infirmity on that occasion, and of their physician, and the desire
of their souls' health, and of praying to God for assistance,' and
that, in spite of these inspirations, these devoted souls
'nevertheless transgress,' and commit the sin?

    "You must conclude then, father, that neither sinners nor yet
saints have always that knowledge, or those desires and
inspirations, every time they offend; that is, to use your own
terms, they have not always actual grace. Say no longer, with your
modern authors, that it is impossible for those to sin who do not know
righteousness; but rather join with St. Augustine and the ancient
fathers in saying that it is impossible not to sin, when we do not
know righteousness: Necesse est ut peccet, a quo ignoratur justilia."

    The good father, though thus driven from both of his positions,
did not lose courage, but after ruminating a little, "Ha!" he
exclaimed, "I shall convince you immediately." And again taking up
Father Bauny, he pointed to the same place he had before quoted,
exclaiming, "Look now- see the ground on which he establishes his
opinion! I was sure he would not be deficient in good proofs. Read
what he quotes from Aristotle, and you will see that, after so express
an authority, you must either burn the books of this prince of
philosophers or adopt our opinion. Hear, then, the principles which
support Father Bauny: Aristotle states first, 'that an action cannot
be imputed as blameworthy, if it be involuntary.'"

    "I grant that," said my friend.

    "This is the first time you have agreed together," said I. "Take
my advice, father, and proceed no further."

    "That would be doing nothing," he replied; "we must know what
are the conditions necessary to constitute an action voluntary."

    "I am much afraid," returned I, "that you will get at
loggerheads on that point."

    "No fear of that," said he; "this is sure ground- Aristotle is
on my side. Hear now, what Father Bauny says: 'In order that an action
be voluntary, it must proceed from a man who perceives, knows, and
comprehends what is good and what is evil in it. Voluntarium est- that
is a voluntary action, as we commonly say with the philosopher'
(that is Aristotle, you know, said the monk, squeezing my hand); 'quod
fit a principio cognoscente singula in quibus est actio- which is done
by a person knowing the particulars of the action; so that when the
will is led inconsiderately, and without mature reflection, to embrace
or reject, to do or omit to do anything, before the understanding
has been able to see whether it would be right or wrong, such an
action is neither good nor evil; because previous to this mental
inquisition, view, and reflection on the good or bad qualities of
the matter in question, the act by which it is done is not voluntary.'
Are you satisfied now?" said the father.

    "It appears," returned I, "that Aristotle agrees with Father
Bauny; but that does not prevent me from feeling surprised at this
statement. What, sir! is it not enough to make an action voluntary
that the man knows what he is doing, and does it just because he
chooses to do it? Must we suppose, besides this, that he 'perceives,
knows, and comprehends what is good and evil in the action'? Why, on
this supposition there would be hardly such a thing in nature as
voluntary actions, for no one scarcely thinks about all this. How many
oaths in gambling, how many excesses in debauchery, how many riotous
extravagances in the carnival, must, on this principle, be excluded
from the list of voluntary actions, and consequently neither good
nor bad, because not accompanied by those 'mental reflections on the
good and evil qualities' of the action? But is it possible, father,
that Aristotle held such a sentiment? I have always understood that he
was a sensible man."

    "I shall soon convince you of that, said the Jansenist, and
requesting a sight of Aristotle's Ethics, he opened it at the
beginning of the third book, from which Father Bauny had taken the
passage quoted, and said to the monk: "I excuse you, my dear sir,
for having believed, on the word of Father Bauny, that Aristotle
held such a sentiment; but you would have changed your mind had you
read him for yourself. It is true that he teaches, that 'in order to
make an action voluntary, we must know the particulars of that
action'- singula in quibus est actio. But what else does he means by
that, than the circumstances of the action? The examples which he
adduces clearly show this to be his meaning, for they are
exclusively confined to cases in which the persons were ignorant of
some of the circumstances; such as that of 'a person who, wishing to
exhibit a machine, discharges a dart which wounds a bystander; and
that of Merope, who killed her own son instead of her enemy,' and such
like.

    "Thus you see what is the kind of ignorance that renders actions
involuntary; namely, that of the particular circumstances, which is
termed by divines, as you must know, ignorance of the fact. But with
respect to ignorance of the right- ignorance of the good or evil in an
action- which is the only point in question, let us see if Aristotle
agrees with Father Bauny. Here are the words of the philosopher:
'All wicked men are ignorant of what they ought to do, and what they
ought to avoid; and it is this very ignorance which makes them
wicked and vicious. Accordingly, a man cannot be said to act
involuntarily merely because he is ignorant of what it is proper for
him to do in order to fulfil his duty. This ignorance in the choice of
good and evil does not make the action involuntary; it only makes it
vicious. The same thing may be affirmed of the man who is ignorant
generally of the rules of his duty; such ignorance is worthy of blame,