Jew, and the thing speaks itself. For what hinders but a Christian
magistrate may have subjects that are Jews? Now, if we acknowledge
that such an injury may not be done unto a Jew as to compel him,
against his own opinion, to practise in his religion a thing that is
in its nature indifferent, how can we maintain that anything of this
kind may be done to a Christian?

  Again, things in their own nature indifferent cannot, by any human
authority, be made any part of the worship of God- for this very
reason: because they are indifferent. For, since indifferent things
are not capable, by any virtue of their own, to propitiate the
Deity, no human power or authority can confer on them so much
dignity and excellency as to enable them to do it. In the common
affairs of life that use of indifferent things which God has not
forbidden is free and lawful, and therefore in those things human
authority has place. But it is not so in matters of religion. Things
indifferent are not otherwise lawful in the worship of God than as
they are instituted by God Himself and as He, by some positive
command, has ordained them to be made a part of that worship which
He will vouchsafe to accept at the hands of poor sinful men. Nor, when
an incensed Deity shall ask us, "Who has required these, or
such-like things at your hands?" will it be enough to answer Him
that the magistrate commanded them. If civil jurisdiction extend
thus far, what might not lawfully be introduced into religion? What
hodgepodge of ceremonies, what superstitious inventions, built upon
the magistrate's authority, might not (against conscience) be
imposed upon the worshippers of God? For the greatest part of these
ceremonies and superstitions consists in the religious use of such
things as are in their own nature indifferent; nor are they sinful
upon any other account than because God is not the author of them. The
sprinkling of water and the use of bread and wine are both in their
own nature and in the ordinary occasions of life altogether
indifferent. Will any man, therefore, say that these things could have
been introduced into religion and made a part of divine worship if not
by divine institution? If any human authority or civil power could
have done this, why might it not also enjoin the eating of fish and
drinking of ale in the holy banquet as a part of divine worship? Why
not the sprinkling of the blood of beasts in churches, and
expiations by water or fire, and abundance more of this kind? But
these things, how indifferent soever they be in common uses, when they
come to be annexed unto divine worship, without divine authority, they
are as abominable to God as the sacrifice of a dog. And why is a dog
so abominable? What difference is there between a dog and a goat, in
respect of the divine nature, equally and infinitely distant from
all affinity with matter, unless it be that God required the use of
one in His worship and not of the other? We see, therefore, that
indifferent things, how much soever they be under the power of the
civil magistrate, yet cannot, upon that pretence, be introduced into
religion and imposed upon religious assemblies, because, in the
worship of God, they wholly cease to be indifferent. He that
worships God does it with design to please Him and procure His favour.
But that cannot be done by him who, upon the command of another,
offers unto God that which he knows will be displeasing to Him,
because not commanded by Himself. This is not to please God, or
appease his wrath, but willingly and knowingly to provoke Him by a
manifest contempt, which is a thing absolutely repugnant to the nature
and end of worship.

  But it will be here asked: "If nothing belonging to divine worship
be left to human discretion, how is it then that Churches themselves
have the power of ordering anything about the time and place of
worship and the like?" To this I answer that in religious worship we
must distinguish between what is part of the worship itself and what
is but a circumstance. That is a part of the worship which is believed
to be appointed by God and to be well-pleasing to Him, and therefore
that is necessary. Circumstances are such things which, though in
general they cannot be separated from worship, yet the particular
instances or modifications of them are not determined, and therefore
they are indifferent. Of this sort are the time and place of
worship, habit and posture of him that worships. These are
circumstances, and perfectly indifferent, where God has not given
any express command about them. For example: amongst the Jews the time
and place of their worship and the habits of those that officiated
in it were not mere circumstances, but a part of the worship itself,
in which, if anything were defective, or different from the
institution, they could not hope that it would be accepted by God. But
these, to Christians under the liberty of the Gospel, are mere
circumstances of worship, which the prudence of every Church may bring
into such use as shall be judged most subservient to the end of order,
decency, and edification. But, even under the Gospel, those who
believe the first or the seventh day to be set apart by God, and
consecrated still to His worship, to them that portion of time is
not a simple circumstance, but a real part of Divine worship, which
can neither be changed nor neglected.

  In the next place: As the magistrate has no power to impose by his
laws the use of any rites and ceremonies in any Church, so neither has
he any power to forbid the use of such rites and ceremonies as are
already received, approved, and practised by any Church; because, if
he did so, he would destroy the Church itself: the end of whose
institution is only to worship God with freedom after its own manner.

  You will say, by this rule, if some congregations should have a mind
to sacrifice infants, or (as the primitive Christians were falsely
accused) lustfully pollute themselves in promiscuous uncleanness, or
practise any other such heinous enormities, is the magistrate
obliged to tolerate them, because they are committed in a religious
assembly? I answer: No. These things are not lawful in the ordinary
course of life, nor in any private house; and therefore neither are
they so in the worship of God, or in any religious meeting. But,