it these things that are lacking to it, completing those which
are imperfect, and yourselves taking the trouble to give a
more ample explanation of those things which have need of it,
or at least making me aware of the defects so that I may apply
myself to remedy them4 ¥when this is done and when finally the
reasonings by which I prove that there is a God, and that the
human soul differs from the body, shall be carried to that
point of perspicuity to which I am sure they can be carried in
order that they may be esteemed as perfectly exact
demonstrations, if you deign to authorize your approbation and
to render public testimony to their truth and certainty, I do
not doubt, I say, that henceforward all the errors and false
opinions which have ever existed regarding these two questions
will soon be effaced from the minds of men.  For the truth
itself will easily cause all men of mind and learning to
subscribe to your judgment; and your authority will cause the
atheists, who are usually more arrogant than learned or
judicious, to rid themselves of their spirit of contradiction
or lead them possibly themselves to defend the reasonings
which they find being received as demonstrations by all
persons of consideration, lest they appear not to understand
them.  And, finally, all others will easily yield to such a
mass of evidence, and there will be none who dares to doubt
the existence of God and the real and true distinction between
the human soul and the body.  It is for you now in your
singular wisdom to judge of the importance of the
establishment of such beliefs [you who see the disorders
produced by the doubt of them]5 .  But it would not become me
to say more in consideration of the cause of God and religion
to those who have always been the most worthy supports of the
Catholic Church.

     

                    Preface to the Reader.

     

     I have already slightly touched on these two questions of
God and the human soul in the Discourse on the Method of
rightly conducting the Reason and seeking truth in the
Sciences, published in French in the year 1637.  Not that I
had the design of treating these with any thoroughness, but
only so to speak in passing, and in order to ascertain by the
judgment of the readers how I should treat them later on.  For
these questions have always appeared to me to be of such
importance that I judged it suitable to speak of them more
than once; and the road which I follow in the explanation of
them is so little trodden, and so far removed from the
ordinary path, that I did not judge it to be expedient to set
it forth at length in French and in a Discourse which might be
read by everyone, in case the feebler minds should believe
that it was permitted to them to attempt to follow the same
path.

     But, having in this Discourse on Method begged all those
who have found in my writings somewhat deserving of censure to
do me the favour of acquainting me with the grounds of it,
nothing worthy of remark has been objected to in them beyond
two matters:  to these two I wish here to reply in a few words
before undertaking their more detailed discussion.

     The first objection is that it does not follow from the
fact that the human mind reflecting on itself does not
perceive itself to be other than a thing that thinks, that its
nature or its essence consists only in its being a thing that
thinks, in the sense that this word only excludes all other
things which might also be supposed to pertain to the nature
of the soul.  To this objection I reply that it was not my
intention in that place to exclude these in accordance with
the order that looks to the truth of the matter (as to which I
was not then dealing), but only in accordance with the order
of my thought [perception]; thus my meaning was that so far as
I was aware, I knew nothing clearly as belonging to my
essence, excepting that I was a thing that thinks, or a thing
that has in itself the faculty of thinking.  But I shall show
hereafter how from the fact that I know no other thing which
pertains to my essence, it follows that there is no other
thing which really does belong to it.

     The second objection is that it does not follow from the
fact that I have in myself the idea of something more perfect
than I am, that this idea is more perfect than I, and much
less that what is represented by this idea exists.  But I
reply that in this term idea there is here something
equivocal, for it may either be taken materially, as an act of
my understanding, and in this sense it cannot be said that it
is more perfect than I; or it may be taken objectively, as the
thing which is represented by this act, which, although we do
not suppose it to exist outside of my understanding, may, none
the less, be more perfect than I, because of its essence.  And
in following out this Treatise I shall show more fully how,
from the sole fact that I have in myself the idea of a thing
more perfect than myself, it follows that this thing truly
exists.

     In addition to these two objections I have also seen two
fairly lengthy works on this subject, which, however, did not
so much impugn my reasonings as my conclusions, and this by
arguments drawn from the ordinary atheistic sources.  But,