passionate and hasty, but a sedate settled design upon another 
man's life, puts him in a state of war with him against whom he 
has declared such an intention, and so has exposed his life to 
the other's power to be taken away by him, or any one that joins 
with him in his defence, and espouses his quarrel; it being 
reasonable and just, I should have a right to destroy that which 
threatens me with destruction: for, by the fundamental law of 
nature, man being to be preserved as much as possible, when all 
cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be 
preferred: and one may destroy a man who makes war upon him, or 
has discovered an enmity to his being, for the same reason that 
he may kill a wolf or a lion; because such men are not under 
the ties of the commonlaw of reason, have no other rule, but that 
of force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts of prey, 
those dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be sure to 
destroy him whenever he falls into their power.

     Sect, 17. And hence it is, that he who attempts to get 
another man into his absolute power, does thereby put himself 
into a state of war with him; it being to be understood as a 
declaration of a design upon his life: for I have reason to 
conclude, that he who would get me into his power without my 
consent, would use me as he pleased when he had got me there, and 
destroy me too when he had a fancy to it; for no body can desire 
to have me in his absolute power, unless it be to compel me by 
force to that which is against the right of my freedom, i.e. 
make me a slave.  To be free from such force is the only security 
of my preservation; and reason bids me look on him, as an enemy 
to my preservation, who would take away that freedom which is 
the fence to it; so that he who makes an attempt to enslave me, 
thereby puts himself into a state of war with me.  He that, in 
the state of nature, would take away the freedom that belongs 
to any one in that state, must necessarily be supposed to have a 
foundationtofeallathevrest;hasghelthat,hin theestateeofgsociety, 
would take away the freedom belonging to those of that society 
or commonwealth, must be supposed to design to take away from 
them every thing else, and so be looked on as in a state of war.

     Sec. 18.  This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief, 
who has not in the least hurt him, nor declared any design upon 
his life, any farther than, by the use of force, so to get him in 
his power, as to take away his money, or what he pleases, from 
him; because using force, where he has no right, to get me into 
his power, let his pretence be what it will, I have no reason to 
suppose, that he, who would take away my liberty, would not, 
when he had me in his power, take away every thing else.  And 
therefore it is lawful for me to treat him as one who has put 
himself into a state of war with me, i.e.  kill him if I can; 
for to that hazard does he justly expose himself, whoever 
introduces a state of war, and is aggressor in it.

     Sec. 19.  And here we have the plain difference between the 
state of nature and the state of war, which however some men 
have confounded, are as far distant, as a state of peace, good 
will, mutual assistance and preservation, and a state of enmity, 
malice, violence and mutual destruction, are one from another.  
Men living together according to reason, without a common 
superior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is 
properly the state of nature.  But force, or a declared design 
of force, upon the person of another, where there is no common 
superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war: 
and it is the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war 
even against an aggressor, tho' he be in society and a fellow 
subject.  Thus a thief, whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to 
the law, for having stolen all that I am worth, I may kill, when 
he sets on me to rob me but of my horse or coat; because the law, 
which was made for my preservation, where it cannot interpose to 
secure my life from present force, which, if lost, is capable of 
no reparation, permits me my own defence, and the right of war, a 
liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor allows not 
time to appeal to our common judge, nor the decision of the law, 
for remedy in a case where the mischief may be irreparable.  Want 
of a common judge with authority, puts all men in a state of 
nature: force without right, upon a man's person, makes a state 
of war, both where there is, and is not, a common judge.

     Sec. 20.  But when the actual force is over, the state of 
war ceases between those that are in society, and are equally on 
both sides subjected to the fair determination of the law; 
because then there lies open the remedy of appeal for the past 
injury, and to prevent future harm: but where no such appeal is, 
as in the state of nature, for want of positive laws, and judges 
with authority to appeal to, the state of war once begun, 
continues, with a right to the innocent party to destroy the 
other whenever he can, until the aggressor offers peace, and 
desires reconciliation on such terms as may repair any wrongs he 
has already done, and secure the innocent for the future; nay, 
where an appeal to the law, and constituted judges, lies open, 
but the remedy is denied by a manifest perverting of justice, and 
a barefaced wresting of the laws to protect or indemnify the 
violence or injuries of some men, or party of men, there it is 
hard to imagine any thing but a state of war: for wherever 
violence is used, and injury done, though by hands appointed to 
administer justice, it is still violence and injury, however 
coloured with the name, pretences, or forms of law, the end 
whereof being to protect and redress the innocent, by an 
unbiassed application of it, to all who are under it; wherever 
that is not bona fide done, war is made upon the sufferers, who 
having no appeal on earth to right them, they are left to the 
only remedy in such cases, an appeal to heaven.