. I do.

     . And have they not then the same appearance of being
distant?

     . They have.

     . But you do not thence conclude the apparitions in a
dream to be without the mind?

     . By no means.

     . You ought not therefore to conclude that sensible
objects are without the mind, from their appearance, or manner
wherein they are perceived.

     . I acknowledge it. But doth not my sense deceive me in
those cases?

     . By no means. The idea or thing which you immediately
perceive, neither sense nor reason informs you that it actually
exists without the mind. By sense you only know that you are
affected with such certain sensations of light and colours, &c.
And these you will not say are without the mind.

     . True: but, beside all that, do you not think the
sight suggests something of <outness or distance>?

     . Upon approaching a distant object, do the visible
size and figure change perpetually, or do they appear the same at
all distances?

     . They are in a continual change.

     . Sight therefore doth not suggest, or any way inform
you, that the visible object you immediately perceive exists at a
distance, or will be perceived when you advance farther onward;
there being a continued series of visible objects succeeding each
other during the whole time of your approach.

     . It doth not; but still I know, upon seeing an object,
what object I shall perceive after having passed over a certain
distance: {202} no matter whether it be exactly the same or no:
there is still something of distance suggested in the case.

     . Good Hylas, do but reflect a little on the point,
and then tell me whether there be any more in it than this: from
the ideas you actually perceive by sight, you have by experience
learned to collect what other ideas you will (according to the
standing order of nature) be affected with, after such a certain
succession of time and motion.

     . Upon the whole, I take it to be nothing else.

     . Now, is it not plain that if we suppose a man born
blind was on a sudden made to see, he could at first have no
experience of what may be  by sight?

     . It is.

     . He would not then, according to you, have any notion
of distance annexed to the things he saw; but would take them for
a new set of sensations, existing only in his mind?

     . It is undeniable.

     . But, to make it still more plain: is not 
a line turned endwise to the eye?

     . It is.

     . And can a line so situated be perceived by sight?

     . It cannot.

     . Doth it not therefore follow that distance is not
properly and immediately perceived by sight?

     . It should seem so.

     . Again, is it your opinion that colours are at a
distance?

     . It must be acknowledged they are only in the mind.

     . But do not colours appear to the eye as coexisting
in the same place with extension and figures?

     . They do.

     . How can you then conclude from sight that figures
exist without, when you acknowledge colours do not; the sensible
appearance being the very same with regard to both?

     . I know not what to answer.

     . But, allowing that distance was truly and
immediately perceived by the mind, yet it would not thence follow
it existed out of the mind. For, whatever is immediately