man's prejudice, nor the hope of it be forced from him by any external
violence. But, forasmuch as men thus entering into societies, grounded
upon their mutual compacts of assistance for the defence of their
temporal goods, may, nevertheless, be deprived of them, either by
the rapine and fraud of their fellow citizens, or by the hostile
violence of foreigners, the remedy of this evil consists in arms,
riches, and multitude of citizens; the remedy of the other in laws;
and the care of all things relating both to one and the other is
committed by the society to the civil magistrate. This is the
original, this is the use, and these are the bounds of the legislative
(which is the supreme) power in every commonwealth. I mean that
provision may be made for the security of each man's private
possessions; for the peace, riches, and public commodities of the
whole people; and, as much as possible, for the increase of their
inward strength against foreign invasions.

  These things being thus explained, it is easy to understand to
what end the legislative power ought to be directed and by what
measures regulated; and that is the temporal good and outward
prosperity of the society; which is the sole reason of men's
entering into society, and the only thing they seek and aim at in
it. And it is also evident what liberty remains to men in reference to
their eternal salvation, and that is that every one should do what
he in his conscience is persuaded to be acceptable to the Almighty, on
whose good pleasure and acceptance depends their eternal happiness.
For obedience is due, in the first place, to God and, afterwards to
the laws.

  But some may ask: "What if the magistrate should enjoin anything
by his authority that appears unlawful to the conscience of a
private person?" I answer that, if government be faithfully
administered and the counsels of the magistrates be indeed directed to
the public good, this will seldom happen. But if, perhaps, it do so
fall out, I say, that such a private person is to abstain from the
action that he judges unlawful, and he is to undergo the punishment
which it is not unlawful for him to bear. For the private judgement of
any person concerning a law enacted in political matters, for the
public good, does not take away the obligation of that law, nor
deserve a dispensation. But if the law, indeed, be concerning things
that lie not within the verge of the magistrate's authority (as, for
example, that the people, or any party amongst them, should be
compelled to embrace a strange religion, and join in the worship and
ceremonies of another Church), men are not in these cases obliged by
that law, against their consciences. For the political society is
instituted for no other end, but only to secure every man's possession
of the things of this life. The care of each man's soul and of the
things of heaven, which neither does belong to the commonwealth nor
can be subjected to it, is left entirely to every man's self. Thus the
safeguard of men's lives and of the things that belong unto this
life is the business of the commonwealth; and the preserving of
those things unto their owners is the duty of the magistrate. And
therefore the magistrate cannot take away these worldly things from
this man or party and give them to that; nor change propriety
amongst fellow subjects (no not even by a law), for a cause that has
no relation to the end of civil government, I mean for their religion,
which whether it be true or false does no prejudice to the worldly
concerns of their fellow subjects, which are the things that only
belong unto the care of the commonwealth.

  But what if the magistrate believe such a law as this to be for
the public good? I answer: As the private judgement of any
particular person, if erroneous, does not exempt him from the
obligation of law, so the private judgement (as I may call it) of
the magistrate does not give him any new right of imposing laws upon
his subjects, which neither was in the constitution of the
government granted him, nor ever was in the power of the people to
grant, much less if he make it his business to enrich and advance
his followers and fellow-sectaries with the spoils of others. But what
if the magistrate believe that he has a right to make such laws and
that they are for the public good, and his subjects believe the
contrary? Who shall be judge between them? I answer: God alone. For
there is no judge upon earth between the supreme magistrate and the
people. God, I say, is the only judge in this case, who will retribute
unto every one at the last day according to his deserts; that is,
according to his sincerity and uprightness in endeavouring to
promote piety, and the public weal, and peace of mankind. But What
shall be done in the meanwhile? I answer: The principal and chief care
of every one ought to be of his own soul first, and, in the next
place, of the public peace; though yet there are very few will think
it is peace there, where they see all laid waste.

  There are two sorts of contests amongst men, the one managed by law,
the other by force; and these are of that nature that where the one
ends, the other always begins. But it is not my business to inquire
into the power of the magistrate in the different constitutions of
nations. I only know what usually happens where controversies arise
without a judge to determine them. You will say, then, the
magistrate being the stronger will have his will and carry his
point. Without doubt; but the question is not here concerning the
doubtfulness of the event, but the rule of right.

  But to come to particulars. I say, first, no opinions contrary to
human society, or to those moral rules which are necessary to the
preservation of civil society, are to be tolerated by the
magistrate. But of these, indeed, examples in any Church are rare. For
no sect can easily arrive to such a degree of madness as that it
should think fit to teach, for doctrines of religion, such things as
manifestly undermine the foundations of society and are, therefore,
condemned by the judgement of all mankind; because their own interest,
peace, reputation, everything would be thereby endangered.