Sec. 21. To avoid this state of war (wherein there is no
appeal but to heaven, and wherein every the least difference is
apt to end, where there is no authority to decide between the
contenders) is one great reason of men's putting themselves into
society, and quitting the state of nature: for where there is an
authority, a power on earth, from which relief can be had by
appeal, there the continuance of the state of war is excluded,
and the controversy is decided by that power. Had there been any
such court, any superior jurisdiction on earth, to determine the
right between Jephtha and the Ammonites, they had never come to a
state of war: but we see he was forced to appeal to heaven. The
Lord the Judge (says he) be judge this day between the children
of Israel and the children of Ammon, Judg. xi. 27. and then
prosecuting, and relying on his appeal, he leads out his army to
battle: and therefore in such controversies, where the question
is put, who shall be judge? It cannot be meant, who shall decide
the controversy; every one knows what Jephtha here tells us, that
the Lord the Judge shall judge. Where there is no judge on
earth, the appeal lies to God in heaven. That question then
cannot mean, who shall judge, whether another hath put himself in
a state of war with me, and whether I may, as Jephtha did, appeal
to heaven in it? of that I myself can only be judge in my own
conscience, as I will answer it, at the great day, to the supreme
judge of all men.
CHAP. IV.
Of SLAVERY.
Sec. 22. THE natural liberty of man is to be free from any
superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or
legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature
for his rule. The liberty of man, in society, is to be under no
other legislative power, but that established, by consent, in the
commonwealth; nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint of
any law, but what that legislative shall enact, according to the
trust put in it. Freedom then is not what Sir Robert Filmer
tells us, Observations, A. 55. a liberty for every one to do what
he lists, to live as he pleases, and not to be tied by any laws:
but freedom of men under government is, to have a standing rule
to live by, common to every one of that society, and made by the
legislative power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will
in all things, where the rule prescribes not; and not to be
subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of
another man: as freedom of nature is, to be under no other
restraint but the law of nature.
Sec. 23. This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is
so necessary to, and closely joined with a man's preservation,
that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits his
preservation and life together: for a man, not having the power
of his own life, cannot, by compact, or his own consent,
enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the absolute,
arbitrary power of another, to take away his life, when he
pleases. No body can give more power than he has himself; and he
that cannot take away his own life, cannot give another power
over it. Indeed, having by his fault forfeited his own life, by
some act that deserves death; he, to whom he has forfeited it,
may (when he has him in his power) delay to take it, and make use
of him to his own service, and he does him no injury by it: for,
whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery outweigh the value
of his life, it is in his power, by resisting the will of his
master, to draw on himself the death he desires.
Sec. 24. This is the perfect condition of slavery, which
is nothing else, but the state of war continued, between a
lawful conqueror and a captive: for, if once compact enter
between them, and make an agreement for a limited power on the
one side, and obedience on the other, the state of war and
slavery ceases, as long as the compact endures: for, as has been
said, no man can, by agreement, pass over to another that which
he hath not in himself, a power over his own life.
I confess, we find among the Jews, as well as other nations,
that men did sell themselves; but, it is plain, this was only to
drudgery, not to slavery: for, it is evident, the person sold
was not under an absolute, arbitrary, despotical power: for the
master could not have power to kill him, at any time, whom, at a
certain time, he was obliged to let go free out of his service;
and the master of such a servant was so far from having an
arbitrary power over his life, that he could not, at pleasure, so
much as maim him, but the loss of an eye, or tooth, set him free,
Exod. xxi.
CHAP. V.
Of PROPERTY.
Sec. 25. Whether we consider natural reason, which tells
us, that men, being once born, have a right to their
preservation, and consequently to meat and drink, and such other
things as nature affords for their subsistence: or revelation,
which gives us an account of those grants God made of the world
to Adam, and to Noah, and his sons, it is very clear, that
God, as king David says, Psal. cxv. 16. has given the
earth to the children of men; given it to mankind in common. But
this being supposed, it seems to some a very great difficulty,
how any one should ever come to have a property in any thing: I
will not content myself to answer, that if it be difficult to
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