any place in which I might be; but that I could not therefore suppose that
I was not; and that, on the contrary, from the very circumstance that I
thought to doubt of the truth of other things, it most clearly and
certainly followed that I was; while, on the other hand, if I had only
ceased to think, although all the other objects which I had ever imagined
had been in reality existent, I would have had no reason to believe that I
existed; I thence concluded that I was a substance whose whole essence or
nature consists only in thinking, and which, that it may exist, has need
of no place, nor is dependent on any material thing; so that " I," that is
to say, the mind by which I am what I am, is wholly distinct from the
body, and is  even more easily known than the latter, and is such, that
although the latter were not, it would still continue to be all that it is.

After this I inquired in general into what is essential I to the truth and
certainty of a proposition; for since I had discovered one which I knew to
be true, I thought that I must likewise be able to discover the ground of
this certitude.  And as I observed that in the words I think, therefore I
am, there is nothing at all which gives me assurance of their truth beyond
this, that I see very clearly that in order to think it is necessary to
exist, I concluded that I might take, as a general rule, the principle,
that all the things which we very clearly and distinctly conceive are
true, only observing, however, that there is some difficulty in rightly
determining the objects which we distinctly conceive.

In the next place, from reflecting on the circumstance that I doubted, and
that consequently my being was not wholly perfect (for I clearly saw that
it was a greater perfection to know than to doubt), I was led to inquire
whence I had learned to think of something more perfect than myself; and I
clearly recognized that I must hold this notion from some nature which in
reality was more perfect.  As for the thoughts of many other objects
external to me, as of the sky, the earth, light, heat, and a thousand
more, I was less at a loss to know whence these came; for since I remarked
in them nothing which seemed to render them superior to myself, I could
believe that, if these were true, they were dependencies on my own nature,
in so far as it possessed a certain perfection, and, if they were false,
that I held them from nothing, that is to say, that they were in me
because of a certain imperfection of my nature.  But this could not be the
case with-the idea of a nature more perfect than myself; for to receive it
from nothing was a thing manifestly impossible; and, because it is not
less repugnant that the more perfect should be an effect of, and
dependence on the less perfect, than that something should proceed from
nothing, it was equally impossible that I could hold it from myself:
accordingly, it but remained that it had been placed in me by a nature
which was in reality more perfect than mine, and which even possessed
within itself all the perfections of which I could form any idea; that is
to say, in a single word, which was God.  And to this I added that, since I
knew some perfections which I did not possess, I was not the only being in
existence (I will here, with your permission, freely use the terms of the
schools); but, on the contrary, that there was of necessity some other
more perfect Being upon whom I was dependent, and from whom I had received
all that I possessed; for if I had existed alone, and independently of
every other being, so as to have had from myself all the perfection,
however little, which I actually possessed, I should have been able, for
the same reason, to have had from myself the whole remainder of
perfection, of the want of which I was conscious, and thus could of myself
have become infinite, eternal, immutable, omniscient, all-powerful, and,
in fine, have possessed all the perfections which I could recognize in
God.  For in order to know the nature of God (whose existence has been
established by the preceding reasonings), as far as my own nature
permitted, I had only to consider in reference to all the properties of
which I found in my  mind some idea, whether their possession was a mark
of perfection; and I was assured that no one which indicated any
imperfection was in him, and that none of the rest was awanting.  Thus I
perceived that doubt, inconstancy,  sadness, and such like, could not be
found in God, since I myself would have been happy to be free from them.
Besides, I had ideas of many sensible and corporeal things; for although I
might suppose that I was dreaming, and that all which I saw or imagined
was false, I could not, nevertheless, deny that the ideas were in reality
in my thoughts.  But, because I had already very clearly recognized in
myself that the intelligent nature is distinct from the corporeal, and as
I observed that all composition is an evidence of dependency, and that a
state of dependency is manifestly a state of imperfection, I therefore
determined that it could not be a perfection in God to be compounded of
these two natures and that consequently he was not so compounded; but that
if there were any bodies in the world, or even any intelligences, or other
natures that were not wholly perfect, their existence depended on his power
in such a way that they could not subsist without him for a single moment.

I was disposed straightway to search for other truths and when I had
represented to myself the object of the geometers, which I conceived to be
a continuous body or a space indefinitely extended in length, breadth, and
height or depth, divisible into divers parts which admit of different
figures and sizes, and of being moved or transposed in all manner of ways
(for all this the geometers suppose to be in the object they contemplate),
I went over some of their simplest demonstrations.  And, in the first
place, I observed, that the great certitude which by common consent is
accorded to these demonstrations, is founded solely upon this, that they
are clearly conceived in accordance with the rules I have already laid
down In the next place, I perceived that there was nothing at all in these
demonstrations which could assure me of the existence of their object:
thus, for example, supposing a triangle to be given, I distinctly
perceived that its three angles were necessarily equal to two right
angles, but I did not on that account perceive anything which could assure
me that any triangle existed:  while, on the contrary, recurring to the
examination of the idea of a Perfect Being, I found that the existence of
the Being was comprised in the idea in the same way that the equality of
its three angles to two right angles is comprised in the idea of a
triangle, or as in the idea of a sphere, the equidistance of all points on
its surface from the center, or even still more clearly; and that
consequently it is at least as certain that God, who is this Perfect