light of nature? None of which can  conceive, otherwise than
as performed in time, and having a beginning. God is a Being of
transcerident and unlimited perfections: His nature, therefore,
is incomprehensible to finite spirits. It is not, therefore, to
be expected, that any man, whether Materialist or Immaterialist,
should have exactly just notions of the Deity, His attributes,
and ways of operation. If then you would infer anything against
me, your difficulty must not be drawn from the inadequateness of
our conceptions of the Divine nature, which is unavoidable on any
scheme; but from the denial of Matter, of which there is not one
word, directly or indirectly, in what you have now objected.

     . I must acknowledge the difficulties you are concerned
to clear are such only as arise from the non-existence of Matter,
and are peculiar to that notion. So far you are in the right. But
I cannot by any means bring myself to think there is no such
peculiar repugnancy between the creation and your opinion; though
indeed where to fix it, I do not distinctly know.

     . What would you have? Do I not acknowledge a twofold
state of things -- the one ectypal or natural, the other
archetypal and eternal? The former was created in time; the
latter existed from everlasting in the mind of God. Is not this
agreeable to the common notions of divines? or, is any more than
this necessary in order to conceive the creation? But you suspect
some peculiar repugnancy, though you know not where it lies. To
take away all possibility of scruple in the case, do but consider
this one point. Either you are not able to conceive {255} the
Creation on any hypothesis whatsoever; and, if so, there is no
ground for dislike or complaint against any particular opinion on
that score: or you are able to conceive it; and, if so, why not
on my Principles, since thereby nothing conceivable is taken
away? You have all along been allowed the full scope of sense,
imagination, and reason. Whatever, therefore, you could before
apprehend, either immediately or mediately by your senses, or by
ratiocination from your senses; whatever you could perceive,
imagine, or understand, remains still with you. If, therefore,
the notion you have of the creation by other Principles be
intelligible, you have it still upon mine; if it be not
intelligible, I conceive it to be no notion at all; and so there
is no loss of it. And indeed it seems to me very plain that the
supposition of Matter, that is a thing perfectly unknown and
inconceivable, cannot serve to make us conceive anything. And, I
hope it need not be proved to you that if the existence of Matter
doth not make the creation conceivable, the creation's being
without it inconceivable can be no objection against its non-
existence.

     . I confess, Philonous, you have almost satisfied me in
this point of the creation.

     . I would fain know why you are not quite satisfied.
You tell me indeed of a repugnancy between the Mosaic history and
Immaterialism: but you know not where it lies. Is this
reasonable, Hylas? Can you expect I should solve a difficulty
without knowing what it is? But, to pass by all that, would not a
man think you were assured there is no repugnancy between the
received notions of Materialists and the inspired writings?

     . And so I am.

     . Ought the historical part of Scripture to be
understood in a plain obvious sense, or in a sense which is
metaphysical and out of the way?

     . In the plain sense, doubtless.

     . When Moses speaks of herbs, earth, water, &c. as
having been created by God; think you not the sensible things
commonly signified by those words are suggested to every
unphilosophical reader?

     . I cannot help thinking so.

     . And are not all ideas, or things perceived by sense,
to be denied a real existence by the doctrine of the Materialist?

     . This I have already acknowledged.

     . The creation, therefore, according to them, was not
{256} the creation of things sensible, which have only a relative
being, but of certain unknown natures, which have an absolute
being, wherein creation might terminate?

     . True.

     . Is it not therefore evident the assertors of Matter
destroy the plain obvious sense of Moses, with which their
notions are utterly inconsistent; and instead of it obtrude on us
I know not what; something equally unintelligible to themselves
and me?

     . I cannot contradict you.

     . Moses tells us of a creation. A creation of what? of
unknown quiddities, of occasions, or ? No, certainly;
but of things obvious to the senses. You must first reconcile
this with your notions, if you expect I should be reconciled to
them.