. Can the mind produce, discontinue, or change
anything, but by an act of the will?

     . It cannot.

     . The mind therefore is to be accounted  in
its perceptions so far forth as  is included in them?

     . It is.

     . In plucking this flower I am active; because I do it
by the motion of my hand, which was consequent upon my volition;
so likewise in applying it to my nose. But is either of these
smelling?

     . .

     . I act too in drawing the air through my nose;
because my breathing so rather than otherwise is the effect of my
volition. But neither can this be called : for, if it
were, I should smell every time I breathed in that manner?

     . True.

     . Smelling then is somewhat consequent to all this?

     . It is.

     . But I do not find my will concerned any farther.
Whatever more there is -- as that I perceive such a particular
smell, or any smell at all -- this is independent of my will, and
therein I am altogether passive. Do you find it otherwise with
you, Hylas?

     . No, the very same.

     . Then, as to seeing, is it not in your power to open
your eyes, or keep them shut; to turn them this or that way?

     . Without doubt.

     . But, doth it in like manner depend on  will
that in looking on this flower you perceive  rather than
any other colour? Or, directing your open eyes towards yonder
part of the heaven, can you avoid seeing the sun? Or is light or
darkness the effect of your volition?

     . No, certainly.

     . You are then in these respects altogether passive?
{197}
     . I am.

     . Tell me now, whether  consists in perceiving
light and colours, or in opening and turning the eyes?

     . Without doubt, in the former.

     . Since therefore you are in the very perception of
light and colours altogether passive, what is become of that
action you were speaking of as an ingredient in every sensation?
And, doth it not follow from your own concessions, that the
perception of light and colours, including no action in it, may
exist in an unperceiving substance? And is not this a plain
contradiction?

     . I know not what to think of it.

     . Besides, since you distinguish the  and
 in every perception, you must do it in that of pain.
But how is it possible that pain, be it as little active as you
please, should exist in an unperceiving substance? In short, do
but consider the point, and then confess ingenuously, whether
light and colours, tastes, sounds, &c. are not all equally
passions or sensations in the soul. You may indeed call them
<external objects>, and give them in words what subsistence you
please. But, examine your own thoughts, and then tell me whether
it be not as I say?

     . I acknowledge, Philonous, that, upon a fair
observation of what passes in my mind, I can discover nothing
else but that I am a thinking being, affected with variety of
sensations; neither is it possible to conceive how a sensation
should exist in an unperceiving substance. But then, on the other
hand, when I look on sensible things in a different view,
considering them as so many modes and qualities, I find it
necessary to suppose a <material substratum>, without which they
cannot be conceived to exist.

     . <Material substratum> call you it? Pray, by which of
your senses came you acquainted with that being?

     . It is not itself sensible; its modes and qualities
only being perceived by the senses.

     . I presume then it was by reflexion and reason you
obtained

     the idea of it?