our rational part should be other than spiritual; and if any one
maintain that we are simply corporeal, this would far more exclude
us from the knowledge of things, there being nothing so
inconceivable as to say that matter knows itself. It is impossible
to imagine how it should know itself.

    So, if we are simply material, we can know nothing at all; and
if we are composed of mind and matter, we cannot know perfectly things
which are simple, whether spiritual or corporeal. Hence it comes
that almost all philosophers have confused ideas of things, and
speak of material things in spiritual terms, and of spiritual things
in material terms. For they say boldly that bodies have a tendency
to fall, that they seek after their centre, that they fly from
destruction, that they fear the void, that they have inclinations,
sympathies, antipathies, all of which attributes pertain only to mind.
And in speaking of minds, they consider them as in a place, and
attribute to them movement from one place to another; and these are
qualities which belong only to bodies.

    Instead of receiving the ideas of these things in their purity, we
colour them with our own qualities, and stamp with our composite being
all the simple things which we contemplate.

    Who would not think, seeing us compose all things of mind and
body, but that this mixture would be quite intelligible to us? Yet
it is the very thing we least understand. Man is to himself the most
wonderful object in nature; for he cannot conceive what the body is,
still less what the mind is, and least of all how a body should be
united to a mind. This is the consummation of his difficulties, and
yet it is his very being. Modus quo corporibus adhaerent spiritus
comprehendi ab hominibus non potest, et hoc tamen homo est.*
Finally, to complete the proof of our weakness, I shall conclude
with these two considerations...

    * St. Augustine, City of God, xxi. 10. "The manner in which the
spirit is united to the body can not be understood by man; and yet
it is man."

    73. But perhaps this subject goes beyond the capacity of reason.
Let us therefore examine her solutions to problems within her
powers. If there be anything to which her own interest must have
made her apply herself most seriously, it is the inquiry into her
own sovereign good. Let us see, then, wherein these strong and
clear-sighted souls have placed it and whether they agree.

    One says that the sovereign good consists in virtue, another in
pleasure, another in the knowledge of nature, another in truth,
Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,* another in total ignorance,
another in indolence, others in disregarding appearances, another in
wondering at nothing, nihil admirari prope res una quae possit
facere et servare beatum,*(2) and the true sceptics in their
indifference, doubt, and perpetual suspense, and others, wiser,
think to find a better definition. We are well satisfied.

    * Virgil, Georgics, ii. "Happy is he who is able to know the
causes of things."

    *(2) Horace, Epistles, I. vi. 1. " To be astonished at nothing
is nearly the only thing which can give and conserve happiness."

    We must see if this fine philosophy has gained nothing certain
from so long and so intent study; perhaps at least the soul will
know itself. Let us hear the rulers of the world on this subject. What
have they thought of her substance? 394.* Have they been more
fortunate in locating her? 395.* What have they found out about her
origin, duration, and departure? Harum sententiarum,* 399.*(2)

    * Cicero, Disputationes Tusculanae, i, ii Harum sententiarum
quae vera sit, Deus aliquis viderit. "Which of these opinions in the
truth, a god will see."

    *(2) Montaigne, Essays, ii.

    Is, then, the soul too noble a subject for their feeble lights?
Let us, then, abase her to matter and see if she knows whereof is made
the very body which she animates and those others which she
contemplates and moves at her will. What have those great
dogmatists, who are ignorant of nothing, known of this matter? 393.*

    *(2) Montaigne, Essays, ii.

    This would doubtless suffice, if Reason were reasonable. She is
reasonable enough to admit that she has been unable to find anything
durable, but she does not yet despair of reaching it; she is as ardent
as ever in this search, and is confident she has within her the
necessary powers for this conquest. We must therefore conclude, and,
after having examined her powers in their effects, observe them in
themselves, and see if she has a nature and a grasp capable of
laying hold of the truth.

    74. A letter On the Foolishness of Human Knowledge and Philosophy.

    This letter before Diversion.

    Felix qui potuit... Nihil admirari.

    280 kinds of sovereign good in Montaigne.

    75. Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.*