[82]  (1) The memory is also strengthened without the aid of the
understanding by means of the power wherewith the imagination or
the sense called common, is affected by some particular physical
object.  (2) I say particular, for the imagination is only affected
by particular objects.  (3) If we read, for instance, a single romantic
comedy, we shall remember it very well, so long as we do not read
many others of the same kind, for it will reign alone in the memory
(4) If, however, we read several others of the same kind, we shall
think of them altogether, and easily confuse one with another.
(82:5) I say also, physical.  (6) For the imagination is only
affected by physical objects.  (7) As, then, the memory is
strengthened both with and without the aid of the understanding,
we may conclude that it is different from the understanding,
and that in the latter considered in itself there is neither
memory nor forgetfulness. 

[83] (1) What, then, is memory? (2) It is nothing else than the
actual sensation of impressions on the brain, accompanied with the
thought of a definite duration, [83d] of the sensation.  (3) This
is also shown by reminiscence.  (4) For then we think of the
sensation, but without the notion of continuous duration; thus the
idea of that sensation is not the actual duration of the sensation
or actual memory.  (83:5) Whether ideas are or are not subject to
corruption will be seen in philosophy.  (6) If this seems too
absurd to anyone, it will be sufficient for our purpose, if he
reflect on the fact that a thing is more easily remembered in
proportion to its singularity, as appears from the example of
the comedy just cited.  (83:7) Further, a thing is remembered more
easily in proportion to its intelligibility; therefore we cannot
help remember that which is extremely singular and sufficiently
intelligible.
 

[84]  (1) Thus, then, we have distinguished between a true idea and
other perceptions, and shown that ideas fictitious, false, and the
rest, originate in the imagination - that is, in certain sensations
fortuitous (so to speak) and disconnected, arising not from the power
of the mind, but from external causes, according as the body,
sleeping or waking, receives various motions.
   (2) But one may take any view one likes of the imagination so long
as one acknowledges that it is different from the understanding, and
that the soul is passive with regard to it.  (3) The view taken is
immaterial, if we know that the imagination is something indefinite,
with regard to which the soul is passive, and that we can by some
means or other free ourselves therefrom with the help of the
understanding.  (4) Let no one then be astonished that before proving
the existence of body, and other necessary things, I speak of
imagination of body, and of its composition.  (5) The view taken is,
I repeat, immaterial, so long as we know that imagination is something
indefinite, &c. 

[85] (1) As regards as a true idea, we have shown that it is simple
or compounded of simple ideas; that it shows how and why something
is or has been made; and that its subjective effects in the soul
correspond to the actual reality of its object.  (2) This conclusion
is identical with the saying of the ancients, that true proceeds
from cause to effect; though the ancients, so far as I know,
never formed the conception put forward here that the soul acts
according to fixed laws, and is as it were an immaterial automaton. 

[86]  (1) Hence, as far as is possible at the outset, we have
acquired a knowledge of our understanding, and such a standard of
a true idea that we need no longer fear confounding truth with
falsehood and fiction.  (2) Neither shall we wonder why we
understand some things which in nowise fall within the scope of
the imagination, while other things are in the imagination but
wholly opposed to the understanding, or others, again, which
agree therewith.  (3) We now know that the operations, whereby the
effects of imagination are produced, take place under other laws
quite different from the laws of the understanding, and that the
mind is entirely passive with regard to them. 

[87]  (1) Whence we may also see how easily men may fall into grave
errors through not distinguishing accurately between the imagination
and the understanding; such as believing that extension must be
localized, that it must be finite, that its parts are really distinct
one from the other, that it is the primary and single foundation of
all things, that it occupies more space at one time than at another
and other similar doctrines, all entirely opposed to truth, as we
shall duly show. 

[88] (1) Again, since words are a part of the imagination - that is,
since we form many conceptions in accordance with confused
arrangements of words in the memory, dependent on particular bodily
conditions, - there is no doubt that words may, equally with the
imagination, be the cause of many and great errors, unless we 
strictly on our guard. 

[89] (1) Moreover, words are formed according to popular fancy and
intelligence, and are, therefore, signs of things as existing in the
imagination, not as existing in the understanding.  (2) This is
evident from the fact that to all such things as exist only in the
understanding, not in the imagination, negative names are often
given, such as incorporeal, infinite, &c.  (3) So, also, many
conceptions really affirmative are expressed negatively, and vice
versa, such as uncreate, independent, infinite, immortal, &c.,
inasmuch as their contraries are much more easily imagined, and,
therefore, occurred first to men, and usurped positive names.
(89:4) Many things we affirm and deny, because the nature of words