two dominions stand towards each other in the same relation as do two
men in the state of nature, with this exception, that a commonwealth can
provide against being oppressed by another; which a man in the state of
nature cannot do, seeing that he is overcome daily by sleep, often by
disease or mental infirmity, and in the end by old age, and is besides
liable to other inconveniences, from which a commonwealth can secure
itself.

12. A commonwealth then is so far independent, as it can plan and
provide against oppression by another (Chap. II. Secs. 9, 15), and so
far dependent on another commonwealth, as it fears that other's power,
or is hindered by it from executing its own wishes, or lastly, as it
needs its help for its own preservation or increase (Chap. II. Secs. 10,
15). For we cannot at all doubt, that if two commonwealths are willing
to offer each other mutual help, both together are more powerful, and
therefore have more right, than either alone (Chap. II. Sec. 13).

13. But this will be more clearly intelligible, if we reflect, that two
commonwealths are naturally enemies. For men in the state of nature are
enemies (Chap. II. Sec. 14). Those, then, who stand outside a
commonwealth, and retain their natural rights, continue enemies.
Accordingly, if one commonwealth wishes to make war on another and
employ extreme measures to make that other dependent on itself, it may
lawfully make the attempt, since it needs but the bare will of the
commonwealth for war to be waged. But concerning peace it can decide
nothing, save with the concurrence of another commonwealth's will.
Whence it follows, that laws of war regard every commonwealth by itself,
but laws of peace regard not one, but at the least two commonwealths,
which are therefore called "contracting powers."

14. This "contract" remains so long unmoved as the motive for entering
into it, that is, fear of hurt or hope of gain, subsists. But take away
from either commonwealth this hope or fear, and it is left independent
(Chap. II. Sec. 10), and the link, whereby the commonwealths were
mutually bound, breaks of itself. And therefore every commonwealth has
the right to break its contract, whenever it chooses, and cannot be said
to act treacherously or perfidiously in breaking its word, as soon as
the motive of hope or fear is removed. For every contracting party was
on equal terms in this respect, that whichever could first free itself
of fear should be independent, and make use of its independence after
its own mind; and, besides, no one makes a contract respecting the
future, but on the hypothesis of certain precedent circumstances. But
when these circumstances change, the reason of policy applicable to the
whole position changes with them; and therefore every one of the
contracting commonwealths retains the right of consulting its own
interest, and consequently endeavours, as far as possible, to be free
from fear and thereby independent, and to prevent another from coming
out of the contract with greater power. If then a commonwealth complains
that it has been deceived, it cannot properly blame the bad faith of
another contracting commonwealth, but only its own folly in having
entrusted its own welfare to another party, that was independent, and
had for its highest law the welfare of its own dominion.

15. To commonwealths, which have contracted a treaty of peace, it
belongs to decide the questions, which may be mooted about the terms or
rules of peace, whereby they have mutually bound themselves, inasmuch as
laws of peace regard not one commonwealth, but the commonwealths which
contract taken together (Sec. 18). But if they cannot agree together
about the conditions, they by that very fact return to a state of war.

16. The more commonwealths there are, that have contracted a joint
treaty of peace, the less each of them by itself is an object of fear to
the remainder, or the less it has the authority to make war. But it is
so much the more bound to observe the conditions of peace; that is (Sec.
13), the less independent, and the more bound to accommodate itself to
the general will of the contracting parties.

17. But the good faith, inculcated by sound reason and religion, is not
hereby made void; for neither reason nor Scripture teaches one to keep
one's word in every case. For if I have promised a man, for instance, to
keep safe a sum of money he has secretly deposited with me, I am not
bound to keep my word, from the time that I know or believe the deposit
to have been stolen, but I shall act more rightly in endeavouring to
restore it to its owners. So likewise, if the supreme authority has
promised another to do something, which subsequently occasion or reason
shows or seems to show is contrary to the welfare of its subjects, it is
surely bound to break its word. As then Scripture only teaches us to
keep our word in general, and leaves to every individual's judgment the
special cases of exception, it teaches nothing repugnant to what we have
just proved.

18. But that I may not have so often to break the thread of my
discourse, and to resolve hereafter similar objections, I would have it
known that all this demonstration of mine proceeds from the necessity of
human nature, considered in what light you will -- I mean, from the
universal effort of all men after self-preservation, an effort inherent
in all men, whether learned or unlearned. And therefore, however one
considers men are led, whether by passion or by reason, it will be the
same thing; for the demonstration, as we have said, is of universal
application.

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1. Literally, "oil and trouble " -- a common proverbial expression in
Latin.

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CHAPTER IV.