favourers of their own faith and way of worship.

  But, after all, the principal consideration, and which absolutely
determines this controversy, is this: Although the magistrate's
opinion in religion be sound, and the way that he appoints be truly
Evangelical, yet, if I be not thoroughly persuaded thereof in my own
mind, there will be no safety for me in following it. No way
whatsoever that I shall walk in against the dictates of my
conscience will ever bring me to the mansions of the blessed. I may
grow rich by an art that I take not delight in; I may be cured of some
disease by remedies that I have not faith in; but I cannot be saved by
a religion that I distrust and by a worship that I abhor. It is in
vain for an unbeliever to take up the outward show of another man's
profession. Faith only and inward sincerity are the things that
procure acceptance with God. The most likely and most approved
remedy can have no effect upon the patient, if his stomach reject it
as soon as taken; and you will in vain cram a medicine down a sick
man's throat, which his particular constitution will be sure to turn
into poison. In a word, whatsoever may be doubtful in religion, yet
this at least is certain, that no religion which I believe not to be
true can be either true or profitable unto me. In vain, therefore,
do princes compel their subjects to come into their Church
communion, under pretence of saving their souls. If they believe, they
will come of their own accord, if they believe not, their coming
will nothing avail them. How great soever, in fine, may be the
pretence of good-will and charity, and concern for the salvation of
men's souls, men cannot be forced to be saved whether they will or no.
And therefore, when all is done, they must be left to their own
consciences.

  Having thus at length freed men from all dominion over one another
in matters of religion, let us now consider what they are to do. All
men know and acknowledge that God ought to be publicly worshipped; why
otherwise do they compel one another unto the public assemblies?
Men, therefore, constituted in this liberty are to enter into some
religious society, that they meet together, not only for mutual
edification, but to own to the world that they worship God and offer
unto His Divine Majesty such service as they themselves are not
ashamed of and such as they think not unworthy of Him, nor
unacceptable to Him; and, finally, that by the purity of doctrine,
holiness of life, and decent form of worship, they may draw others
unto the love of the true religion, and perform such other things in
religion as cannot be done by each private man apart.

  These religious societies I call Churches; and these, I say, the
magistrate ought to tolerate, for the business of these assemblies
of the people is nothing but what is lawful for every man in
particular to take care of- I mean the salvation of their souls; nor
in this case is there any difference between the National Church and
other separated congregations.

  But as in every Church there are two things especially to be
considered- the outward form and rites of worship, and the doctrines
and articles of things must be handled each distinctly that so the
whole matter of toleration may the more clearly be understood.

  Concerning outward worship, I say, in the first place, that the
magistrate has no power to enforce by law, either in his own Church,
or much less in another, the use of any rites or ceremonies whatsoever
in the worship of God. And this, not only because these Churches are
free societies, but because whatsoever is practised in the worship
of God is only so far justifiable as it is believed by those that
practise it to be acceptable unto Him. Whatsoever is not done with
that assurance of faith is neither well in itself, nor can it be
acceptable to God. To impose such things, therefore, upon any
people, contrary to their own judgment, is in effect to command them
to offend God, which, considering that the end of all religion is to
please Him, and that liberty is essentially necessary to that end,
appears to be absurd beyond expression.

  But perhaps it may be concluded from hence that I deny unto the
magistrate all manner of power about indifferent things, which, if
it be not granted, the whole subject-matter of law-making is taken
away. No, I readily grant that indifferent things, and perhaps none
but such, are subjected to the legislative power. But it does not
therefore follow that the magistrate may ordain whatsoever he
pleases concerning anything that is indifferent. The public good is
the rule and measure of all law-making. If a thing be not useful to
the commonwealth, though it be never so indifferent, it may not
presently be established by law.

  And further, things never so indifferent in their own nature, when
they are brought into the Church and worship of God, are removed out
of the reach of the magistrate's jurisdiction, because in that use
they have no connection at all with civil affairs. The only business
of the Church is the salvation of souls, and it no way concerns the
commonwealth, or any member of it, that this or the other ceremony
be there made use of. Neither the use nor the omission of any
ceremonies in those religious assemblies does either advantage or
prejudice the life, liberty, or estate of any man. For example, let it
be granted that the washing of an infant with water is in itself an
indifferent thing, let it be granted also that the magistrate
understand such washing to be profitable to the curing or preventing
of any disease the children are subject unto, and esteem the matter
weighty enough to be taken care of by a law. In that case he may order
it to be done. But will any one therefore say that a magistrate has
the same right to ordain by law that all children shall be baptised by
priests in the sacred font in order to the purification of their
souls? The extreme difference of these two cases is visible to every
one at first sight. Or let us apply the last case to the child of a