consists. 
    (39:4) Now it is clear that the mind apprehends itself better
in proportion as it understands a greater number of natural
objects; it follows, therefore, that this portion of the method
will be more perfect in proportion as the mind attains to the
comprehension of a greater number of objects, and that it will
be absolutely perfect when the mind gains a knowledge of the
absolutely perfect being, or becomes conscious thereof. 

[40]  (1) Again, the more things the mind knows, the better does
it understand its own strength and the order of nature; by
increased self-knowledge, it can direct itself more easily, and
lay down rules for its own guidance; and, by increased knowledge
of nature, it can more easily avoid what is useless.  (2) And
this is the sum total of method, as we have already stated. 

[41]  (1) We may add that the idea in the world of thought is in
the same case as its correlate in the world of reality.  (2) If,
therefore, there be anything in nature which is without connection
with any other thing, and if we assign to it a subjective essence,
which would in every way correspond to the objective reality,
the subjective essence would have no connection, [p] with any
other ideas - in other words, we could not draw any conclusions
with regard to it.  (41:3) On the other hand, those things which are
connected with others - as all things that exist in nature - will
be understood by the mind, and their subjective essences will
maintain the same mutual relations as their objective realities - 
that is to say, we shall infer from these ideas other ideas, which
will in turn be connected with others, and thus our instruments
for proceeding with our investigation will increase.  (4) This is
what we were endeavoring to prove. 

[42]  (1) Further, from what has just been said - namely, that an
idea must, in all respects, correspond to its correlate in the
world of reality, - it is evident that, in order to reproduce in
every respect the faithful image of nature, our mind must deduce
all its ideas from the idea which represents the origin and source
of the whole of nature, so that it may itself become the source
of other ideas. 

[43]  (1) It may, perhaps, provoke astonishment that, after having
said that the good method is that which teaches us to direct our
mind according to the standard of the given true idea, we should
prove our point by reasoning, which would seem to indicate that it
is not self-evident.  (2) We may, therefore, be questioned as to
the validity of our reasoning.  (3) If our reasoning be sound, we
must take as a starting-point a true idea.  (4) Now, to be certain
that our starting-point is really a true idea, we need proof. 
(5) This first course of reasoning must be supported by a second,
the second by a third, and so on to infinity. 

[44]  (1) To this I make answer that, if by some happy chance anyone
had adopted this method in his investigations of nature - that is,
if he had acquired new ideas in the proper order, according to the
standard of the original true idea, he would never have doubted [q]
of the truth of his knowledge, inasmuch as truth, as we have shown,
makes itself manifest, and all things would flow, as it were,
spontaneously towards him.  (44:2) But as this never, or rarely,
happens, I have been forced so to arrange my proceedings, that we
may acquire by reflection and forethought what we cannot acquire
by chance, and that it may at the same time appear that, for
proving the truth, and for valid reasoning, we need no other means
than the truth and valid reasoning themselves: for by valid
reasoning I have established valid reasoning, and, in like measure,
I seek still to establish it. 

[45]  (1) Moreover, this is the order of thinking adopted by men
in their inward meditations.  (2) The reasons for its rare employment
in investigations of nature are to be found in current misconceptions,
whereof we shall examine the causes hereafter in our philosophy.
(3) Moreover, it demands, as we shall show, a keen and accurate
discernment.  (4) Lastly, it is hindered by the conditions of human
life, which are, as we have already pointed out, extremely changeable.
(5) There are also other obstacles, which we will not here inquire into. 

 
[46]  (1) If anyone asks why I have not at the starting-point set forth
all the truths of nature in their due order, inasmuch as truth is
self-evident, I reply by warning him not to reject as false any
paradoxes he may find here, but to take the trouble to reflect on
the chain of reasoning by which they are supported; he will then
be no longer in doubt that we have attained to the truth.
(2) This is why I have as above. 

[47] (1) If there yet remains some sceptic, who doubts of our
primary truth, and of all deductions we make, taking such truth
as our standard, he must either be arguing in bad faith, or we
must confess that there are men in complete mental blindness
either innate or due to misconceptions - that is, to some external
influence.  (2) Such persons are not conscious of themselves.
(3) If they affirm or doubt anything, they know not that they
affirm or doubt: they say that they know nothing, and they say
that they are ignorant of the very fact of their knowing nothing.
(4) Even this they do not affirm absolutely, they are afraid of
confessing that they exist, so long as they know nothing;
in fact, they ought to remain dumb, for fear of haply supposing
which should smack of truth.

[48]  (1) Lastly, with such persons, one should not speak of
sciences: for, in what relates to life and conduct, they are