into prison." My poor body, you mean. "I will cut
your head off." When, then, have I told you that my head alone
cannot be cut off? These are the things which philosophers should
meditate on, which they should write daily, in which they should
exercise themselves.

  Thrasea used to say, "I would rather be killed to-day than
banished to-morrow." What, then, did Rufus say to him? "If you
choose death as the heavier misfortune, how great is the folly of your