dominion (Sec. 3); therefore of these laws he who holds dominion remains
sole interpreter. Moreover, no private person can by right vindicate
these laws, and so they do not really bind him who holds dominion.
Notwithstanding, if they are of such a nature that they cannot be
broken, without at the same time weakening the commonwealth's strength,
that is, without at the same time changing to indignation the common
fear of most of the citizens, by this very fact the commonwealth is
dissolved, and the contract comes to an end; and therefore such contract
is vindicated not by the civil law, but by the law of war. And so he who
holds dominion is not bound to observe the terms of the contract by any
other cause than that, which bids a man in the state of nature to beware
of being his own enemy, lest he should destroy himself, as we said in
the last section.

------------------------

CHAPTER V.

OF THE BEST STATE OF A DOMINION.

IN Chap. II. Sec. 2, we showed, that man is then most independent, when
he is most led by reason, and, in consequence (Chap. III. Sec. 7), that
that commonwealth is most powerful and most independent, which is
founded and guided by reason. But, as the best plan of living, so as to
assure to the utmost self-preservation, is that which is framed
according to the dictate of reason, therefore it follows, that that in
every kind is best done, which a man or commonwealth does, so far as he
or it is in the highest degree independent. For it is one thing to till
a field by right, and another to till it in the best way. One thing, I
say, to defend or preserve one's self, and to pass judgment by right,
and another to defend or preserve one's self in the best way, and to
pass the best judgment; and, consequently, it is one thing to have
dominion and care of affairs of state by right, and another to exercise
dominion and direct affairs of state in the best way. And so, as we have
treated of the right of every commonwealth in general, it is time to
treat of the best state of every dominion.

2. Now the quality of the state of any dominion is easily perceived from
the end of the civil state, which end is nothing else but peace and
security of life. And therefore that dominion is the best, where men
pass their lives in unity, and the laws are kept unbroken. For it is
certain, that seditions, wars, and contempt or breach of the laws are
not so much to be imputed to the wickedness of the subjects, as to the
bad state of a dominion. For men are not born fit for citizenship, but
must be made so. Besides, men's natural passions are everywhere the
same; and if wickedness more prevails, and more offences are committed
in one commonwealth than in another, it is certain that the former has
not enough pursued the end of unity, nor framed its laws with sufficient
forethought; and that, therefore, it has failed in making quite good its
right as a commonwealth. For a civil state, which has not done away with
the causes of seditions, where war is a perpetual object of fear, and
where, lastly, the laws are often broken, differs but little from the
mere state of nature, in which everyone lives after his own mind at the
great risk of his life.

3. But as the vices and inordinate licence and contumacy of subjects
must be imputed to the commonwealth, so, on the other hand, their virtue
and constant obedience to the laws are to be ascribed in the main to the
virtue and perfect right of the commonwealth, as is clear from Chap. II.
Sec. 15. And so it is deservedly reckoned to Hannibal as an
extraordinary virtue, that in his army there never arose a sedition. [1]

4. Of a commonwealth, whose subjects are but hindered by terror from
taking arms, it should rather be said, that it is free from war, than
that it has peace. For peace is not mere absence of war, but is a virtue
that springs from force of character: for obedience (Chap. II. Sec. 19)
is the constant will to execute what, by the general decree of the
commonwealth, ought to be done. Besides that commonwealth, whose peace
depends on the sluggishness of its subjects, that are led about like
sheep, to learn but slavery, may more properly be called a desert than a
commonwealth.

5. When, then, we call that dominion best, where men pass their lives in
unity, I understand a human life, defined not by mere circulation of the
blood, and other qualities common to all animals, but above all by
reason, the true excellence and life of the mind.

6. But be it remarked that, by the dominion which I have said is
established for this end, I intend that which has been established by a
free multitude, not that which is acquired over a multitude by right of
war. For a free multitude is guided more by hope than fear; a conquered
one, more by fear than hope: inasmuch as the former aims at making use
of life, the latter but at escaping death. The former, I say, aims at
living for its own ends, the latter is forced to belong to the
conqueror; and so we say that this is enslaved, but that free. And,
therefore, the end of a dominion, which one gets by right of war, is to
be master, and have rather slaves than subjects. And although between
the dominion created by a free multitude, and that gained by right of
war, if we regard generally the right of each, we can make no essential
distinction; yet their ends, as we have already shown, and further the
means to the preservation of each are very different.

7. But what means a prince, whose sole motive is lust of mastery, should
use to establish and maintain his dominion, the most ingenious
Machiavelli has set forth at large, [2] but with what design one can
hardly be sure. If, however, he had some good design, as one should
believe of a learned man, it seems to have been to show, with how little
foresight many attempt to remove a tyrant, though thereby the causes
which make the prince a tyrant can in no wise be removed, but, on the
contrary, are so much the more established, as the prince is given more