. It seems then you have no idea at all, neither
relative nor positive, of Matter; you know neither what it is in
itself, nor what relation it bears to accidents?

     . I acknowledge it.

     . And yet you asserted that you could not conceive how
qualities or accidents should really exist, without conceiving at
the same time a material support of them?

     . I did.

     . That is to say, when you conceive the real existence
of qualities, you do withal conceive Something which you cannot
conceive?

     . It was wrong, I own. But still I fear there is some
fallacy or other. Pray what think you of this? It is just come
into my head that the ground of all our mistake lies in your
treating of each quality by itself. Now, I grant that each
quality cannot singly subsist without the mind. Colour cannot
without extension, neither can figure without some other sensible
quality. But, as the several qualities united or blended together
form entire sensible things, nothing hinders why such things may
not be supposed to exist without the mind.

     . Either, Hylas, you are jesting, or have a very bad
memory. Though indeed we went through all the qualities by name
one after another, yet my arguments or rather your concessions,
nowhere tended to prove that the Secondary Qualities did not
subsist each alone by itself; but, that they were not {200}  without the mind. Indeed, in treating of figure and motion
we concluded they could not exist without the mind, because it
was impossible even in thought to separate them from all
secondary qualities, so as to conceive them existing by
themselves. But then this was not the only argument made use of
upon that occasion. But (to pass by all that hath been hitherto
said, and reckon it for nothing, if you will have it so) I am
content to put the whole upon this issue. If you can conceive it
possible for any mixture or combination of qualities, or any
sensible object whatever, to exist without the mind, then I will
grant it actually to be so.

     . If it comes to that the point will soon be decided.
What more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing by
itself, independent of, and unperceived by, any mind whatsoever?
I do at this present time conceive them existing after that
manner.

     . How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at
the same time unseen?

     . No, that were a contradiction.

     . Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of
 a thing which is <unconceived>?

     . It is.

     . The, tree or house therefore which you think of is
conceived by you?

     . How should it be otherwise?

     . And what is conceived is surely in the mind?

     . Without question, that which is conceived is in the
mind.

     . How then came you to say, you conceived a house or
tree existing independent and out of all minds whatsoever?

     . That was I own an oversight; but stay, let me
consider what led me into it. -- It is a pleasant mistake enough.
As I was thinking of a tree in a solitary place, where no one was
present to see it, methought that was to conceive a tree as
existing unperceived or unthought of; not considering that I
myself conceived it all the while. But now I plainly see that all
I can do is to frame ideas in my own mind. I may indeed conceive
in my own thoughts the idea of a tree, or a house, or a mountain,
but that is all. And this is far from proving that I can conceive
them <existing out of the minds of all Spirits>.

     . You acknowledge then that you cannot possibly
conceive how any one corporeal sensible thing should exist
otherwise than in the mind? {201}

     . I do.

     . And yet you will earnestly contend for the truth of
that which you cannot so much as conceive?

     . I profess I know not what to think; but still there
are some scruples remain with me. Is it not certain I <see things
at> a distance? Do we not perceive the stars and moon, for
example, to be a great way off? Is not this, I say, manifest to
the senses?

     . Do you not in a dream too perceive those or the like
objects?