1. Theologico-Political Treatise, Chap. xvi.

2. Ethics, iv. 37, note 2. 

3. Ibid., ii. 48, 49, note. 

4. Virgil, Ecl. ii. 65. 

5. Romans ix. 21.

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CHAPTER III.

OF THE RIGHT OF SUPREME AUTHORITIES. 

UNDER every dominion the state is said to be Civil; but the entire body
subject to a dominion is called a Commonwealth, and the general business
of the dominion, subject to the direction of him that holds it, has the
name of Affairs of State. Next we call men Citizens, as far as they
enjoy by the civil law all the advantages of the commonwealth, and
Subjects, as far as they are bound to obey its ordinances or laws.
Lastly, we have already said that, of the civil state, there are three
kinds -- democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy (Chap. II. Sec. 17). Now,
before I begin to treat of each kind separately, I will first deduce all
the properties of the civil state in general. And of these, first of all
comes to be considered the supreme right of the commonwealth, or the
right of the supreme authorities. 

2. From Chap. II. Sec. 15, it is clear that the right of the supreme
authorities is nothing else than simple natural right, limited, indeed,
by the power, not of every individual, but of the multitude, which is
guided, as it were, by one mind -- that is, as each individual in the
state of nature, so the body and mind of a dominion have as much right
as they have power. And thus each single citizen or subject has the less
right, the more the commonwealth exceeds him in power (Chap. II. Sec.
16), and each citizen consequently does and has nothing, but what he may
by the general decree of the commonwealth defend.

3. If the commonwealth grant to any man the right, and therewith the
authority (for else it is but a gift of words, Chap. II. Sec. 12), to
live after his own mind, by that very act it abandons its own right, and
transfers the same to him, to whom it has given such authority. But if
it has given this authority to two or more, I mean authority to live
each after his own mind, by that very act it has divided the dominion,
and if, lastly, it has given this same authority to every citizen, it
has thereby destroyed itself, and there remains no more a commonwealth,
but everything returns to the state of nature; all of which is very
manifest from what goes before. And thus it follows, that it can by no
means be conceived, that every citizen should by the ordinance of the
commonwealth live after his own mind, and accordingly this natural right
of being one's own judge ceases in the civil state. I say expressly "by
the ordinance of the commonwealth," for, if we weigh the matter aright,
the natural right of every man does not cease in the civil state. For
man, alike in the natural and in the civil state, acts according to the
laws of his own nature, and consults his own interest. Man, I say, in
each state is led by fear or hope to do or leave undone this or that;
but the main difference between the two states is this, that in the
civil state all fear the same things, and all have the same ground of
security, and manner of life; and this certainly does not do away with
the individual's faculty of judgment. For he that is minded to obey all
the commonwealth's orders, whether through fear of its power or through
love of quiet, certainly consults after his own heart his own safety and
interest.

4. Moreover, we cannot even conceive, that every citizen should be
allowed to interpret the commonwealth's decrees or laws. For were every
citizen allowed this, he would thereby be his own judge, because each
would easily be able to give a colour of right to his own deeds, which
by the last section is absurd. 

5. We see then, that every citizen depends not on himself, but on the
commonwealth, all whose commands he is bound to execute, and has no
right to decide, what is equitable or iniquitous, just or unjust. But,
on the contrary, as the body of the dominion should, so to speak, be
guided by one mind, and consequently the will of the commonwealth must
be taken to be the will of all; what the state decides to be just and
good must be held to be so decided by every individual. And so, however
iniquitous the subject may think the commonwealth's decisions, he is
none the less bound to execute them. 

6. But (it may be objected) is it not contrary to the dictate of reason
to subject one's self wholly to the judgment of another, and
consequently, is not the civil state repugnant to reason? Whence it
would follow, that the civil state is irrational, and could only be
created by men destitute of reason, not at all by such as are led by it.
But since reason teaches nothing contrary to nature, sound reason cannot
therefore dictate, that every one should remain independent, so long as
men are liable to passions (Chap. II. Sec. 15), that is, reason
pronounces against such independence (Chap. I. Sec. 5). Besides, reason
altogether teaches to seek peace, and peace cannot be maintained, unless
the commonwealth's general laws be kept unbroken. And so, the more a man
is guided by reason, that is (Chap. II. Sec. 11), the more he is free,
the more constantly he will keep the laws of the commonwealth, and
execute the commands of the supreme authority, whose subject he is.
Furthermore, the civil state is naturally ordained to remove general
fear, and prevent general sufferings, and therefore pursues above
everything the very end, after which everyone, who is led by reason,
strives, but in the natural state strives vainly (Chap. II. Sec. 15).
Wherefore, if a man, who is led by reason, has sometimes to do by the