. What! the greatest as well as the least?

     .  tell you, the reason is plainly the same in
respect of both. They are both perceived by sense; nay, the
greater degree of heat is more sensibly perceived; and
consequently, if there is {176} any difference, we are more
certain of its real existence than we can be of the reality of a
lesser degree.

     . But is not the most vehement and intense degree of
heat a very great pain?

     . No one can deny it.

     . And is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or
pleasure?

     . No, certainly.

     . Is your material substance a senseless being, or a
being endowed with sense and perception?

     . It is senseless without doubt.

     . It cannot therefore be the subject of pain?

     . By no means.

     . Nor consequently of the greatest heat perceived by
sense, since you acknowledge this to be no small pain?

     . I grant it.

     . What shall we say then of your external object; is
it a material Substance, or no?

     . It is a material substance with the sensible
qualities inhering in it.

     . How then can a great heat exist in it, since you own
it cannot in a material substance? I desire you would clear this
point.

     . Hold, Philonous, I fear I was out in yielding intense
heat to be a pain. It should seem rather, that pain is something
distinct from heat, and the consequence or effect of it.

     . Upon putting your hand near the fire, do you
perceive one simple uniform sensation, or two distinct
sensations?

     . But one simple sensation.

     . Is not the heat immediately perceived?,

     . It is.

     . And the pain?

     . True.

     . Seeing therefore they are both immediately perceived
at the same time, and the fire affects you only with one simple
or uncompounded idea, it follows that this same simple idea is
both the intense heat immediately perceived, and the pain; and,
consequently, that the intense heat immediately perceived is
nothing distinct from a particular sort of pain.

     . It seems so.

     . Again, try in your thoughts, Hylas, if you can
conceive a vehement sensation to be without pain or pleasure.
{177}

     . I cannot.

     . Or can you frame to yourself an idea of sensible
pain or pleasure in general, abstracted from every particular
idea of heat, cold, tastes, smells? &c.

     . I do not find that I can.

     . Doth it not therefore follow, that sensible pain is
nothing distinct from those sensations or ideas, in an intense
degree?

     . It is undeniable; and, to speak the truth, I begin to
suspect a very great heat cannot exist but in a mind perceiving
it.

     . What! are you then in that sceptical state of
suspense, between affirming and denying?

     . I think I may be positive in the point. A very
violent and painful heat cannot exist without the mind.

     . It hath not therefore according to you, any 
being?