facile credimus; what suits our wishes, is forwardly believed, is, I
suppose, what every one hath more than once experimented: and though
men cannot always openly gainsay or resist the force of manifest
probabilities that make against them, yet yield they not to the
argument. Not but that it is the nature of the understanding
constantly to close with the more probable side; but yet a man hath
a power to suspend and restrain its inquiries, and not permit a full
and satisfactory examination, as far as the matter in question is
capable, and will bear it to be made. Until that be done, there will
be always these two ways left of evading the most apparent
probabilities:

  13. Two means of evading probabilities: I. Supposed fallacy latent
in the words employed. First, That the arguments being (as for the
most part they are) brought in words, there may be a fallacy latent in
them: and the consequences being, perhaps, many in train, they may
be some of them incoherent. There are very few discourses so short,
clear, and consistent, to which most men may not, with satisfaction
enough to themselves, raise this doubt; and from whose conviction they
may not, without reproach of disingenuity or unreasonableness, set
themselves free with the old reply, Non persuadebis, etiamsi
persuaseris; though I cannot answer, I will not yield.

  14. Supposed unknown arguments for the contrary. Secondly,
Manifest probabilities may be evaded, and the assent withheld, upon
this suggestion, That I know not yet all that may he said on the
contrary side. And therefore, though I be beaten, it is not
necessary I should yield, not knowing what forces there are in reserve
behind. This is a refuge against conviction so open and so wide,
that it is hard to determine when a man is quite out of the verge of
it.

 15. What probabilities naturally determine the assent. But yet
there is some end of it; and a man having carefully inquired into
all the grounds of probability and unlikeliness; done his utmost to
inform himself in all particulars fairly, and cast up the sum total on
both sides; may, in most cases, come to acknowledge, upon the whole
matter, on which side the probability rests: wherein some proofs in
matter of reason, being suppositions upon universal experience, are so
cogent and clear, and some testimonies in matter of fact so universal,
that he cannot refuse his assent. So that I think we may conclude,
that, in propositions, where though the proofs in view are of most
moment, yet there are sufficient grounds to suspect that there is
either fallacy in words, or certain proofs as considerable to be
produced on the contrary side; there assent, suspense, or dissent, are
often voluntary actions. But where the proofs are such as make it
highly probable, and there is not sufficient ground to suspect that
there is either fallacy of words (which sober and serious
consideration may discover) nor equally valid proofs yet undiscovered,
latent on the other side (which also the nature of the thing may, in
some cases, make plain to a considerate man); there, I think, a man
who has weighed them can scarce refuse his assent to the side on which
the greater probability appears. Whether it be probable that a
promiscuous jumble of printing letters should often fall into a method
and order, which should stamp on paper a coherent discourse; or that a
blind fortuitous concourse of atoms, not guided by an understanding
agent, should frequently constitute the bodies of any species of
animals: in these and the like cases, I think, nobody that considers
them can be one jot at a stand which side to take, nor at all waver in
his assent. Lastly, when there can be no supposition (the thing in its
own nature indifferent, and wholly depending upon the testimony of
witnesses) that there is as fair testimony against, as for the
matter of fact attested; which by inquiry is to be learned, v.g.
whether there was one thousand seven hundred years ago such a man at
Rome as Julius Caesar: in all such cases, I say, I think it is not
in any rational man's power to refuse his assent; but that it
necessarily follows, and closes with such probabilities. In other less
clear cases, I think it is in man's power to suspend his assent; and
perhaps content himself with the proofs he has, if they favour the
opinion that suits with his inclination or interest, and so stop
from further search. But that a man should afford his assent to that
side on which the less probability appears to him, seems to me utterly
impracticable, and as impossible as it is to believe the same thing
probable and improbable at the same time.

  16. Where it is in our power to suspend our judgment. As knowledge
is no more arbitrary than perception; so, I think, assent is no more
in our power than knowledge. When the agreement of any two ideas
appears to our minds, whether immediately or by the assistance of
reason, I can no more refuse to perceive, no more avoid knowing it,
than I can avoid seeing those objects which I turn my eyes to, and
look on in daylight; and what upon full examination I find the most
probable, I cannot deny my assent to. But, though we cannot hinder our
knowledge, where the agreement is once perceived; nor our assent,
where the probability manifestly appears upon due consideration of all
the measures of it: yet we can hinder both knowledge and assent, by
stopping our inquiry, and not employing our faculties in the search of
any truth. If it were not so, ignorance, error, or infidelity, could
not in any case be a fault. Thus, in some cases we can prevent or
suspend our assent: but can a man versed in modern or ancient
history doubt whether there is such a place as Rome, or whether
there was such a man as Julius Caesar? Indeed, there are millions of
truths that a man is not, or may not think himself concerned to
know; as whether our king Richard the Third was crooked or no; or
whether Roger Bacon was a mathematician or a magician. In these and
such like cases, where the assent one way or other is of no importance
to the interest of any one; no action, no concernment of his following
or depending thereon, there it is not strange that the mind should
give itself up to the common opinion, or render itself to the first
comer. These and the like opinions are of so little weight and moment,