48. The condition and characteristic of a vulgar person, is,
           that he never expects either benefit or hurt from himself, but
           from externals. The condition and characteristic of a
           philosopher is, that he expects all hurt and benefit from
           himself. The marks of a proficient are, that he censures no
           one, praises no one, blames no one, accuses no one, says
           nothing concerning himself as being anybody, or knowing
           anything: when he is, in any instance, hindered or restrained,
           he accuses himself; and, if he is praised, he secretly laughs
           at the person who praises him; and, if he is censured, he
           makes no defense. But he goes about with the caution of sick
           or injured people, dreading to move anything that is set
           right, before it is perfectly fixed. He suppresses all desire
           in himself; he transfers his aversion to those things only
           which thwart the proper use of our own faculty of choice; the
           exertion of his active powers towards anything is very gentle;
           if he appears stupid or ignorant, he does not care, and, in a
           word, he watches himself as an enemy, and one in ambush.

           49. When anyone shows himself overly confident in ability to
           understand and interpret the works of Chrysippus, say to
           yourself, " Unless Chrysippus had written obscurely, this
           person would have had no subject for his vanity. But what do I
           desire? To understand nature and follow her. I ask, then, who
           interprets her, and, finding Chrysippus does, I have recourse
           to him. I don't understand his writings. I seek, therefore,
           one to interpret them." So far there is nothing to value
           myself upon. And when I find an interpreter, what remains is
           to make use of his instructions. This alone is the valuable
           thing. But, if I admire nothing but merely the interpretation,
           what do I become more than a grammarian instead of a
           philosopher? Except, indeed, that instead of Homer I interpret
           Chrysippus. When anyone, therefore, desires me to read
           Chrysippus to him, I rather blush when I cannot show my
           actions agreeable and consonant to his discourse.

           50. Whatever moral rules you have deliberately proposed to
           yourself. abide by them as they were laws, and as if you would
           be guilty of impiety by violating any of them. Don't regard
           what anyone says of you, for this, after all, is no concern of
           yours. How long, then, will you put off thinking yourself
           worthy of the highest improvements and follow the distinctions
           of reason? You have received the philosophical theorems, with
           which you ought to be familiar, and you have been familiar
           with them. What other master, then, do you wait for, to throw
           upon that the delay of reforming yourself? You are no longer a
           boy, but a grown man. If, therefore, you will be negligent and
           slothful, and always add procrastination to procrastination,
           purpose to purpose, and fix day after day in which you will
           attend to yourself, you will insensibly continue without
           proficiency, and, living and dying, persevere in being one of
           the vulgar. This instant, then, think yourself worthy of
           living as a man grown up, and a proficient. Let whatever
           appears to be the best be to you an inviolable law. And if any
           instance of pain or pleasure, or glory or disgrace, is set
           before you, remember that now is the combat, now the Olympiad
           comes on, nor can it be put off. By once being defeated and
           giving way, proficiency is lost, or by the contrary preserved.
           Thus Socrates became perfect, improving himself by everything.
           attending to nothing but reason. And though you are not yet a
           Socrates, you ought, however, to live as one desirous of
           becoming a Socrates.

           51. The first and most necessary topic in philosophy is that
           of the use of moral theorems, such as, "We ought not to lie;"
           the second is that of demonstrations, such as, "What is the
           origin of our obligation not to lie;" the third gives strength
           and articulation to the other two, such as, "What is the
           origin of this is a demonstration." For what is demonstration?
           What is consequence? What contradiction? What truth? What
           falsehood? The third topic, then, is necessary on the account
           of the second, and the second on the account of the first. But
           the most necessary, and that whereon we ought to rest, is the
           first. But we act just on the contrary. For we spend all our
           time on the third topic, and employ all our diligence about
           that, and entirely neglect the first. Therefore, at the same
           time that we lie, we are immediately prepared to show how it
           is demonstrated that lying is not right.

           52. Upon all occasions we ought to have these maxims ready at
           hand:

             "Conduct me, Jove, and you, 0 Destiny,
             Wherever your decrees have fixed my station." [Cleanthes]
             "I follow cheerfully; and, did I not,
             Wicked and wretched, I must follow still

   Whoever yields properly to Fate, is deemed
   Wise among men, and knows the laws of heaven." [Euripides, Frag. 965]
   And this third:

     "0 Crito, if it thus pleases the gods, thus let it be. Anytus and
     Melitus may kill me indeed, but hurt me they cannot." [Plato's
     Crito and Apology]

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