commonwealth's order what he knows to be repugnant to reason, that harm
is far compensated by the good, which he derives from the existence of a
civil state. For it is reason's own law, to choose the less of two
evils; and accordingly we may conclude, that no one is acting against
the dictate of his own reason, so far as he does what by the law of the
commonwealth is to be done. And this anyone will more easily grant us,
after we have explained, how far the power and consequently the right of
the commonwealth extends.

7. For, first of all, it must be considered, that, as in the state of
nature the man who is led by reason is most powerful and most
independent, so too that commonwealth will be most powerful and most
independent, which is founded and guided by reason. For the right of the
commonwealth is determined by the power of the multitude, which is led,
as it were, by one mind. But this unity of mind can in no wise be
conceived, unless the commonwealth pursues chiefly the very end, which
sound reason teaches is to the interest of all men.

8. In the second place it comes to be considered, that subjects are so
far dependent not on themselves, but on the commonwealth, as they fear
its power or threats, or as they love the civil state (Chap. II. Sect.
10). Whence it follows, that such things, as no one can be induced to do
by rewards or threats, do not fall within the rights of the
commonwealth. For instance, by reason of his faculty of judgment, it is
in no man's power to believe. For by what rewards or threats can a man
be brought to believe, that the whole is not greater than its part, or
that God does not exist, or that that is an infinite being, which he
sees to be finite, or generally anything contrary to his sense or
thought? So, too, by what rewards or threats can a man be brought to
love one, whom he hates, or to hate one, whom he loves? And to this head
must likewise be referred such things as are so abhorrent to human
nature, that it regards them as actually worse than any evil, as that a
man should be witness against himself, or torture himself, or kill his
parents, or not strive to avoid death, and the like, to which no one can
be induced by rewards or threats. But if we still choose to say, that
the commonwealth has the right or authority to order such things, we can
conceive of it in no other sense, than that in which one might say, that
a man has the right to be mad or delirious. For what but a delirious
fancy would such a right be, as could bind no one? And here I am
speaking expressly of such things as cannot be subject to the right of a
commonwealth and are abhorrent to human nature in general. For the fact,
that a fool or madman can by no rewards or threats be induced to execute
orders, or that this or that person, because he is attached to this or
that religion, judges the laws of a dominion worse than any possible
evil, in no wise makes void the laws of the commonwealth, since by them
most of the citizens are restrained. And so, as those who are without
fear or hope are so far independent (Chap. II. Sec. 10), they are,
therefore, enemies of the dominion (Chap. II. Sec. 14), and may lawfully
be coerced by force.

9. Thirdly and lastly, it comes to be considered, that those things are
not so much within the commonwealth's right, which cause indignation in
the majority. For it is certain, that by the guidance of nature men
conspire together, either through common fear, or with the desire to
avenge some common hurt; and as the right of the commonwealth is
determined by the common power of the multitude, it is certain that the
power and right of the commonwealth are so far diminished, as it gives
occasion for many to conspire together. There are certainly some
subjects of fear for a commonwealth, and as every separate citizen or in
the state of nature every man, so a commonwealth is the less
independent, the greater reason it has to fear. So much for the right of
supreme authorities over subjects. Now before I treat of the right of
the said authorities as against others, we had better resolve a question
commonly mooted about religion.

10. For it may be objected to us, Do not the civil state, and the
obedience of subjects, such as we have shown is required in the civil
state, do away with religion, whereby we are bound to worship God? But
if we consider the matter, as it really is, we shall find nothing that
can suggest a scruple. For the mind, so far as it makes use of reason,
is dependent, not on the supreme authorities, but on itself (Chap. II.
Sec. 11). And so the true knowledge and the love of God cannot be
subject to the dominion of any, nor yet can charity towards one's
neighbour (Sec. 8). And if we further reflect, that the highest exercise
of charity is that which aims at keeping peace and joining in unity, we
shall not doubt that he does his duty, who helps everyone, so far as the
commonwealth's laws, that is so far as unity and quiet allow. As for
external rites, it is certain, that they can do no good or harm at all
in respect of the true knowledge of God, and the love which necessarily
results from it; and so they ought not to be held of such importance,
that it should be thought worth while on their account to disturb public
peace and quiet. Moreover it is certain, that I am not a champion of
religion by the law of nature, that is (Chap. II. Sec. 3), by the divine
decree. For I have no authority, as once the disciples of Christ had, to
cast out unclean spirits and work miracles; which authority is yet so
necessary to the propagating of religion in places where it is
forbidden, that without it one not only, as they say, wastes one's time
[1] and trouble, but causes besides very many inconveniences, whereof
all ages have seen most mournful examples. Everyone therefore, wherever
he may be, can worship God with true religion, and mind his own
business, which is the duty of a private man. But the care of
propagating religion should be left to God, or the supreme authorities,
upon whom alone falls the charge of affairs of state. But I return to my
subject.

11. After explaining the right of supreme authorities over citizens and
the duty of subjects, it remains to consider the right of such
authorities against the world at large, which is now easily intelligible
from what has been said. For since (Sec. 2) the right of the supreme
authorities is nothing else but simple natural right, it follows that