or the advancement of science and art. (2) But this subject is
    reserved to its own place, for it is not here proper to
    investigate the matter more accurately.
[b] These considerations should be set forth more precisely.
[c] These matters are explained more at length elsewhere.
[d] N.B. I do no more here than enumerate the sciences necessary
    for our purpose; I lay no stress on their order.
[e] There is for the sciences but one end, to which they should
    all be directed.
[f] (1) In this case we do not understand anything of the cause
    from the consideration of it in the effect.  (2) This is
    sufficiently evident from the fact that the cause is only
    spoken of in very general terms, such as - there exists then
    something; there exists then some power, &c.; or from the
    that we only express it in a negative manner - it is not
    or that, &c.  (3) In the second case something is ascribed
    to the cause because of the effect, as we shall show in an
    example, but only a property, never an essence.
[g] (1) From this example may be clearly seen what I have just
    drawn attention to.  (2) For through this union we understand
    nothing beyond the sensation, the effect, to wit, from which
    we inferred the cause of which we understand nothing.
[h] (1) A conclusion of this sort, though it be certain, is yet
    not to be relied on without great caution; for unless we are
    exceedingly careful we shall forthwith fall into error.
    (2) When things are conceived thus abstractedly, and not
    through their true essence, they are apt to be confused by the
    imagination.  (3) For that which is in itself one, men imagine
    to be multiplex.  (4) To those things which are conceived
    abstractedly, apart, and confusedly, terms are applied which are
    apt to become wrested from their strict meaning, and bestowed on
    things more familiar; whence it results that these latter are
    imagined in the same way as the former to which the terms were
    originally given.
[i] I shall here treat a little more in detail of experience,
    and shall examine the method adopted by the Empirics,
    and by recent philosophers.
[k] By native strength, I mean that not bestowed on us by external
    causes, as I shall afterwards explain in my philosophy.
[l] Here I term them operations: I shall explain their nature
    in my philosophy.
[m] I shall take care not only to demonstrate what I have just
    advanced, but also that we have hitherto proceeded rightly,
    and other things needful to be known.
[33note1] (1) In modern language, "the idea may become the
    subject of another presentation."  (2) Objectivus generally
    corresponds to the modern "subjective," formalis to the
    modern "objective." [Trans.- Note 1]
[n] (1) Observe that we are not here inquiring how the first
    subjective essence is innate in us.  (2) This belongs to an
    investigation into nature, where all these matters are amply
    explained, and it is shown that without ideas neither
    affirmation, nor negation, nor volition are possible.
[o] The nature of mental search is explained in my philosophy.
[p] To be connected with other things is to be produced by them,
    or to produce them.
[q] In the same way as we have here no doubt of the truth of
    our knowledge.
[r] See below the note on hypotheses, whereof we have a clear
    understanding; the fiction consists in saying that such
    hypotheses exist in heavenly bodies.
[s] (1) As a thing, when once it is understood, manifests itself,
    we have need only of an example without further proof.
    (2) In the same way the contrary has only to be presented to
    our minds to be recognized as false, as will forthwith appear
    when we come to discuss fiction concerning essences.
[t] Observe, that although many assert that they doubt whether God
    exists, they have nought but his name in their minds, or else
    some fiction which they call God: this fiction is not in
    harmony with God's real nature, as we will duly show.
[u] (1) I shall presently show that no fiction can concern eternal
    truths. By an eternal truth, I mean that which being positive
    could never become negative.  (2) Thus it is a primary and
    eternal truth that God exists, but it is not an eternal truth
    that Adam thinks.  (3) That the Chimaera does not exist is an
    eternal truth, that Adam does not think is not so.
[x] (1) Afterwards, when we come to speak of fiction that is
    concerned with essences, it will be evident that fiction never
    creates or furnishes the mind with anything new; only such things
    as are already in the brain or imagination are recalled to the
    memory, when the attention is directed to them confusedly and all
    at once.  (2) For instance, we have remembrance of spoken words
    and of a tree; when the mind directs itself to them confusedly,
    it forms the notion of a tree speaking.  (3) The same may be said
    of existence, especially when it is conceived quite generally as
    an entity; it is then readily applied to all things together in
    the memory.  (4) This is specially worthy of remark.
[y] We must understand as much in the case of hypotheses put forward
    to explain certain movements accompanying celestial phenomena;
    but from these, when applied to the celestial motions, we any
    draw conclusions as to the nature of the heavens, whereas this
    last may be quite different, especially as many other causes are
    conceivable which would account for such motions.
[z] (1) It often happens that a man recalls to mind this word soul,
    and forms at the same time some corporeal image: as the two
    representations are simultaneous, he easily thinks that he
    imagines and feigns a corporeal soul: thus confusing the name
    with the thing itself.  (2) I here beg that my readers will not
    be in a hurry to refute this proposition; they will, I hope,
    have no mind to do so, if they pay close attention to the