Corollary III.- (16:5) It follows, thirdly, that God is the absolutely
first cause. 

PROP. [XVII]  God acts solely by the laws of his own nature,
              and is not constrained by any one.

Proof.- (17:1) We have just shown (in [xvi] ), that solely from the
necessity of the divine nature, or, what is the same thing, solely from
the laws of his nature, an infinite number of things absolutely follow
in an infinite number of ways; and we proved (in [xv] ), that without
God nothing can be, nor be conceived; but that all things are in God.
(17:2) Wherefore nothing can exist outside himself, whereby he can be
conditioned or constrained to act.  (3) Wherefore God acts solely by the
laws of his own nature, and is not constrained by any one.  Q.E.D.

Corollary I.- (17:4) It follows: I. That there can be no cause which,
either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides the perfection of his
own nature, moves God to act.

Corollary II.- (17:5) It follows: 2. That God is the sole free cause.

(17:6) For God alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature (by [xi]
and [xiv] , Coroll. i. ), and acts by the sole necessity of his nature,
wherefore God is (by [D.vii] ) the sole free cause.  Q.E.D. 

Note.- (17:7) Others think that God is a free cause, because he can, as
they think, bring it about, that those things which we have said follow
from his nature, that is, which are in his power, should not come to pass,
or should not be produced by him.  (8) But this is the same as if they
said, that God could bring it about, that it should not follow from the
nature of a triangle, that its three interior angles should not be equal
to two right angles; or that from a given cause no effect should follow,
which is absurd.

(17:9) Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of this proposition,
that neither intellect nor will appertain to God's nature.  (10) I know
that there are many who think that they can show, that supreme intellect
and free will do appertain to God's nature; for they say they know of
nothing more perfect, which they can attribute to God, than that which is
the highest perfection in ourselves.  (11) Further, although they conceive
God as actually supremely intelligent, they yet do not believe, that he
can bring into existence everything which he actually understands, for
they think that they would thus destroy God's power.  (17:12) If, they
contend, God had created everything which is in his intellect, he would
not be able to create anything more, and this, they think, would clash
with God's omnipotence; therefore, they prefer to assert that God is
indifferent to all things, and that he creates nothing except that
which he has decided, by some absolute exercise of will, to create.
(17:13) However, I think I have shown sufficiently clearly (by [xvi] ),
that from God's supreme power, or infinite nature, an infinite number of 
things, that is, all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite
number of ways, or always follow from the same necessity; in the same
way as from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for
eternity, that its three interior angles are equal to two right angles.  
(17:14) Wherefore the omnipotence of God has been displayed from all
eternity, and will for all eternity remain in the same state of activity.
(15) This manner of treating the question attributes to God an omnipotence, 
in my opinion, far more perfect.  (16) For, otherwise, we are compelled to 
confess that God understands an infinite number of creatable things,
which he will never be able to create, for, if he created all that he
understands, he would, according to this showing, exhaust his omnipotence,
and render himself imperfect.  (17:17) Wherefore, in order to establish
that God is perfect, we should be reduced to establishing at the same time,
that he cannot bring to pass everything over which his power extends;
this seems to be an hypothesis most absurd, and most repugnant to God's
omnipotence.

(17:18) Further (to say a word here concerning the intellect and the will
which we attribute to God), if intellect and will appertain to the eternal
essence of God, we must take these words in some significations quite
different from those they usually bear.  (19) For intellect and will, which
should constitute the essence of God, would perforce be as far apart as the
poles from the human intellect and will, in fact, would have nothing in
common with them but the name; there would be about as much correspondence
between the two as there is between the Dog, the heavenly constellation,
and a dog, an animal that barks.  (20) This I will prove as follows: If 
intellect belongs to the divine nature, it cannot be in nature, as ours
is generally thought to be, posterior to, or simultaneous with the things
understood, inasmuch as God is prior to all things by reason of his
casualty ([xvi] Coroll. i.).  (17:21) On the contrary, the truth and formal
essence of things is as it is, because it exists by representation as such
in the intellect of God; Wherefore the intellect of God, in so far as it
is conceived to constitute God's essence, is, in reality, the cause of 
things, both of their essence and of their existence.  (22) This seems to 
have been recognized by those who have asserted, that God's intellect,
God's will, and God's power, are one and the same.  (17:23) As, therefore, 
God's intellect is the sole cause of things, namely, both of their essence
and existence, it must necessarily differ from them in respect to its
essence, and in respect to its existence.  (17:24) For a cause differs
from a thing it causes, precisely in the quality which the latter gains
from the former.

(17:25) For example, a man is the cause of another man's existence, 
not of his essence (for the latter is an eternal truth), and, therefore,
the two men may be entirely similar in essence, but must be different in
existence; and hence if the existence of one of them cease, the existence
of the other will not necessarily cease also; but if the essence of one
could be destroyed, and be made false, the essence of the other would be
destroyed also.  (17:26) Wherefore, a thing which is the cause both of
the essence and of the existence of a given effect, must differ from