which is included no mention, or no thought, either of
, <instrument, occasion, or absolute existence. And,
upon inquiry, I doubt not it will be found that most plain honest
men, who believe the creation, never think of those things any
more than I. What metaphysical sense you may understand it in,
you only can tell.

     . But, Philonous, you do not seem to be aware that you
allow created things, in the beginning, only a relative, and
consequently hypothetical being: that is to say, upon supposition
there were  to perceive them; without which they have no
actuality of absolute existence, wherein creation might
terminate. Is it not, therefore, according to you, plainly
impossible the creation of any inanimate creatures should precede
that of man? And is not this directly contrary to the Mosaic
account?

     . In answer to that, I say, first, created beings
might begin to exist in the mind of other created intelligences,
beside men. You will not therefore be able to prove any
contradiction between Moses and my notions, unless you first shew
there was no other order of finite created spirits in being,
before man. I say farther, in case we conceive the creation, as
we should at this time, a parcel of plants or vegetables of all
sorts produced, by an invisible Power, in a desert where nobody
was present -- that this way of explaining or conceiving it is
consistent with my principles, since they deprive you of nothing,
either sensible or imaginable; that it exactly suits with the
common, natural, and undebauched notions of mankind; that it
manifests the dependence of all things on God; and consequently
hath all the good effect or influence, which it is possible that
important article of our faith should have in making men humble,
thankful, and resigned to their [great][11] Creator. I say,
moreover, that, in this naked {253} conception of things,
divested of words, there will not be found any notion of what you
call the <actuality of absolute existence>. You may indeed raise
a dust with those terms, and so lengthen our dispute to no
purpose. But I entreat you calmly to look into your own thoughts,
and then tell me if they are not a useless and unintelligible
jargon.

     . I own I have no very clear notion annexed to them.
But what say you to this? Do you not make the existence of
sensible things consist in their being in a mind? And were not
all things eternally in the mind of God? Did they not therefore
exist from all eternity, according to you? And how could that
which was eternal be created in time? Can anything be clearer or
better connected than this?

     . And are not you too of opinion, that God knew all
things from eternity?

     . I am.

     . Consequently they always had a being in the Divine
intellect.

     . This I acknowledge.

     . By your own confession, therefore, nothing is new,
or begins to be, in respect of the mind of God. So we are agreed
in that point.

     . What shall we make then of the creation?

     . May we not understand it to have been entirely in
respect of finite spirits; so that things, with regard to us, may
properly be said to begin their existence, or be created, when
God decreed they should become perceptible to intelligent
creatures, in that order and manner which He then established,
and we now call the laws of nature? You may call this a
, <or hypothetical existence> if you please. But, so
long as it supplies us with the most natural, obvious, and
literal sense of the Mosaic history of the creation; so long as
it answers all the religious ends of that great article; in a
word, so long as you can assign no other sense or meaning in its
stead; why should we reject this? Is it to comply with a
ridiculous sceptical humour of making everything nonsense and
unintelligible? I am sure you cannot say it is for the glory of
God. For, allowing it to be a thing possible and conceivable that
the corporeal world should have an absolute existence extrinsical
to the mind of God, as well as to the minds of all created
spirits; yet how could this set forth either the immensity or
omniscience of the Deity, or the necessary and immediate
dependence of all {254} things on Him? Nay, would it not rather
seem to derogate from those attributes?

     . Well, but as to this decree of God's, for making
things perceptible, what say you, Philonous? Is it not plain, God
did either execute that decree from all eternity, or at some
certain time began to will what He had not actually willed
before, but only designed to will? If the former, then there
could be no creation, or beginning of existence, in finite
things. If the latter, then we must acknowledge something new to
befall the Deity; which implies a sort of change: and all change
argues imperfection.

     . Pray consider what you are doing. Is it not evident
this objection concludes equally against a creation in any sense;
nay, against every other act of the Deity, discoverable by the