to have existed, or not to be going to exist), thought would perforce
have existed without the idea of God, which is contrary to our hypothesis,
for we supposed that, thought being given, the idea of God necessarily
flowed therefrom.  (9) Therefore the idea of God expressed in thought,
or anything which necessarily follows from the absolute nature of some
attribute of God, cannot have a limited duration, but through the said
attribute is eternal, which is our second point.  (10) Bear in mind that
the same proposition may be affirmed of anything, which in any attribute
necessarily follows from God's absolute nature.

PROP. [XXII]  Whatsoever follows from any attribute of God, in so 
              far as it is modified by a modification, which exists
              necessarily and as infinite, through the said attribute,
              must also exist necessarily and as infinite.

Proof.- (22:1) The proof of this proposition is similar to that of the 
preceding one.

PROP. [XXIII]  Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as
               infinite, must necessarily follow either from the
               absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from
               an attribute modified by a modification which exists
               necessarily, and as infinite.

Proof.- (23:1) A mode exists in something else, through which it must be
conceived ([D.v] ), that is ([xv] ), it exists solely in God, and solely
through God can be conceived.  (2) If, therefore, a mode is conceived as
necessarily existing and infinite, it must necessarily be inferred or
perceived through some attribute of God, in so far as such attribute is
conceived as expressing the infinity and necessity of existence, in other
words (Def. viii.) eternity; that is, in so far as it is considered
absolutely.  (3) A mode, therefore, which necessarily exists as infinite,
must follow from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, either
immediately ([xxi] ) or through the means of some modification, which
follows from the absolute nature of the said attribute; that is
(by [xxii] ), which exists necessarily and as infinite.

PROP. [XXIV]  The essence of things produced by God does not 
              involve existence.

Proof.- (24:1) This proposition is evident from ([D.i] ).  (2) For that
of which the nature (considered in itself) involves existence is self-
caused, and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature.

Corollary.- (24:3) Hence it follows that God is not only the cause of
things coming into existence, but also of their continuing in existence,
that is, in scholastic phraseology, God is cause of the being of things
(essendi rerum).  (4) For whether things exist, or do not exist,
whenever we contemplate their essence, we see that it involves neither
existence nor duration; consequently, it cannot be the cause of either
the one or the other.  (5) God must be the sole cause, inasmuch as to
him alone does existence appertain. ([xiv] Coroll. i.)  Q.E.D. 

PROP. [XXV]  God is the efficient cause not only of the existence 
             of things, but also of their essence.

Proof.- (25:1) If this be denied, then God is not the cause of the essence
of things; and therefore the essence of things can (by [A.iv] ) be
conceived without God.  (2) This (by [xv] ) is absurd.  (3) Therefore,
God is the cause of the essence of things.  Q.E.D.

Note.- (25:4) This proposition follows more clearly from [xvi] .  (5) For
it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, the essence of things
must be inferred from it, no less than their existence, in a word, God
must be called the cause of all things, in the same sense as he is
called the cause of himself.  (6) This will be made still clearer by the
following corollary.

Corollary.- (25:7) Individual things are nothing but modifications
of the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God
are expressed in a fixed and definite manner.  (8) The proof appears
from [xv] and [D.v] . 

PROP. [XXVI]  A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular 
              manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God;
              and that which has not been conditioned by God cannot
              condition itself to act.

Proof.- (26:1) That by which things are said to be conditioned to act in
a particular manner is necessarily something positive ( this is obvious );
therefore both of its essence and of its existence God by the necessity
of his nature is the efficient cause ([xxv] and xvi.); this is our first
point.  (2) Our second point is plainly to be inferred therefrom.
26:(3) For if a thing, which has not been conditioned by God, could
condition itself, the first part of our proof would be false, and this,
as we have shown, is absurd.

PROP. [XXVII]  A thing, which has been conditioned by God to
               act in a particular way, cannot render itself
               unconditioned.

Proof.- (27:1) This proposition is evident from the [A.III] axiom. 

PROP. [XXVIII]  Every individual thing, or everything which is
                finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot
                exist or be conditioned to act, unless it be
                conditioned for existence and action by a cause
                other than itself, which also is finite, and has
                a conditioned existence; and likewise this cause
                cannot in its turn exist, or be conditioned to