are less fitted for abstract reasoning, whereas those who excel in
intellect and its use keep their imagination more restrained and
controlled, holding it in subjection, so to speak, lest it should
usurp the place of reason.

[2:1] (6) Thus to suppose that knowledge of natural and spiritual
phenomena can be gained from the prophetic books, is an utter
mistake, which I shall endeavour to expose, as I think philosophy,
the age, and the question itself demand.  (7) I care not for the
girdings of superstition, for superstition is the bitter enemy
of all true knowledge and true morality.  (8) Yes; it has come to
this!  (9) Men who openly confess that they can form no idea of God,
and only know Him through created things, of which they know not
the causes, can unblushingly accuse philosophers of Atheism.
(2:10) Treating the question methodically, I will show that
prophecies varied, not only according to the imagination and
physical temperament of the prophet, but also according to his
particular opinions; and further that prophecy never rendered the
prophet wiser than he was before.  (11) But I will first discuss
the assurance of truth which the prophets received, for this is
akin to the subject-matter of the chapter, and will serve to
elucidate somewhat our present point.

(2:12) Imagination does not, in its own nature, involve any
certainty of truth, such as is implied in every clear and distinct
idea, but requires some extrinsic reason to assure us of its
objective reality: hence prophecy cannot afford certainty, and the
prophets were assured of God's revelation by some sign, and not by
the fact of revelation, as we may see from Abraham, who, when he
had heard the promise of God, demanded a sign, not because he did
not believe in God, but because he wished to be sure that it was God
Who made the promise.  (13) The fact is still more evident in the
case of Gideon: "Show me," he says to God, "show me a sign, that I
may know that it is Thou that talkest with me."  (14) God also says
to Moses: "And let this be a sign that I have sent thee."
(2:15) Hezekiah, though he had long known Isaiah to be a prophet,
none the less demanded a sign of the cure which he predicted.
(15a) It is thus quite evident that the prophets always received
some sign to certify them of their prophetic imaginings; and for
this reason Moses bids the Jews (Deut. xviii.) ask of the prophets
a sign, namely, the prediction of some coming event.  (16) In this
respect, prophetic knowledge is inferior to natural knowledge,
which needs no sign, and in itself implies certitude.
(2:17) Moreover, Scripture warrants the statement that the
certitude of the prophets was not mathematical, but moral.
(18) Moses lays down the punishment of death for the prophet
who preaches new gods, even though he confirm his doctrine by
signs and wonders (Deut. xiii.); "For," he says, "the Lord
also worketh signs and wonders to try His people."  (19) And
Jesus Christ warns His disciples of the same thing
(Matt. xxiv:24).  (20) Furthermore, Ezekiel (xiv:9) plainly
states that God sometimes deceives men with false revelations;
and Micaiah bears like witness in the case of the prophets of Ahab.

(2:21) Although these instances go to prove that revelation is
open to doubt, it nevertheless contains, as we have said, a
considerable element of certainty, for God never deceives the
good, nor His chosen, but (according to the ancient proverb,
and as appears in the history of Abigail and her speech), God
uses the good as instruments of goodness, and the wicked as
means to execute His wrath. (22) This may be seen from the case
of Micaiah above quoted; for although God had determined to
deceive Ahab, through prophets, He made use of lying prophets;
to the good prophet He revealed the truth, and did not forbid his
proclaiming it.

(2:23) Still the certitude of prophecy remains, as I have said,
merely moral; for no one can justify himself before God, nor
boast that he is an instrument for God's goodness.  (24) Scripture
itself teaches and shows that God led away David to number the
people, though it bears ample witness to David's piety.

[2:2] (25) The whole question of the certitude of prophecy was
based on these three considerations:
   1. That the things revealed were imagined very
      vividly, affecting the prophets in the same
      way as things seen when awake;
   2. The presence of a sign;
   3. Lastly and chiefly, that the mind of the
      prophet was given wholly to what was right
      and  good.

(2:26) Although Scripture does not always make mention of a sign,
we must nevertheless suppose that a sign was always vouchsafed;
for Scripture does not always relate every condition and
circumstance (as many have remarked), but rather takes them for
granted.  (27) We may, however, admit that no sign was needed when
the prophecy declared nothing that was not already contained in
the law of Moses, because it was confirmed by that law.  (28) For
instance, Jeremiah's prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem was
confirmed by the prophecies of other prophets, and by the threats
in the law, and, therefore, it needed no sign; whereas Hananiah,
who, contrary to all the prophets, foretold the speedy restoration
of the state, stood in need of a sign, or he would have been in
doubt as to the truth of his prophecy, until it was confirmed by
facts.  (29) "The prophet which prophesieth of peace, when the word
of the prophet shall come to pass, then shall the prophet be known
that the Lord hath truly sent him."

(2:30) As, then, the certitude afforded to the prophet by signs