choice? But if, as the lighter, who has given you the choice? Will you
not study to be content with that which has been given to you?"

  What, then, did Agrippinus say? He said, "I am not a hindrance to
myself." When it was reported to him that his trial was going on in
the Senate, he said, "I hope it may turn out well; but it is the fifth
hour of the day"- this was the time when he was used to exercise
himself and then take the cold bath- "let us go and take our
exercise." After he had taken his exercise, one comes and tells him,
"You have been condemned." "To banishment," he replies, "or to death?"
"To banishment." "What about my property?" "It is not taken from you."
"Let us go to Aricia then," he said, "and dine."

  This it is to have studied what a man ought to study; to have made
desire, aversion, free from hindrance, and free from all that a man
would avoid. I must die. If now, I am ready to die. If, after a
short time, I now dine because it is the dinner-hour; after this I
will then die. How? Like a man who gives up what belongs to another.

  CHAPTER 2

  How a Man on every occasion can maintain his Proper Character

  To the rational animal only is the irrational intolerable; but
that which is rational is tolerable. Blows are not naturally
intolerable. "How is that?" See how the Lacedaemonians endure whipping
when they have learned that whipping is consistent with reason. "To
hang yourself is not intolerable." When, then, you have the opinion
that it is rational, you go and hang yourself. In short, if we
observe, we shall find that the animal man is pained by nothing so
much as by that which is irrational; and, on the contrary, attracted
to nothing so much as to that which is rational.

  But the rational and the irrational appear such in a different way
to different persons, just as the good and the bad, the profitable and
the unprofitable. For this reason, particularly, we need discipline,
in order to learn how to adapt the preconception of the rational and
the irrational to the several things conformably to nature. But in
order to determine the rational and the irrational, we use not only
the of external things, but we consider also what is appropriate to
each person. For to one man it is consistent with reason to hold a
chamber pot for another, and to look to this only, that if he does not
hold it, he will receive stripes, and he will not receive his food:
but if he shall hold the pot, he will not suffer anything hard or
disagreeable. But to another man not only does the holding of a
chamber pot appear intolerable for himself, but intolerable also for
him to allow another to do this office for him. If, then, you ask me
whether you should hold the chamber pot or not, I shall say to you
that the receiving of food is worth more than the not receiving of it,
and the being scourged is a greater indignity than not being scourged;
so that if you measure your interests by these things, go and hold the
chamber pot. "But this," you say, "would not be worthy of me." Well,
then, it is you who must introduce this consideration into the
inquiry, not I; for it is you who know yourself, how much you are
worth to yourself, and at what price you sell yourself; for men sell
themselves at various prices.

  For this reason, when Florus was deliberating whether he should go
down to Nero's spectacles and also perform in them himself, Agrippinus
said to him, "Go down": and when Florus asked Agrippinus, "Why do
not you go down?" Agrippinus replied, "Because I do not even
deliberate about the matter." For he who has once brought himself to
deliberate about such matters, and to calculate the value of
external things, comes very near to those who have forgotten their own
character. For why do you ask me the question, whether death is
preferable or life? I say "life." "Pain or pleasure?" I say
"pleasure." But if I do not take a part in the tragic acting, I
shall have my head struck off. Go then and take a part, but I will
not. "Why?" Because you consider yourself to be only one thread of
those which are in the tunic. Well then it was fitting for you to take
care how you should be like the rest of men, just as the thread has no
design to be anything superior to the other threads. But I wish to
be purple, that small part which is bright, and makes all the rest
appear graceful and beautiful. Why then do you tell me to make
myself like the many? and if I do, how shall I still be purple?

  Priscus Helvidius also saw this, and acted conformably. For when
Vespasian sent and commanded him not to go into the senate, he
replied, "It is in your power not to allow me to be a member of the
senate, but so long as I am, I must go in." "Well, go in then," says
the emperor, "but say nothing." "Do not ask my opinion, and I will
be silent." "But I must ask your opinion." "And I must say what I
think right." "But if you do, I shall put you to death." "When then
did I tell you that I am immortal? You will do your part, and I will
do mine: it is your part to kill; it is mine to die, but not in
fear: yours to banish me; mine to depart without sorrow."

  What good then did Priscus do, who was only a single person? And
what good does the purple do for the toga? Why, what else than this,
that it is conspicuous in the toga as purple, and is displayed also as
a fine example to all other things? But in such circumstances
another would have replied to Caesar who forbade him to enter the
senate, "I thank you for sparing me." But such a man Vespasian would
not even have forbidden to enter the senate, for he knew that he would
either sit there like an earthen vessel, or, if he spoke, he would say
what Caesar wished, and add even more.

  In this way an athlete also acted who was in danger of dying
unless his private parts were amputated. His brother came to the
athlete, who was a philosopher, and said, "Come, brother, what are you