though he chastened them, he chastened them as a man chastens 
his son, Deut. viii. 5. i.e. with tenderness and affection, 
and kept them under no severer discipline than what was 
absolutely best for them, and had been less kindness to have 
slackened.  This is that power to which children are commanded 
obedience, that the pains and care of their parents may not be 
increased, or ill rewarded.

     Sec. 68.  On the other side, honour and support, all 
that which gratitude requires to return for the benefits received 
by and from them, is the indispensable duty of the child, and the 
proper privilege of the parents.  This is intended for the 
parents advantage, as the other is for the child's; though 
education, the parents duty, seems to have most power, because 
the ignorance and infirmities of childhood stand in need of 

restraint and correction; which is a visible exercise of rule, 
and a kind of dominion.  And that duty which is comprehended in 
the word honour, requires less obedience, though the obligation 
be stronger on grown, than younger children: for who can think 
the command, Children obey your parents, requires in a man, 
that has children of his own, the same submission to his father, 
as it does in his yet young children to him; and that by this 
precept he were bound to obey all his father's commands, if, out 
of a conceit of authority, he should have the indiscretion to 
treat him still as a boy?

     Sec. 69.  The first part then of paternal power, or rather 
duty, which is education, belongs so to the father, that it 
terminates at a certain season; when the business of education is 
over, it ceases of itself, and is also alienable before: for a 
man may put the tuition of his son in other hands; and he that 
has made his son an apprentice to another, has discharged him, 
during that time, of a great part of his obedience both to 
himself and to his mother.  But all the duty of honour, the 
other part, remains never the less entire to them; nothing can 
cancel that: it is so inseparable from them both, that the 
father's authority cannot dispossess the mother of this right, 
nor can any man discharge his son from honouring her that bore 
him.  But both these are very far from a power to make laws, and 
enforcing them with penalties, that may reach estate, liberty, 
limbs and life.  The power of commanding ends with nonage; and 
though, after that, honour and respect, support and defence, 
and whatsoever gratitude can oblige a man to, for the highest 
benefits he is naturally capable of, be always due from a son to 
his parents; yet all this puts no scepter into the father's hand, 
no sovereign power of commanding.  He has no dominion over his 
son's property, or actions; nor any right, that his will should 
prescribe to his son's in all things; however it may become his 
son in many things, not very inconvenient to him and his family, 
to pay a deference to it.

     Sec. 70.  A man may owe honour and respect to an ancient, or 
wise man; defence to his child or friend; relief and support to 
the distressed; and gratitude to a benefactor, to such a degree, 
that all he has, all he can do, cannot sufficiently pay it: but 
all these give no authority, no right to any one, of making laws 
over him from whom they are owing.  And it is plain, all this is 
due not only to the bare title of father; not only because, as 
has been said, it is owing to the mother too; but because these 
obligations to parents, and the degrees of what is required of 
children, may be varied by the different care and kindness, 
trouble and expence, which is often employed upon one child more 
than another.

     Sec. 71.  This shews the reason how it comes to pass, that 
parents in societies, where they themselves are subjects, retain 
a power over their children, and have as much right to their 
subjection, as those who are in the state of nature.  Which could 
not possibly be, if all political power were only paternal, and 
that in truth they were one and the same thing: for then, all 
paternal power being in the prince, the subject could naturally 
have none of it.  But these two powers, political and paternal, 
are so perfectly distinct and separate; are built upon so 
different foundations, and given to so different ends, that every 
subject that is a father, has as much a paternal power over his 
children, as the prince has over his: and every prince, that has 
parents, owes them as much filial duty and obedience, as the 
meanest of his subjects do to their's; and can therefore contain 
not any part or degree of that kind of dominion, which a prince 
or magistrate has over his subject.  

     Sec. 72.  Though the obligation on the parents to bring up 
their children, and the obligation on children to honour their 
parents, contain all the power on the one hand, and submission on 
the other, which are proper to this relation, yet there is 

another power ordinarily in the father, whereby he has a tie on 
the obedience of his children; which tho' it be common to him 
with other men, yet the occasions of shewing it, almost consich 
tho' it be common to him with other men, yet the occasions of 
shewing it, almost constantly happening to fathers in their 
private families, and the instances of it elsewhere being rare, 
and less taken notice of, it passes in the world for a part of 
paternal jurisdiction.  And this is the power men generally have 
to bestow their estates on those who please them best; the 
possession of the father being the expectation and inheritance of 
the children, ordinarily in certain proportions, according to the 
law and custom of each country; yet it is commonly in the 
father's power to bestow it with a more sparing or liberal hand,