cannot be taken from them without great danger to the state.

(P:50) From these considerations I pass on to the Hebrew State,
which I describe at some length, in order to trace the manner
in which Religion acquired the force of law, and to touch on
other noteworthy points.  (51) I then prove, that the holders
of sovereign power are the depositories and interpreters of
religious no less than of civil ordinances, and that they alone
have the right to decide what is just or unjust, pious or impious;
lastly, I conclude by showing, that they best retain this right
and secure safety to their state by allowing every man to think 
what he likes, and say what he thinks. 

[P:4] (52) Such, Philosophical Reader, are the questions I submit
to your notice, counting on your approval, for the subject matter
of the whole book and of the several chapters is important and
profitable.  (53) I would say more, but I do not want my preface
to extend to a volume, especially as I know that its leading
propositions are to Philosophers but commonplaces.  (54) To the
rest of mankind I care not to commend my treatise, for I cannot
expect that it contains anything to please them: I know how deeply
rooted are the prejudices embraced under the name of religion;
I am aware that in the mind of the masses superstition is no less
deeply rooted than fear; I recognize that their constancy is mere
obstinacy, and that they are led to praise or blame by impulse
rather than reason.  (P:55) Therefore the multitude, and those of
like passions with the multitude, I ask not to read my book; nay,
I would rather that they should utterly neglect it, than that they
should misinterpret it after their wont.  (56) They would gain no
good themselves, and might prove a stumbling-block to others, whose 
philosophy is hampered by the belief that Reason is a mere handmaid
to Theology, and whom I seek in this work especially to benefit.
(P:57) But as there will be many who have neither the leisure, nor,
perhaps, the inclination to read through all I have written, I feel
bound here, as at the end of my treatise, to declare that I have
written nothing, which I do not most willingly submit to the
examination and judgment of my country's rulers, and that I am ready
to retract anything, which they shall decide to be repugnant to the
laws or prejudicial to the public good.  (58) I know that I am a man
and, as a man, liable to error, but against error I have taken
scrupulous care, and striven to keep in entire accordance with the
laws of my country, with loyalty, and with morality.

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[1:0] CHAPTER I. - Of Prophecy

[1:1] (1) Prophecy, or revelation is sure knowledge revealed by
God to man. (2) A prophet is one who interprets the revelations
of God to those who are unable to attain to sure knowledge of
the matters revealed, and therefore can only apprehend them by
simple faith.

(1:3) The Hebrew word for prophet is "naw-vee'", Strong:5030,
[Endnote 1] i.e. speaker or interpreter, but in Scripture its
meaning is restricted to interpreter of God, as we may learn
from Exodus vii:1, where God says to Moses, "See, I have made
thee a god to Pharaoh, and Aaron thy brother shall be thy
prophet;" implying that, since in interpreting Moses' words to
Pharaoh, Aaron acted the part of a prophet, Moses would be to
Pharaoh as a god, or in the attitude of a god.

(1:4) Prophets I will treat of in the next chapter, and at
present consider prophecy.

(1:5) Now it is evident, from the definition above given, that
prophecy really includes ordinary knowledge; for the knowledge
which we acquire by our natural faculties depends on knowledge
of God and His eternal laws; but ordinary knowledge is common
to all men as men, and rests on foundations which all share,
whereas the multitude always strains after rarities and
exceptions, and thinks little of the gifts of nature; so that,
when prophecy is talked of, ordinary knowledge is not supposed
to be included.  (1:6) Nevertheless it has as much right as any
other to be called Divine, for God's nature, in so far as we
share therein, and God's laws, dictate it to us; nor does it
suffer from that to which we give the preeminence, except in so
far as the latter transcends its limits and cannot be accounted
for by natural laws taken in themselves.  (7) In respect to the
certainty it involves, and the source from which it is derived,
i.e. God, ordinary knowledge is no whit inferior to prophetic,
unless indeed we believe, or rather dream, that the prophets had
human bodies but superhuman minds, and therefore that their
sensations and consciousness were entirely different from our own.

(1:8) But, although ordinary knowledge is Divine, its professors
cannot be called prophets [Endnote 2] , for they teach what the
rest of mankind could perceive and apprehend, not merely by
simple faith, but as surely and honourably as themselves.

(1:9) Seeing then that our mind subjectively contains in itself
and partakes of the nature of God, and solely from this cause is
enabled to form notions explaining natural phenomena and
inculcating morality, it follows that we may rightly assert the
nature of the human mind (in so far as it is thus conceived) to
be a primary cause of Divine revelation.  (1:10) All that we
clearly and distinctly understand is dictated to us, as I have
just pointed out, by the idea and nature of God; not indeed
through words, but in a way far more excellent and agreeing
perfectly with the nature of the mind, as all who have enjoyed