no idea or connection of subject and predicate, in our mind.
(3) If there were such a conception we should at the same time
be aware of the means and the causes whereby the event took place.
(4) Moreover, we pay no attention to the nature of the subject
and the predicate. 

[63]  (1) Now, if the first idea be not fictitious, and if all the
other ideas be deduced therefrom, our hurry to form fictitious ideas
will gradually subside.  (2) Further, as a fictitious idea cannot be
clear and distinct, but is necessarily confused, and as all confusion
arises from the fact that the mind has only partial knowledge of a
thing either simple or complex, and does not distinguish between the
known and the unknown, and, again, that it directs its attention
promiscuously to all parts of an object at once without making
distinctions, it follows, first, that if the idea be of something
very simple, it must necessarily be clear and distinct.  (3) For
a very simple object cannot be known in part, it must either be
known altogether or not at all. 

[64]  (1) Secondly, it follows that if a complex object be divided by
thought into a number of simple component parts, and if each be
regarded separately, all confusion will disappear.  (2) Thirdly, it
follows that fiction cannot be simple, but is made up of the blending
of several confused ideas of diverse objects or actions existent in
nature, or rather is composed of attention directed to all such ideas
at once, [64b] and unaccompanied by any mental assent. 
   (64:3) Now a fiction that was simple would be clear and distinct,
and therefore true, also a fiction composed only of distinct ideas
would be clear and distinct, and therefore true.  (4) For instance,
when we know the nature of the circle and the square, it is
impossible for us to blend together these two figures, and to
hypothesize a square circle, any more than a square soul, or things
of that kind. 

[65] (1) Let us shortly come to our conclusion, and again repeat
that we need have no fear of confusing with true ideas that which
is only a fiction.  (2) As for the first sort of fiction of which
we have already spoken, when a thing is clearly conceived, we saw
that if the existence of a that thing is in itself an eternal trut
fiction can have no part in it; but if the existence of the 
conceived be not an eternal truth, we have only to be careful 
such existence be compared to the thing's essence, and to
consider the order of nature. (64:3) As for the second sort of
fiction, which we stated to be the result of simultaneously
directing the attention, without the assent of the intellect,
to different confused ideas representing different things and
actions existing in nature, we have seen that an absolutely
simple thing cannot be feigned, but must be understood, and that
a complex thing is in the same case if we regard separately the
simple parts whereof it is composed; we shall not even be able
to hypothesize any untrue action concerning such objects, for we
shall be obliged to consider at the same time the causes and manner
of such action.

[66]  (1) These matters being thus understood, let us pass on to
consider the false idea, observing the objects with which it is
concerned, and the means of guarding ourselves from falling into
false perceptions.  (2) Neither of these tasks will present much
difficulty, after our inquiry concerning fictitious ideas.
(3) The false idea only differs from the fictitious idea in the
fact of implying a mental assent - that is, as we have already
remarked, while the representations are occurring, there are no
causes present to us, wherefrom, as in fiction, we can conclude
that such representations do not arise from external objects:
in fact, it is much the same as dreaming with our eyes open,
or while awake.  (67:4) Thus, a false idea is concerned with, or
(to speak more correctly) is attributable to, the existence of
a thing whereof the essence is known, or the essence itself, in
the same way as a fictitious idea. 

[67]  (1) If attributable to the existence of the thing, it is
corrected in the same way as a fictitious idea under similar
circumstances.  (2) If attributable to the essence, it is
likewise corrected in the same way as a fictitious idea.
(67:3) For if the nature of the thing known implies necessary
existence, we cannot possible be in error with regard to its
existence; but if the nature of the thing be not an eternal
truth, like its essence, but contrariwise the necessity or
impossibility of its existence depends on external causes,
then we must follow the same course as we adopted in the 
of fiction, for it is corrected in the same manner. 

[68]  (1) As for false ideas concerned with essences, or even
with actions, such perceptions are necessarily always confused,
being compounded of different confused perceptions of things
existing in nature, as, for instance, when men are persuaded
that deities are present in woods, in statues, in brute beasts,
and the like; that there are bodies which, by their composition
alone, give rise to intellect; that corpses reason, walk about,
and speak; that God is deceived, and so on.  (68:2) But ideas which
are clear and distinct can never be false: for ideas of things
clearly and distinctly conceived are either very simple
themselves, or are compounded from very simple ideas, that is,
are deduced therefrom.  (3) The impossibility of a very simple
idea being false is evident to everyone who understands the nature
of truth or understanding and of falsehood. 

[69]  (1) As regards that which constitutes the reality of truth,
it is certain that a true idea is distinguished from a false one,
not so much by its extrinsic object as by its intrinsic nature.