"for I do not even comprehend when in my sleep I imagine that I am
awake." Does this appearance then not differ from the other? "Not at
all," he replies. Shall I still argue with this man? And what fire
or what iron shall I apply to him to make him feel that he is
deadened? He does perceive, but he pretends that he does not. He's
even worse than a dead man. He does not see the contradiction: he is
in a bad condition. Another does see it, but he is not moved, and
makes no improvement: he is even in a worse condition. His modesty
is extirpated, and his sense of shame; and the rational faculty has
not been cut off from him, but it is brutalized. Shall I name this
strength of mind? Certainly not, unless we also name it such in
catamites, through which they do and say in public whatever comes into
their head.

  CHAPTER 6

  Of providence

  From everything which is or happens in the world, it is easy to
praise Providence, if a man possesses these two qualities, the faculty
of seeing what belongs and happens to all persons and things, and a
grateful disposition. If he does not possess these two qualities,
one man will not see the use of things which are and which happen;
another will not be thankful for them, even if he does know them. If
God had made colours, but had not made the faculty of seeing them,
what would have been their use? None at all. On the other hand, if
He had made the faculty of vision, but had not made objects such as to
fall under the faculty, what in that case also would have been the use
of it? None at all. Well, suppose that He had made both, but had not
made light? In that case, also, they would have been of no use. Who is
it, then, who has fitted this to that and that to this? And who is
it that has fitted the knife to the case and the case to the knife? Is
it no one? And, indeed, from the very structure of things which have
attained their completion, we are accustomed to show that the work
is certainly the act of some artificer, and that it has not been
constructed without a purpose. Does then each of these things
demonstrate the workman, and do not visible things and the faculty
of seeing and light demonstrate Him? And the existence of male and
female, and the desire of each for conjunction, and the power of using
the parts which are constructed, do not even these declare the
workman? If they do not, let us consider the constitution of our
understanding according to which, when we meet with sensible
objects, we simply receive impressions from them, but we also select
something from them, and subtract something, and add, and compound
by means of them these things or those, and, in fact, pass from some
to other things which, in a manner, resemble them: is not even this
sufficient to move some men, and to induce them not to forget the
workman? If not so, let them explain to us what it is that makes
each several thing, or how it is possible that things so wonderful and
like the contrivances of art should exist by chance and from their own
proper motion?

  What, then, are these things done in us only. Many, indeed, in us
only, of which the rational animal had peculiar need; but you will
find many common to us with irrational animals. Do they them
understand what is done? By no means. For use is one thing, and
understanding is another: God had need of irrational animals to make
use of appearances, but of us to understand the use of appearances. It
is therefore enough for them to eat and to drink, and to sleep and
to copulate, and to do all the other things which they severally do.
But for us, to whom He has given also the faculty, these things are
not sufficient; for unless we act in a proper and orderly manner,
and conformably to the nature and constitution of each thing, we shall
never attain our true end. For where the constitutions of living
beings are different, there also the acts and the ends are
different. In those animals, then, whose constitution is adapted
only to use, use alone is enough: but in an animal which has also
the power of understanding the use, unless there be the due exercise
of the understanding, he will never attain his proper end. Well then
God constitutes every animal, one to be eaten, another to serve for
agriculture, another to supply cheese, and another for some like
use; for which purposes what need is there to understand appearances
and to be able to distinguish them? But God has introduced man to be a
spectator of God and of His works; and not only a spectator of them,
but an interpreter. For this reason it is shameful for man to begin
and to end where irrational animals do, but rather he ought to begin
where they begin, and to end where nature ends in us; and nature
ends in contemplation and understanding, in a way of life
conformable to nature. Take care then not to die without having been
spectators of these things.

  But you take a journey to Olympia to see the work of Phidias, and
all of you think it a misfortune to die without having seen such
things. But when there is no need to take a journey, and where a man
is, there he has the works (of God) before him, will you not desire to
see and understand them? Will you not perceive either what you are, or
what you were born for, or what this is for which you have received
the faculty of sight? But you may say, "There are some things
disagreeable and troublesome in life." And are there none in
Olympia? Are you not scorched? Are you not pressed by a crowd? Are you
not without comfortable means of bathing? Are you not wet when it
rains? Have you not abundance of noise, clamour, and other
disagreeable things? But I suppose that setting all these things off
against the magnificence of the spectacle, you bear and endure.
Well, then, and have you not received faculties by which you will be
able to bear all that happens? Have you not received greatness of
soul? Have you not received manliness? Have you not received
endurance? And why do I trouble myself about anything that can
happen if I possess greatness of soul? What shall distract my mind
or disturb me, or appear painful? Shall I not use the power for the