sensible qualities, doth it not follow, that where the one exist
there necessarily the other exist likewise?

     . It should seem so.

     . Consequently, the very same arguments which you
admitted as conclusive against the Secondary Qualities are,
without any farther application of force, against the Primary
too. Besides, if you will trust your senses, is it not plain all
sensible qualities coexist, or to them appear as being in the
same place? Do they ever represent a motion, or figure, as being
divested of all other visible and tangible qualities?

     . You need say no more on this head. I am free to own,
if there be no secret error or oversight in our proceedings
hitherto, that all sensible qualities are alike to be denied
existence without the mind. But, my fear is that I have been too
liberal in my former concessions, or overlooked some fallacy or
other. In short, I did not take time to think.

     . For that matter, Hylas, you may take what time you
please in reviewing the progress of our inquiry. You are at
liberty to recover any slips you might have made, or offer
whatever you have omitted which makes for your first opinion.

     . One great oversight I take to be this -- that I did
not sufficiently distinguish the  from the .
Now, though this latter may not exist without the mind, yet it
will not thence follow that the former cannot.

     . What object do you mean? the object of the senses?

     . The same.

     . It is then immediately perceived? {195}

     . Right.

     . Make me to understand the difference between what is
immediately perceived and a sensation.

     . The sensation I take to be an act of the mind
perceiving; besides which, there is something perceived; and this
I call the . For example, there is red and yellow on that
tulip. But then the act of perceiving those colours is in me
only, and not in the tulip.

     . What tulip do you speak of? Is it that which you
see?

     . The same.

     . And what do you see beside colour, figure, and
extension?

     . Nothing.

     . What you would say then is that the red and yellow
are coexistent with the extension; is it not?

     . That is not all; I would say they have a real
existence without the mind, in some unthinking substance.

     . That the colours are really in the tulip which I see
is manifest. Neither can it be denied that this tulip may exist
independent of your mind or mine; but, that any immediate object
of the senses, -- that is, any idea, or combination of ideas --
should exist in an unthinking substance, or exterior to 
minds, is in itself an evident contradiction. Nor can I imagine
how this follows from what you said just now, to wit, that the
red and yellow were on the tulip , since you do not
pretend to  that unthinking substance.

     . You have an artful way, Philonous, of diverting our
inquiry from the subject.

     . I see you have no mind to be pressed that way. To
return then to your distinction between  and ;
if I take you right, you distinguish in every perception two
things, the one an action of the mind, the other not.

     . True.

     . And this action cannot exist in, or belong to, any
unthinking thing; but, whatever beside is implied in a perception
may? {196}

     . That is my meaning.

     . So that if there was a perception without any act of
the mind, it were possible such a perception should exist in an
unthinking substance?

     . I grant it. But it is impossible there should be such
a perception.

     . When is the mind said to be active?

     . When it produces, puts an end to, or changes,
anything.