heard of you.

     . Pray, what were those?

     . You were represented, in last night's conversation,
as one who maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever
entered into the mind of man, to wit, that there is no such thing
as <material substance> in the world.

     . That there is no such thing as what <philosophers
call material substance>, I am seriously persuaded: but, if I
were made to see anything absurd or sceptical in this, I should
then have the same reason to renounce this that I imagine I have
now to reject the contrary opinion.

     . What I can anything be more fantastical, more
repugnant to Common Sense, or a more manifest piece of
Scepticism, than to believe there is no such thing as ?

     . Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove that
you, who hold there is, are, by virtue of that opinion, a greater
sceptic, and maintain more paradoxes and repugnances to Common
Sense, than I who believe no such thing?

     . You may as soon persuade me, the part is greater than
the whole, as that, in order to avoid absurdity and Scepticism, I
should ever be obliged to give up my opinion in this point.

     . Well then, are you content to admit that opinion for
true, which upon examination shall appear most agreeable to
Common Sense, and remote from Scepticism?

     . With all my heart. Since you are for raising disputes
{173} about the plainest things in nature, I am content for once
to hear what you have to say.

     . Pray, Hylas, what do you mean by a ?

     . I mean what all men mean -- one that doubts of
everything.

     . He then who entertains no doubts concerning some
particular point, with regard to that point cannot be thought a
sceptic.

     . I agree with you.

     . Whether doth doubting consist in embracing the
affirmative or negative side of a question?

     . In neither; for whoever understands English cannot
but know that  signifies a suspense between both.

     . He then that denies any point, can no more be said
to doubt of it, than he who affirmeth it with the same degree of
assurance.

     . True.

     . And, consequently, for such his denial is no more to
be esteemed a sceptic than the other.

     . I acknowledge it.

     . How cometh it to pass then, Hylas, that you
pronounce me , because I deny what you affirm, to wit,
the existence of Matter? Since, for aught you can tell, I am as
peremptory in my denial, as you in your affirmation.

     . Hold, Philonous, I have been a little out in my
definition; but every false step a man makes in discourse is not
to be insisted on. I said indeed that a  was one who
doubted of everything; but I should have added, or who denies the
reality and truth of things.

     . What things? Do you mean the principles and theorems
of sciences? But these you know are universal intellectual
notions, and consequently independent of Matter. The denial
therefore of this doth not imply the denying them.

     . I grant it. But are there no other things? What think
you of distrusting the senses, of denying the real existence of
sensible things, or pretending to know nothing of them. Is not
this sufficient to denominate a man a ?

     . Shall we therefore examine which of us it is that
denies the reality of sensible things, or professes the greatest
ignorance of them; since, if I take you rightly, he is to be
{174} esteemed the greatest ?

     . That is what I desire.

     . What mean you by Sensible Things?

     . Those things which are perceived by the senses. Can
you imagine that I mean anything else?

     . Pardon me, Hylas, if I am desirous clearly to
apprehend your notions, since this may much shorten our inquiry.
Suffer me then to ask you this farther question. Are those things