act, unless it be conditioned for existence and
                action by another cause, which also is finite,
                and has a conditioned existence, and so on to
                infinity.

Proof.- (28:1) Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act, has been thus
conditioned by God (by [xxvi] and [xxiv] Coroll).

(28:2) But that which is finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot
be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God; for whatsoever
follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God is infinite and
eternal (by [xxi] ).  (28:3) It must, therefore, follow from some attribute
of God, in so far as the said attribute is considered as in some way
modified; for substance and modes make up the sum total of existence
(by [A.i] and [D.iii] , [D.v] ), while modes are merely modifications of
the attributes of God.  (4) But from God, or from any of his attributes,
in so far as the latter is modified by a modification infinite and eternal,
a conditioned thing cannot follow.  (28:5) Wherefore it must follow from,
or be conditioned for, existence and action by God or one of his attributes, 
in so far as the latter are modified by some modification which is finite
and has a conditioned existence.  (6) This is our first point.  (7) Again, 
this cause or this modification (for the reason by which we established
the first part of this proof) must in its turn be conditioned by another
cause, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and again,
this last by another (for the same reason); and so on (for the same reason)
to infinity.  Q.E.D.

Note.- (28:8) As certain things must be produced immediately by God,
namely those things which necessarily follow from his absolute nature,
through the means of these primary attributes, which, nevertheless,
can neither exist nor be conceived without God, it follows:-

(28:9)  1. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of those things
           immediately produced by him.  (10) I say absolutely, not
           after his kind, as is usually stated.  (11) For the of God
           cannot either exist or be conceived without a cause
           ([xv] and [xxiv] , Coroll.).
(28:12) 2. That God cannot properly be styled the remote cause of
           individual things, except for the sake of distinguishing
           these from what he immediately produces, or rather from
           what follows from his absolute nature.  (13) For, by 
           remote cause, we understand a cause which is in no way
           conjoined to the effect.  (14) But all things which are,
           are in God, and so depend on God, that without him they
           can neither be nor be conceived. 

PROP. [XXIX]  Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all
              things are conditioned to exist and operate in
              a particular manner by the necessity of the
              divine nature.

Proof.- (29:1) Whatsoever is, is in God ( [xv] ).  (2) But God cannot be
called a thing contingent.  (3) For (by [xi] ) he exists necessarily, and
not contingently.  (4) Further, the modes of the divine nature follow
therefrom necessarily, and not contingently ([xvi] ); and they thus follow,
whether we consider the divine nature absolutely or whether we consider it
as in any way conditioned to act ([xxvii] ).  (5) Further, God is not only
the cause of these modes, in so far as they simply exist (by [xxiv] 
Coroll.), but also in so far as they are considered as conditioned for
operating in a particular manner ([xxvi] ).  (29:6) If they be not
conditioned by God ([xxvi] ), it is impossible, and not contingent, that
they should condition themselves; contrariwise, if they be conditioned
by God, it is impossible, and not contingent that they should render
themselves unconditioned.  (29:7) Wherefore all things are conditioned by
the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but also to exist
and operate in a particular manner, and there is nothing that is contingent.
Q.E.D.

Note.- (29:8) Before going any further, I wish here to explain, what we
should understand by nature viewed as active (natura natarans), and nature
viewed as passive (natura naturata).  (9) I say to explain, or rather call
attention to it, for I think that, from what has been said, it is
sufficiently clear, that by nature viewed as active we should understand
that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself, or those
attributes of substance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in
other words ([xiv] Coroll. i., and [xvii] Coroll. ii.) God, in so far as
he is considered as a free cause.

(29:10) By nature viewed as passive I understand all that which follows
from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the attributes of
God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of God, in so far as they
are considered as things which are in God, and which without God cannot
exist or be conceived. 

PROP. [XXX]  Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in function
             infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and
             the modifications of God, and nothing else.

Proof.- (30:1) A true idea must agree with its object ([Avi] ); in
other words (obviously), that which is contained in the intellect in
representation must necessarily be granted in nature.  (2) But in
nature (by [xiv] Coroll. i.) there is no substance save God, nor any
modifications save those ( [xv] ) which are in God, and cannot without
God either be or be conceived.  (3) Therefore the intellect, in function 
finite, or in function infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God
and the modifications of God, and nothing else.  Q.E.D. 

PROP. [XXXI]  The intellect in function, whether finite or infinite,
              as will, desire, love, etc., should be referred to
              passive nature and not to active nature.