somewhere heard of a distinction between absolute and sensible
extension. Now, though it be acknowledged that  and
, consisting merely in the relation which other extended
beings have to the parts of our own bodies, do not really inhere
in the substances themselves; yet nothing obliges us to hold the
same with regard to <absolute extension>, which is something
abstracted from  and , from this or that particular
magnitude or figure. So likewise as to motion;  and 
are altogether relative to the succession of ideas in our own
minds. But, it doth not follow, because those modifications of
motion exist not without the mind, that therefore absolute motion
abstracted from them doth not.

     . Pray what is it that distinguishes one motion, or
one part of extension, from another? Is it not something
sensible, as some degree of swiftness or slowness, some certain
magnitude or figure peculiar to each?

     . I think so.

     . These qualities, therefore, stripped of all sensible
properties, are without all specific and numerical differences,
as the schools call them.

     . They are.

     . That is to say, they are extension in general, and
motion in general.

     . Let it be so.

     . But it is a universally received maxim that
<Everything which exists is particular>. How then can motion in
general, or extension in general, exist in any corporeal
substance? {193}

     . I will take time to solve your difficulty.

     . But I think the point may be speedily decided.
Without doubt you can tell whether you are able to frame this or
that idea. Now I am content to put our dispute on this issue. If
you can frame in your thoughts a distinct <abstract idea> of
motion or extension, divested of all those sensible modes, as
swift and slow, great and small, round and square, and the like,
which are acknowledged to exist only in the mind, I will then
yield the point you contend for. But if you cannot, it will be
unreasonable on your side to insist any longer upon what you have
no notion of.

     . To confess ingenuously, I cannot.

     . Can you even separate the ideas of extension and
motion from the ideas of all those qualities which they who make
the distinction term ?

     . What! is it not an easy matter to consider extension
and motion by themselves, abstracted from all other sensible
qualities? Pray how do the mathematicians treat of them?

     . I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form
general propositions and reasonings about those qualities,
without mentioning any other; and, in this sense, to consider or
treat of them abstractedly. But, how doth it follow that, because
I can pronounce the word  by itself, I can form the idea
of it in my mind exclusive of body? or, because theorems may be
made of extension and figures, without any mention of  or
, or any other sensible mode or quality, that therefore it
is possible such an abstract idea of extension, without any
particular size or figure, or sensible quality,[3 ] [should be
distinctly formed, and apprehended by the mind? Mathematicians
treat of quantity, without regarding what other sensible.
qualities it is attended with, as being altogether indifferent to
their demonstrations. But, when laying aside the words, they
contemplate the bare ideas, I believe you will find, they are not
the pure abstracted ideas of extension.

     . But what say you to <pure intellect>? May not
abstracted ideas be framed by that faculty?

     . Since I cannot frame abstract ideas at all, it is
plain I cannot frame them by the help of <pure intellect>; {194}
whatsoever faculty you understand by those words. Besides, not to
inquire into the nature of pure intellect and its spiritual
objects, as , , , or the like, thus much
seems manifest -- that sensible things are only to be perceived
by sense, or represented by the imagination. Figures, therefore,
and extension, being originally perceived by sense, do not belong
to pure intellect: but, for your farther satisfaction, try if you
can frame the idea of any figure, abstracted from all
particularities of size, or even from other sensible qualities.

     . Let me think a little -- I do not find that I can.

     . And can you think it possible that should really
exist in nature which implies a repugnancy in its conception?

     . By no means.

     . Since therefore it is impossible even for the mind
to disunite the ideas of extension and motion from all other