that, like motes in the sun, their tendencies are very rarely taken
notice of. They are there, as it were, by chance, and the mind lets
them float at liberty. But where the mind judges that the
proposition has concernment in it: where the assent or not assenting
is thought to draw consequences of moment after it, and good and
evil to depend on choosing or refusing the right side, and the mind
sets itself seriously to inquire and examine the probability: there
I think it is not in our choice to take which side we please, if
manifest odds appear on either. The greater probability, I think, in
that case will determine the assent: and a man can no more avoid
assenting, or taking it to be true, where he perceives the greater
probability, than he can avoid knowing it to be true, where he
perceives the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas.

  If this be so, the foundation of error will lie in wrong measures of
probability; as the foundation of vice in wrong measures of good.

  17. IV. Authority. The fourth and last wrong measure of
probability I shall take notice of, and which keeps in ignorance or
error more people than all the other together, is that which I have
mentioned in the foregoing chapter: I mean the giving up our assent to
the common received opinions, either of our friends or party,
neighbourhood or country. How many men have no other ground for
their tenets, than the supposed honesty, or learning, or number of
those of the same profession? As if honest or bookish men could not
err; or truth were to be established by the vote of the multitude: yet
this with most men serves the turn. The tenet has had the
attestation of reverend antiquity; it comes to me with the passport of
former ages, and therefore I am secure in the reception I give it:
other men have been and are of the same opinion, (for that is all is
said,) and therefore it is reasonable for me to embrace it. A man
may more justifiably throw up cross and pile for his opinions, than
take them up by such measures. All men are liable to error, and most
men are in many points, by passion or interest, under temptation to
it. If we could but see the secret motives that influenced the men
of name and learning in the world, and the leaders of parties, we
should not always find that it was the embracing of truth for its
own sake, that made them espouse the doctrines they owned and
maintained. This at least is certain, there is not an opinion so
absurd, which a man may not receive upon this ground. There is no
error to be named, which has not had its professors: and a man shall
never want crooked paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is in the
right way, wherever he has the footsteps of others to follow.

  18. Not so many men in errors as is commonly supposed. But,
notwithstanding the great noise is made in the world about errors
and opinions, I must do mankind that right as to say, There are not so
many men in errors and wrong opinions as is commonly supposed. Not
that I think they embrace the truth; but indeed, because concerning
those doctrines they keep such a stir about, they have no thought,
no opinion at all. For if any one should a little catechise the
greatest part of the partizans of most of the sects in the world, he
would not find, concerning those matters they are so zealous for, that
they have any opinions of their own: much less would he have reason to
think that they took them upon the examination of arguments and
appearance of probability. They are resolved to stick to a party
that education or interest has engaged them in; and there, like the
common soldiers of an army, show their courage and warmth as their
leaders direct, without ever examining, or so much as knowing, the
cause they contend for. If a man's life shows that he has no serious
regard for religion; for what reason should we think that he beats his
head about the opinions of his church, and troubles himself to examine
the grounds of this or that doctrine? It is enough for him to obey his
leaders, to have his hand and his tongue ready for the support of
the common cause, and thereby approve himself to those who can give
him credit, preferment, or protection in that society. Thus men become
professors of, and combatants for, those opinions they were never
convinced of nor proselytes to; no, nor ever had so much as floating
in their heads: and though one cannot say there are fewer improbable
or erroneous opinions in the world than there are, yet this is
certain; there are fewer that actually assent to them, and mistake
them for truths, than is imagined.

                             Chapter XXI

                   Of the Division of the Sciences

  1. Science may be divided into three sorts. All that can fall within
the compass of human understanding, being either, First, the nature of
things, as they are in themselves, their relations, and their manner
of operation: or, Secondly, that which man himself ought to do, as a
rational and voluntary agent, for the attainment of any end,
especially happiness: or, Thirdly, the ways and means whereby the
knowledge of both the one and the other of these is attained and
communicated; I think science may be divided properly into these three
sorts:-

  2. Physica. First, The knowledge of things, as they are in their own
proper beings, their constitution, properties, and operations; whereby
I mean not only matter and body, but spirits also, which have their
proper natures, constitutions, and operations, as well as bodies.
This, in a little more enlarged sense of the word, I call Phusike,
or natural philosophy. The end of this is bare speculative truth:
and whatsoever can afford the mind of man any such, falls under this
branch, whether it be God himself, angels, spirits, bodies; or any
of their affections, as number, and figure, &c.

  3. Practica. Secondly, Praktike, The skill of right applying our own
powers and actions, for the attainment of things good and useful.
The most considerable under this head is ethics, which is the