This is what the same St. Gregory says to some persons who were
astonished at the circumstance of another pope having suffered himself
to be deluded: "Why do you wonder," says he, "that we should be
deceived, we who are but men? Have you not read that David, a king who
had the spirit of prophecy, was induced, by giving credit to the
falsehoods of Ziba, to pronounce an unjust judgement against the son
of Jonathan? Who will think it strange, then, that we, who are not
prophets, should sometimes be imposed upon by deceivers? A
multiplicity of affairs presses on us, and our minds, which, by
being obliged to attend to so many things at once, apply themselves
less closely to each in particular, are the more easily liable to be
imposed upon in individual cases." Truly, father, I should suppose
that the popes know better than you whether they may be deceived or
not. They themselves tell us that popes, as well as the greatest
princes, are more exposed to deception than individuals who are less
occupied with important avocations. This must be believed on their
testimony. And it is easy to imagine by what means they come to be
thus overreached. St. Bernard, in the letter which he wrote to
Innocent II, gives us the following description of the process: "It is
no wonder, and no novelty, that the human mind may be deceived, and is
deceived. You are surrounded by monks who come to you in the spirit of
lying and deceit. They have filled your ears with stories against a
bishop, whose life has been most exemplary, but who is the object of
their hatred. These persons bite like dogs, and strive to make good
appear evil. Meanwhile, most holy father, you put yourself into a rage
against your own son. Why have you afforded matter of joy to his
enemies? Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they be
of God. I trust that, when you have ascertained the truth, all this
delusion, which rests on a false report, will be dissipated. I pray
the spirit of truth to grant you the grace to separate light from
darkness, and to favour the good by rejecting the evil." You see,
then, father, that the eminent rank of the popes does not exempt
them from the influence of delusion; and I may now add, that it only
serves to render their mistakes more dangerous and important than
those of other men. This is the light in which St. Bernard
represents them to Pope Eugenius: "There is another fault, so common
among the great of this world that I never met one of them who was
free from it; and that is, holy father, an excessive credulity, the
source of numerous disorders. From this proceed violent persecutions
against the innocent, unfounded prejudices against the absent, and
tremendous storms about nothing (pro nihilo). This, holy father, is
a universal evil, from the influence of which, if you are exempt, I
shall only say you are the only individual among all your compeers who
can boast of that privilege."

    I imagine, father, that the proofs I have brought are beginning to
convince you that the popes are liable to be surprised. But, to
complete your conversion, I shall merely remind you of some
examples, which you yourself have quoted in your book, of popes and
emperors whom heretics have actually deceived. You will remember,
then, that you have told us that Apollinarius surprised Pope Damasius,
in the same way that Celestius surprised Zozimus. You inform us,
besides, that one called Athanasius deceived the Emperor Heraclius,
and prevailed on him to persecute the Catholics. And lastly, that
Sergius obtained from Honorius that infamous decretal which was burned
at the sixth council, "by playing the busybody," as you say, "about
the person of that pope."

    It appears, then, father, by your own confession, that those who
act this part about the persons of kings and popes do sometimes
artfully entice them to persecute the faithful defenders of the truth,
under the persuasion that they are persecuting heretics. And hence the
popes, who hold nothing in greater horror than these surprisals, have,
by a letter of Alexander III, enacted an ecclesiastical statute, which
is inserted in the canonical law, to permit the suspension of the
execution of their bulls and decretals, when there is ground to
suspect that they have been imposed upon. "If," says that pope to
the Archbishop of Ravenna, "we sometimes send decretals to your
fraternity which are opposed to your sentiments, give yourselves no
distress on that account. We shall expect you eitherto carry them
respectfully into execution, or to send us the reason why you conceive
they ought not to be executed; for we deem it right that you should
not execute a decree which may have been procured from us by
artifice and surprise." Such has been the course pursued by the popes,
whose sole object is to settle the disputes of Christians, and not
to follow the passionate counsels of those who strive to involve
them in trouble and perplexity. Following the advice of St. Peter
and St. Paul, who in this followed the commandment of Jesus Christ,
they avoid domination. The spirit which appears in their whole conduct
is that of peace and truth. In this spirit they ordinarily insert in
their letters this clause, which is tacitly understood in them all:
"Si ita est; si preces veritate nitantur- If it be so as we have heard
it; if the facts be true." It is quite clear, if the popes
themselves give no force to their bulls, except in so far as they
are founded on genuine facts, that it is not the bulls alone that
prove the truth of the facts, but that, on the contrary, even
according to the canonists, it is the truth of the facts which renders
the bulls lawfully admissible.

    In what way, then, are we to learn the truth of facts? It must
be by the eyes, father, which are the legitimate judges of such
matters, as reason is the proper judge of things natural and
intelligible, and faith of things supernatural and revealed. For,
since you will force me into this discussion, you must allow me to
tell you that, according to the sentiments of the two greatest doctors
of the Church, St. Augustine and St. Thomas, these three principles of
our knowledge, the senses, reason, and faith, have each their separate
objects and their own degrees of certainty. And as God has been
pleased to employ the intervention of the senses to give entrance to
faith (for "faith cometh by hearing"), it follows, that so far from