To these uses, there are also four correspondent abuses. First, when
men register their thoughts wrong by the inconstancy of the
signification of their words; by which they register for their
conceptions that which they never conceived, and so deceive
themselves. Secondly, when they use words metaphorically; that is,
in other sense than that they are ordained for, and thereby deceive
others. Thirdly, when by words they declare that to be their will
which is not. Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another:
for seeing nature hath armed living creatures, some with teeth, some
with horns, and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an
abuse of speech to grieve him with the tongue, unless it be one whom
we are obliged to govern; and then it is not to grieve, but to correct
and amend.

  The manner how speech serveth to the remembrance of the
consequence of causes and effects consisteth in the imposing of names,
and the connexion of them.

  Of names, some are proper, and singular to one only thing; as Peter,
John, this man, this tree: and some are common to many things; as man,
horse, tree; every of which, though but one name, is nevertheless
the name of diverse particular things; in respect of all which
together, it is called a universal, there being nothing in the world
universal but names; for the things named are every one of them
individual and singular.

  One universal name is imposed on many things for their similitude in
some quality, or other accident: and whereas a proper name bringeth to
mind one thing only, universals recall any one of those many.

  And of names universal, some are of more and some of less extent,
the larger comprehending the less large; and some again of equal
extent, comprehending each other reciprocally. As for example, the
name body is of larger signification than the word man, and
comprehendeth it; and the names man and rational are of equal
extent, comprehending mutually one another. But here we must take
notice that by a name is not always understood, as in grammar, one
only word, but sometimes by circumlocution many words together. For
all these words, He that in his actions observeth the laws of his
country, make but one name, equivalent to this one word, just.

  By this imposition of names, some of larger, some of stricter
signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things
imagined in the mind into a reckoning of the consequences of
appellations. For example, a man that hath no use of speech at all,
(such as is born and remains perfectly deaf and dumb), if he set
before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles (such as are
the corners of a square figure), he may by meditation compare and find
that the three angles of that triangle are equal to those two right
angles that stand by it. But if another triangle be shown him
different in shape from the former, he cannot know without a new
labour whether the three angles of that also be equal to the same. But
he that hath the use of words, when he observes that such equality was
consequent, not to the length of the sides, nor to any other
particular thing in his triangle; but only to this, that the sides
were straight, and the angles three, and that that was all, for
which he named it a triangle; will boldly conclude universally that
such equality of angles is in all triangles whatsoever, and register
his invention in these general terms: Every triangle hath its three
angles equal to two right angles. And thus the consequence found in
one particular comes to be registered and remembered as a universal
rule; and discharges our mental reckoning of time and place, and
delivers us from all labour of the mind, saving the first; and makes
that which was found true here, and now, to be true in all times and
places.

  But the use of words in registering our thoughts is in nothing so
evident as in numbering. A natural fool that could never learn by
heart the order of numeral words, as one, two, and three, may
observe every stroke of the clock, and nod to it, or say one, one,
one, but can never know what hour it strikes. And it seems there was a
time when those names of number were not in use; and men were fain
to apply their fingers of one or both hands to those things they
desired to keep account of; and that thence it proceeded that now
our numeral words are but ten, in any nation, and in some but five,
and then they begin again. And he that can tell ten, if he recite them
out of order, will lose himself, and not know when he has done: much
less will he be able to add, and subtract, and perform all other
operations of arithmetic. So that without words there is no
possibility of reckoning of numbers; much less of magnitudes, of
swiftness, of force, and other things, the reckonings whereof are
necessary to the being or well-being of mankind.

  When two names are joined together into a consequence, or
affirmation, as thus, A man is a living creature; or thus, If he be
a man, he is a living creature; if the latter name living creature
signify all that the former name man signifieth, then the affirmation,
or consequence, is true; otherwise false. For true and false are
attributes of speech, not of things. And where speech is not, there is
neither truth nor falsehood. Error there may be, as when we expect
that which shall not be, or suspect what has not been; but in
neither case can a man be charged with untruth.

  Seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names
in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise truth had need to
remember what every name he uses stands for, and to place it
accordingly; or else he will find himself entangled in words, as a
bird in lime twigs; the more he struggles, the more belimed. And
therefore in geometry (which is the only science that it hath
pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind), men begin at settling