like desire, which is undoubtedly in other men weak, being of one
and the same nature: to have anything offered them repugnant to this
desire must needs, in all respects, grieve them as much as me; so that
if I do harm, I must look to suffer, there being no reason that others
should show greater measure of love to me than they have by me
showed unto them; my desire, therefore, to be loved of my equals in
Nature, as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of
bearing to themward fully the like affection. From which relation of
equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what
several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn for direction of
life no man is ignorant." (Eccl. Pol. i.)*

  * Richard Hooker, The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity.

  6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of
licence; though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to
dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to
destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but
where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The
state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which obliges
every one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will
but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought
to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions; for men
being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker;
all the servants of one sovereign Master, sent into the world by His
order and about His business; they are His property, whose workmanship
they are made to last during His, not one another's pleasure. And,
being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of
Nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us
that may authorise us to destroy one another, as if we were made for
one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours.
Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his
station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation
comes not in competition, ought he as much as he can to preserve the
rest of mankind, and not unless it be to do justice on an offender,
take away or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the
life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.

  7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others'
rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of Nature be
observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the
execution of the law of Nature is in that state put into every man's
hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of
that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation. For the law
of Nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world,
be in vain if there were nobody that in the state of Nature had a
power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and
restrain offenders; and if any one in the state of Nature may punish
another for any evil he has done, every one may do so. For in that
state of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority
or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in prosecution of
that law, every one must needs have a right to do.

  8. And thus, in the state of Nature, one man comes by a power over
another, but yet no absolute or arbitrary power to use a criminal,
when he has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats or
boundless extravagancy of his own will, but only to retribute to him
so far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to
his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and
restraint. For these two are the only reasons why one man may lawfully
do harm to another, which is that we call punishment. In transgressing
the law of Nature, the offender declares himself to live by another
rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure
God has set to the actions of men for their mutual security, and so he
becomes dangerous to mankind; the tie which is to secure them from
injury and violence being slighted and broken by him, which being a
trespass against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it,
provided for by the law of Nature, every man upon this score, by the
right he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where
it is necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such
evil on any one who hath transgressed that law, as may make him repent
the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and, by his example, others
from doing the like mischief. And in this case, and upon this
ground, every man hath a right to punish the offender, and be
executioner of the law of Nature.

  9. I doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some
men; but before they condemn it, I desire them to resolve me by what
right any prince or state can put to death or punish an alien for
any crime he commits in their country? It is certain their laws, by
virtue of any sanction they receive from the promulgated will of the
legislature, reach not a stranger. They speak not to him, nor, if they
did, is he bound to hearken to them. The legislative authority by
which they are in force over the subjects of that commonwealth hath no
power over him. Those who have the supreme power of making laws in
England, France, or Holland are, to an Indian, but like the rest of
the world- men without authority. And therefore, if by the law of
Nature every man hath not a power to punish offences against it, as he
soberly judges the case to require, I see not how the magistrates of
any community can punish an alien of another country, since, in
reference to him, they can have no more power than what every man
naturally may have over another.

  10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the laws, and
varying from the right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes
degenerate, and declares himself to quit the principles of human
nature and to be a noxious creature, there is commonly injury done,
and some person or other, some other man, receives damage by his
transgression; in which case, he who hath received any damage has
(besides the right of punishment common to him, with other men) a