granted the premisses, but you must abide by what you have granted.
Indeed, if the premisses continue to the end such as they were when
they were granted, it is absolutely necessary for us to abide by
what we have granted, and we must accept their consequences: but if
the premisses do not remain such as they were when they were
granted, it is absolutely necessary for us also to withdraw from
what we granted, and from accepting what does not follow from the
words in which our concessions were made. For the inference is now not
our inference, nor does it result with our assent, since we have
withdrawn from the premisses which we granted. We ought then both to
examine such kind of premisses, and such change and variation of them,
by which in the course of questioning or answering, or in making the
syllogistic conclusion, or in any other such way, the premisses
undergo variations, and give occasion to the foolish to be confounded,
if they do not see what conclusions are. For what reason ought we to
examine? In order that we may not in this matter be employed in an
improper manner nor in a confused way.

  And the same in hypotheses and hypothetical arguments; for it is
necessary sometimes to demand the granting of some hypothesis as a
kind of passage to the argument which follows. Must we then allow
every hypothesis that is proposed, or not allow every one? And if
not every one, which should we allow? And if a man has allowed an
hypothesis, must he in every case abide by allowing it? or must he
sometimes withdraw from it, but admit the consequences and not admit
contradictions? Yes; but suppose that a man says, "If you admit the
hypothesis of a possibility, I will draw you to an impossibility."
With such a person shall a man of sense refuse to enter into a
contest, and avoid discussion and conversation with him? But what
other man than the man of sense can use argumentation and is
skillful in questioning and answering, and incapable of being
cheated and deceived by false reasoning? And shall he enter into the
contest, and yet not take care whether he shall engage in argument not
rashly and not carelessly? And if he does not take care, how can he be
such a man as we conceive him to be? But without some such exercise
and preparation, can he maintain a continuous and consistent argument?
Let them show this; and all these speculations become superfluous, and
are absurd and inconsistent with our notion of a good and serious man.

  Why are we still indolent and negligent and sluggish, and why do
we seek pretences for not labouring and not being watchful in
cultivating our reason? "If then I shall make a mistake in these
matters may I not have killed my father?" Slave, where was there a
father in this matter that you could kill him? What, then, have you
done? The only fault that was possible here is the fault which you
have committed. This is the very remark which I made to Rufus when
he blamed me for not having discovered the one thing omitted in a
certain syllogism: "I suppose," I said, "that I have burnt the
Capitol." "Slave," he replied, "was the thing omitted here the
Capitol?" Or are these the only crimes, to burn the Capitol and to
kill your father? But for a man to use the appearances resented to him
rashly and foolishly and carelessly, not to understand argument, nor
demonstration, nor sophism, nor, in a word, to see in questioning
and answering what is consistent with that which we have granted or is
not consistent; is there no error in this?

  CHAPTER 8

  That the faculties are not safe to the uninstructed

  In as many ways as we can change things which are equivalent to
one another, in just so many ways we can change the forms of arguments
and enthymemes in argumentation. This is an instance: "If you have
borrowed and not repaid, you owe me the money: you have not borrowed
and you have not repaid; then you do not owe me the money." To do this
skillfully is suitable to no man more than to the philosopher; for
if the enthymeme is all imperfect syllogism. it is plain that he who
has been exercised in the perfect syllogism must be equally expert
in the imperfect also.

  "Why then do we not exercise ourselves and one another in this
manner?" Because, I reply, at present, though we are not exercised
in these things and not distracted from the study of morality, by me
at least, still we make no progress in virtue. What then must we
expect if we should add this occupation? and particularly as this
would not only be an occupation which would withdraw us from more
necessary things, but would also be a cause of self conceit and
arrogance, and no small cause. For great is the power of arguing and
the faculty of persuasion, and particularly if it should be much
exercised, and also receive additional ornament from language: and
so universally, every faculty acquired by the uninstructed and weak
brings with it the danger of these persons being elated and inflated
by it. For by what means could one persuade a young man who excels
in these matters that he ought not to become an appendage to them, but
to make them an appendage to himself? Does he not trample on all
such reasons, and strut before us elated and inflated, not enduring
that any man should reprove him and remind him of what he has
neglected and to what he has turned aside?

  "What, then, was not Plato a philosopher?" I reply, "And was not
Hippocrates a physician? but you see how Hippocrates speaks." Does
Hippocrates, then, speak thus in respect of being a physician? Why
do you mingle things which have been accidentally united in the same
men? And if Plato was handsome and strong, ought I also to set to work
and endeavor to become handsome or strong, as if this was necessary
for philosophy, because a certain philosopher was at the same time
handsome and a philosopher? Will you not choose to see and to
distinguish in respect to what men become philosophers, and what
things belong to belong to them in other respects? And if I were a
philosopher, ought you also to be made lame? What then? Do I take away