. I see you can assault me with my own weapons.

     . Then as to <absolute existence>; was there ever
known a more jejune notion than that? Something it is so
abstracted and unintelligible that you have frankly owned you
could not conceive it, much less explain anything by it. But
allowing Matter to exist, and the notion of absolute existence to
be clear as light; yet, was this ever known to make the creation
more credible? Nay, hath it not furnished the atheists and
infidels of all ages with the most plausible arguments against a
creation? That a corporeal substance, which hath an absolute
existence without the minds of spirits, should be produced out of
nothing, by the mere will of a Spirit, hath been looked upon as a
thing so contrary to all reason, so impossible and absurd! that
not only the most celebrated among the ancients, but even divers
modern and Christian philosophers have thought Matter co-eternal
with the Deity. Lay these things together, and then judge you
whether Materialism disposes men to believe the creation of
things.

     . I own, Philonous, I think it does not. This of the
 is the last objection I can think of; and I must needs
own it hath been sufficiently answered as well as the rest.
Nothing now remains to be overcome but a sort of unaccountable
backwardness that I find in myself towards your notions.

     . When a man is swayed, he knows not why, to one side
of' the question, can this, think you, be anything else but the
effect of prejudice, which never fails to attend old and rooted
{257} notions? And indeed in this respect I cannot deny the
belief of Matter to have very much the advantage over the
contrary opinion, with men of a learned, education.

     . I confess it seems to be as you say.

     . As a balance, therefore, to this weight of
prejudice, let us throw into the scale the great advantages that
arise from the belief of Immaterialism, both in regard to
religion and human learning. The being of a God, and
incorruptibility of the soul, those great articles of religion,
are they not proved with the clearest and most immediate
evidence? When I say the being of a God, I do not mean an obscure
general Cause of things, whereof we have no conception, but God,
in the strict and proper sense of the word. A Being whose
spirituality, omnipresence, providence, omniscience, infinite
power and goodness, are as conspicuous as the existence of
sensible things, of which (notwithstanding the fallacious
pretences and affected scruples of Sceptics) there is no more
reason to doubt than of our own being. -- Then, with relation to
human sciences. In Natural Philosophy, what intricacies, what
obscurities, what contradictions hath the belief of Matter led
men into! To say nothing of the numberless disputes about its
extent, continuity, homogeneity, gravity, divisibility, &c. -- do
they not pretend to explain all things by bodies operating on
bodies, according to the laws of motion? and yet, are they able
to comprehend how one body should move another? Nay, admitting
there was no difficulty in reconciling the notion of an inert
being with a cause, or in conceiving how an accident might pass
from one body to another; yet, by all their strained thoughts and
extravagant suppositions, have they been able to reach the
 production of any one animal or vegetable body? Can
they account, by the laws of motion, for sounds, tastes, smells,
or colours; or for the regular course of things? Have they
accounted, by physical principles, for the aptitude and
contrivance even of the most inconsiderable parts of the
universe? But, laying aside Matter and corporeal, causes, and
admitting only the efficiency of an All-perfect Mind, are not all
the effects of nature easy and intelligible? If the 
are nothing else but ; God is a , but Matter an
unintelligent, unperceiving being. If they demonstrate an
unlimited power in their cause; God is active and omnipotent, but
Matter an inert mass. If the order, regularity, and usefulness of
them can {258} never be sufficiently admired; God is infinitely
wise and provident, but Matter destitute of all contrivance and
design. These surely are great advantages in . Not to
mention that the apprehension of a distant Deity naturally
disposes men to a negligence in their moral actions; which they
would be more cautious of, in case they thought Him immediately
present, and acting on their minds, without the interposition of
Matter, or unthinking second causes. -- Then in <Metaphysics>:
what difficulties concerning entity in abstract, substantial
forms, hylarchic principles, plastic natures, substance and
accident, principle of individuation, possibility of Matter's
thinking, origin of ideas, the manner how two independent
substances so widely different as <Spirit and Matter>, should
mutually operate on each other? what difficulties, I say, and
endless disquisitions, concerning these and innumerable other the
like points, do we escape, by supposing only Spirits and ideas? -
- Even the <Mathematics> themselves, if we take away the absolute
existence of extended things, become much more clear and easy;
the most shocking paradoxes and intricate speculations in those
sciences depending on the. infinite divisibility of finite
extension; which depends on that supposition -- But what need is
there to insist on the particular sciences? Is not that
opposition to all science whatsoever, that frenzy of the ancient
and modern Sceptics, built on the same foundation? Or can you
produce so much as one argument against the reality of corporeal
things, or in behalf of that avowed utter ignorance of their
natures, which doth not suppose their reality to consist in an
external absolute existence? Upon this supposition, indeed, the