the significations of their words; which settling of significations,
they call definitions, and place them in the beginning of their
reckoning.

  By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to
true knowledge to examine the definitions of former authors; and
either to correct them, where they are negligently set down, or to
make them himself. For the errors of definitions multiply
themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds, and lead men into
absurdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoid, without
reckoning anew from the beginning; in which lies the foundation of
their errors. From whence it happens that they which trust to books do
as they that cast up many little sums into a greater, without
considering whether those little sums were rightly cast up or not; and
at last finding the error visible, and not mistrusting their first
grounds, know not which way to clear themselves, spend time in
fluttering over their books; as birds that entering by the chimney,
and finding themselves enclosed in a chamber, flutter at the false
light of a glass window, for want of wit to consider which way they
came in. So that in the right definition of names lies the first use
of speech; which is the acquisition of science: and in wrong, or no
definitions, lies the first abuse; from which proceed all false and
senseless tenets; which make those men that take their instruction
from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation, to
be as much below the condition of ignorant men as men endued with true
science are above it. For between true science and erroneous
doctrines, ignorance is in the middle. Natural sense and imagination
are not subject to absurdity. Nature itself cannot err: and as men
abound in copiousness of language; so they become more wise, or more
mad, than ordinary. Nor is it possible without letters for any man
to become either excellently wise or (unless his memory be hurt by
disease, or ill constitution of organs) excellently foolish. For words
are wise men's counters; they do but reckon by them: but they are
the money of fools, that value them by the authority of an
Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other doctor whatsoever, if
but a man.

  Subject to names is whatsoever can enter into or be considered in an
account, and be added one to another to make a sum, or subtracted
one from another and leave a remainder. The Latins called accounts
of money rationes, and accounting, ratiocinatio: and that which we
in bills or books of account call items, they called nomina; that
is, names: and thence it seems to proceed that they extended the
word ratio to the faculty of reckoning in all other things. The Greeks
have but one word, logos, for both speech and reason; not that they
thought there was no speech without reason, but no reasoning without
speech; and the act of reasoning they called syllogism; which
signifieth summing up of the consequences of one saying to another.
And because the same things may enter into account for diverse
accidents, their names are (to show that diversity) diversely
wrested and diversified. This diversity of names may be reduced to
four general heads.

  First, a thing may enter into account for matter, or body; as
living, sensible, rational, hot, cold, moved, quiet; with all which
names the word matter, or body, is understood; all such being names of
matter.

  Secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for some
accident or quality which we conceive to be in it; as for being moved,
for being so long, for being hot, etc.; and then, of the name of the
thing itself, by a little change or wresting, we make a name for
that accident which we consider; and for living put into the account
life; for moved, motion; for hot, heat; for long, length, and the
like: and all such names are the names of the accidents and properties
by which one matter and body is distinguished from another. These
are called names abstract, because severed, not from matter, but
from the account of matter.

  Thirdly, we bring into account the properties of our own bodies,
whereby we make such distinction: as when anything is seen by us, we
reckon not the thing itself, but the sight, the colour, the idea of it
in the fancy; and when anything is heard, we reckon it not, but the
hearing or sound only, which is our fancy or conception of it by the
ear: and such are names of fancies.

  Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names, to
names themselves, and to speeches: for, general, universal, special,
equivocal, are names of names. And affirmation, interrogation,
commandment, narration, syllogism, sermon, oration, and many other
such are names of speeches. And this is all the variety of names
positive; which are put to mark somewhat which is in nature, or may be
feigned by the mind of man, as bodies that are, or may be conceived to
be; or of bodies, the properties that are, or may be feigned to be; or
words and speech.

  There be also other names, called negative; which are notes to
signify that a word is not the name of the thing in question; as these
words: nothing, no man, infinite, indocible, three want four, and
the like; which are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting
of reckoning, and call to mind our past cogitations, though they be
not names of anything; because they make us refuse to admit of names
not rightly used.

  All other names are but insignificant sounds; and those of two
sorts. One, when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained
by definition; whereof there have been abundance coined by Schoolmen
and puzzled philosophers.

  Another, when men make a name of two names, whose significations are