when perhaps it had ceased to be so, or I had ceased to esteem it such.

My second maxim was to be as firm and resolute in my actions as I was
able, and not to adhere less steadfastly to the most doubtful opinions,
when once adopted, than if they had been highly certain; imitating in this
the example of travelers who, when they have lost their way in a forest,
ought not to wander from side to side, far less remain in one place, but
proceed constantly towards the same side in as straight a line as
possible, without changing their direction for slight reasons, although
perhaps it might be chance alone which at first determined the selection;
for in this way, if they do not exactly reach the point they desire, they
will come at least in the end to some place that will probably be
preferable to the middle of a forest.  In the same way, since in action it
frequently happens that no delay is permissible, it is very certain that,
when it is not in our power to determine what is true, we ought to act
according to what is most probable; and even although we should not remark
a greater probability in one opinion than in another, we ought
notwithstanding to choose one or the other, and afterwards consider it, in
so far as it relates to practice, as no longer dubious, but manifestly
true and certain,  since the reason by which our choice has been
determined  is itself possessed of these qualities.  This principle was
sufficient thenceforward to rid me of all those repentings and pangs of
remorse that usually disturb the consciences of such feeble and uncertain
minds as, destitute of any clear and determinate principle of choice,
allow themselves one day to adopt a course of action as the best, which
they abandon the next, as the opposite.

My third maxim was to endeavor always to conquer myself rather than
fortune, and change my desires rather than the order of the world, and in
general, accustom  myself to the persuasion that, except our own thoughts,
there is nothing absolutely in our power; so that when we have done our
best in things external to us, all wherein we fail of success is to be
held, as regards us, absolutely impossible:  and this single principle
seemed to me sufficient to prevent me from desiring for the future
anything which I could not obtain, and thus render me contented; for since
our will naturally seeks those objects alone which the understanding
represents as in some way possible of attainment, it is plain, that if we
consider all external goods as equally beyond our power, we shall no more
regret the absence of such goods as seem due to our birth, when deprived
of them without any fault of ours,  than our not possessing the kingdoms
of China or Mexico, and thus making, so to speak, a virtue of necessity,
we shall no more desire health in disease, or freedom in imprisonment,
than we now do bodies incorruptible as diamonds, or the wings of birds to
fly with.  But I confess there is need of prolonged discipline and
frequently repeated meditation to accustom the mind to view all objects in
this light; and I believe that in this chiefly consisted the secret of the
power of such philosophers as in former times were enabled to rise
superior to the influence of fortune, and, amid suffering and poverty,
enjoy a happiness which their gods might have envied.  For, occupied
incessantly with the consideration of the limits prescribed to their power
by nature, they became so entirely convinced that nothing was at their
disposal except their own thoughts, that this conviction was of itself
sufficient to prevent their entertaining any desire of other objects; and
over their thoughts they acquired a sway so absolute, that they had some
ground on this account for esteeming themselves more rich and more
powerful, more free and more happy, than other men who, whatever be the
favors heaped on them by nature and fortune, if destitute of this
philosophy, can never command the realization of all their desires.

In fine, to conclude this code of morals, I thought of reviewing the
different occupations of men in this life, with the view of making choice
of the best.  And, without wishing to offer any remarks on the employments
of others, I may state that it was my conviction that I could not do
better than continue in that in which I was engaged, viz., in devoting my
whole life to the culture of my reason, and in making the greatest
progress I was able in the knowledge of truth, on the principles of the
method which I had prescribed to myself.  This method, from the time I had
begun to apply it, had been to me the source of satisfaction so intense as
to lead me to, believe that more perfect or more innocent could not be
enjoyed in this life; and as by its means I daily discovered truths that
appeared to me of some importance, and of which other men were generally
ignorant, the gratification thence arising so occupied my mind that I was
wholly indifferent to every other object.  Besides, the three preceding
maxims were founded singly on the design of continuing the work of self-
instruction.  For since God has endowed each of us with some light of
reason by which to distinguish truth from error, I could not have believed
that I ought for a single moment to rest satisfied with the opinions of
another, unless I had resolved to exercise my own judgment in examining
these whenever I should be duly qualified for the task.  Nor could I have
proceeded on such opinions without scruple, had I supposed that I should
thereby forfeit any advantage for attaining still more accurate, should
such exist.  And, in fine, I could not have restrained my desires, nor
remained satisfied had I not followed a path in which I thought myself
certain of attaining all the knowledge to the acquisition of which I was
competent, as well as the largest amount of what is truly good which I
could ever hope to secure Inasmuch as we neither seek nor shun any object
except in so far as our understanding represents it as good or bad, all
that is necessary to right action is right judgment, and to the best
action the most correct judgment, that is, to the acquisition of all the
virtues with all else that is truly valuable and within our reach; and the
assurance of such an acquisition cannot fail to render us contented.

Having thus provided myself with these maxims, and having placed them in
reserve along with the truths of  faith, which have ever occupied the
first place in my  belief, I came to the conclusion that I might with
freedom set about ridding myself of what remained of my opinions.  And,
inasmuch as I hoped to be better able successfully to accomplish this work
by holding intercourse with mankind, than by remaining longer shut up in
the retirement where these thoughts had occurred to me, I betook me again
to traveling before the winter was well ended.  And, during the nine