make it pass for his own, is first injustice and meanness of spirit in
those who do it, who having nothing in them of their own fit to
procure them a reputation, endeavor to do it by attempting to impose
things upon the world in their own name, which they have no manner
of title to; and, next, a ridiculous folly to content themselves
with acquiring the ignorant approbation of the vulgar by such a
pitiful cheat, at the price at the same time of degrading themselves
in the eyes of men of understanding, who turn up their noses at all
this borrowed incrustation, yet whose praise alone is worth the
having. For my own part, there is nothing I would not sooner do than
that, neither have I said so much of others, but to get a better
opportunity to explain myself. Nor in this do I glance at the
composers of centos, who declare themselves such; of which sort of
writers I have in my time known many very ingenious, and
particularly one under the name of Capilupus, besides the ancients.
These are really men of wit, and that make it appear they are so, both
by that and other ways of writing; as for example, Lipsius, in that
learned and laborious contexture of his politics.

    But, be it how it will, and how inconsiderable soever these essays
of mine may be, I will say I never intended to conceal them, no more
than my old bald grizzled pate before them, where the painter has
presented you not with a perfect face, but with mine. For these are my
own particular opinions and fancies, and I deliver them as only what I
myself believe, and not for what is to be believed by others. I have
no other end in this writing, but only to discover myself, who,
also, shall, peradventure, be another thing tomorrow, if I chance to
meet any new instruction to change me. I have no authority to be
believed, neither do I desire it, being too conscious of my own
inerudition to be able to instruct others.

    A friend of mine, then, having read the preceding chapter, the
other day told me, that I should a little farther have extended my
discourse on the education of children. Now, madame, if I had any
sufficiency in this subject, I could not possibly better employ it,
than to present my best instructions to the little gentleman that
threatens you shortly with a happy birth (for you are too generous
to begin otherwise than with a male); for having had so great a hand
in the treaty of your marriage, I have a certain particular right
and interest in the greatness and prosperity of the issue that shall
spring from it; besides that, your having had the best of my
services so long in possession, sufficiently obliges me to desire
the honor and advantage of all wherein you shall be concerned. But, in
truth, all I understand as to that particular is only this, that the
greatest and most important difficulty of human science is the
education of children. For as in agriculture, the husbandry that is to
precede planting, as also planting itself, is certain, plain, and well
known; but after that which is planted comes to life, there is a great
deal more to be done, more art to be used, more care to be taken,
and much more difficulty to cultivate and bring it to perfection; so
it is with men; it is no hard matter to get children; but after they
are born, then begins the trouble, solicitude, and care rightly to
train, principle, and bring them up. The symptoms of their
inclinations in that tender age are so obscure, and the promises so
uncertain and fallacious, that it is very hard to establish any
solid judgment or conjecture upon them. Look at Cimon, for example,
and Themistocles, and a thousand others, who very much deceived the
expectation men had of them. Cubs of bears and puppies readily
discover their natural inclination; but men, so soon as ever they
are grown up, applying themselves to certain habits, engaging
themselves in certain opinions, and conforming themselves to
particular laws and customs, easily alter, or at least disguise, their
true and real disposition; and yet it is hard to force the
propension of nature. Whence it comes to pass, that for not having
chosen the right course, we often take very great pains, and consume a
good part of our time in training up children to things, for which, by
their natural constitution, they are totally unfit. In this
difficulty, nevertheless, I am clearly of opinion, that they ought
to be elemented in the best and most advantageous studies, without
taking too much notice of, or being too superstitious in those light
prognostics they give of themselves in their tender years, and to
which Plato, in his Republic, gives, methinks, too much authority.

    Madame, science, is a very great ornament, and a thing of
marvelous use, especially in persons raised to that degree of
fortune in which you are. And, in truth, in persons of mean and low
condition, it cannot perform its true and genuine office, being
naturally more prompt to assist in the conduct of war, in the
government of peoples, in negotiating the leagues and friendships of
princes and foreign nations, than in forming a syllogism in logic,
in pleading a process in law, or in prescribing a dose of pills in
physic. Wherefore, madame, believing you will not omit this so
necessary feature in the education of your children, who yourself have
tasted its sweetness, and are of a learned extraction (for we yet have
the writings of the ancient Counts of Foix, from whom my lord, your
husband, and yourself, are both of you descended, and Monsieur de
Candale, your uncle, every day obliges the world with others, which
will extend the knowledge of this quality in your family for so many
succeeding ages), I will, upon this occasion, presume to acquaint your
ladyship, with one particular fancy of my own, contrary to the
common method, which is all I am able to contribute to your service in
this affair.

    The charge of the tutor you shall provide for your son, upon the
choice of whom depends the whole success of his education, has several
other great and considerable parts and duties required in so important
a trust, besides that of which I am about to speak: these, however,
I shall not mention, as being unable to add anything of moment to
the common rules: and in this, wherein I take upon me to advise, he
may follow it so far only as it shall appear advisable.